CA Pub. Decisions

Sukhsagar Pannu suffered a severe spinal injury, resulting in quadriplegia, when his Land Rover Discovery (Series 1) sport utility vehicle rolled over following a chain of collisions on the 118 Freeway near Simi Valley. Pannu sued Land Rover North America, Inc., Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC and Terry York Motor Cars, Ltd., doing business as Land Rover Encino (collectively Land Rover) alleging claims, among others, for strict liability based on defective design.
Following a bench trial, the court entered a judgment for $21,654,000 against Land Rover, finding stability and roof defects in the Discovery had caused Pannu's injury. On appeal Land Rover contends a new trial is warranted because the trial court erred as a matter of law in applying the â€

The procedures attendant to a criminal defendant's right to discover relevant evidence in confidential peace officer personnel files--through the filing of a so-called "Pitchess"[1] motion--are established by both statute and decisional law.[2] The defining hallmark of the process is an in camera hearing in which the trial court reviews the files at issue outside the presence of the defendant and his or her counsel. The completeness of the records is established through questioning of the custodian of records who produced them. In order to protect the defendant's right to a fair trial, the custodian must be placed under oath. (People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1230, fn. 4 (Mooc); Evid. Code, § 710.) In this case we decide whether the trial court's failure to administer the oath in this regard compels a conditional reversal of the judgment. Court conclude that it does.

Defendant Rodrigo Caballero appeals from the judgment entered following his conviction by jury of three counts of willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder, with findings that he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm, inflicted great bodily injury upon one victim, and committed the crimes for the benefit of a criminal street gang. (Pen. Code, §§ 664/187, subd. (a), 664, subd. (a), 12022.53, subds. (b)-(d), 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C).)[1] He was sentenced to 110 years to life in state prison. Caballero contends: (1) he was mentally incompetent to waive his right against self‑incrimination; (2) the failure to conduct a competency hearing deprived him of due process; (3) he was denied effective assistance of counsel; (4) there was instructional error; and (5) his sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. In the published portion of the opinion, Court conclude his sentence passes constitutional muster. In the unpublished portion, court reject the remainder of defendant's claims. Accordingly, Court affirm the judgment.

Defendant Humberto Miranda appeals from the judgment of conviction of attempted murder, second degree robbery, possession of a firearm by a felon and assault with a firearm. He contends principally: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction on all of the substantive charges, as well as the gang enhancement and (2) the trial court incorrectly calculated the sentence on the attempted murder conviction under the Three Strikes law. Court affirm.

For the following three reasons, the trial court refused to enforce a fee-sharing agreement between lawyers plaintiff James Brown and defendant Milton Grimes arising out of cases they handled in Texas: Brown had not performed his contractual responsibility to pay Paul Ross, a third party; Brown had unclean hands because he had unethically agreed to share his fees with Ross, a former lawyer who had resigned from the Bar; and the fee-sharing agreement violated applicable Texas law because the clients did not consent to the arrangement at the outset of the litigation. The trial court also ordered Brown to return fees he had already received from Grimes under the fee sharing agreement less an amount for the reasonable value of Brown's services. Brown does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court's factual conclusions.
Court hold as follows: the trial court did not commit legal error in excusing Grimes from any further obligation to Brown under a fee-sharing agreement because of Brown's failure to perform one of his contractual obligations; the trial court erred in requiring Brown to repay moneys already paid to him because there was not a total failure of consideration; the trial court erred in denying enforcement of the fee-sharing agreement under the unclean hands doctrine because Brown's offending conduct did not affect the fee sharing agreement, was not inequitable as to Grimes, and did not prejudice Grimes; even if unclean hands applied, Grimes was not entitled to any affirmative relief; and a violation of the laws of either California or Texas governing fee sharing agreements did not require Brown to repay money received from Grimes under the fee sharing agreement.

Plaintiff Alec Zubarau, an amateur or â€

Plaintiff Alec Zubarau, an amateur or â€

A criminal defendant has a hard enough time defending the underlying charge. He should not "pick a new fight" with the prosecutor and yet another fight with his court appointed counsel, i. e. he should not threaten to kill them thereby creating two new cases to defend. Here, appellant is charged with having done exactly that. He created two new felony cases against himself by threatening both the prosecutor and his own lawyer. These threats created, at the least, potential conflicts of interest which led the trial court to remove the district attorney (and appoint the Attorney General) and the public defender (and appoint new defense counsel). As we shall explain, removal of the public defender was within the trial court's discretion and was a safe and rational way to proceed.[1] The trial court was trying to protect appellant's right to conflict-free counsel and the irony is that it is now faulted for doing so.
Daniel Avila appeals from the trial court's orders, entered in three separate criminal cases after a single hearing, declaring him mentally incompetent to stand trial and committing him to the Metropolitan State Hospital. He contends the trial court deprived him of a fair hearing on the issue of his mental competence and interfered with his right to be represented by counsel of his choice. Court affirm.

The City of Santa Barbara (City) approved the development of 25 single-family homes. The project was to be constructed by real parties in interest and appellants, Peak-Las Positas Partners and its managing partner, Mark Lee (Las Positas). The City and Las Positas wished to provide access to the development via construction of a concrete bridge and roadway, which would create a significant (Class I) environmental impact to Arroyo Burro creek.
Citizens Planning Association and Santa Barbara Urban Creeks Council (CPA) filed a petition for a writ of mandamus, requesting the trial court to enjoin the development. CPA alleged that voter approval was required before construction could begin. Pursuant to the City Charter, the City may not encumber parkland without a vote, and the bridge and roadway would cross over City-owned parkland. The trial court agreed, and issued a peremptory writ of mandate enjoining development until the matter could be placed on the ballot. Court affirm.

Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1 is an interpretive beast, a Frankenstein's monster of legislative parts stitched together over 16 years. And like Shelley's literary counterpart, this legislative monster is easily misunderstood, especially when it comes to the 2002 amendments that both lengthened the limitations period for certain childhood sex abuse claims against third parties and revived for one year all such claims that had been barred under the previous versions of the statute. Consistent with our earlier decisions, we hold once more that all such actions that were time barred before the 2002 amendments took effect were revived for the calendar year 2003 only, regardless of whether the plaintiffs had yet discovered the link between their abuse as children and their adult onset of psychological injuries. After a brief summary of the few relevant facts, we will dissect the statute's parts.

Plaintiffs John Roe 58 and John Roe 61 appeal from the judgment of dismissal entered after the trial court sustained without leave to amend the demurrers of various Catholic Church entities to their first amended complaint. Because the statute of limitations on the plaintiffs' claims expired years before they sued, and because they did not sue in 2003 during the Legislature's oneyear revival window for such claims, their claims again became time barred and the trial court correctly sustained the demurrers on that ground.

Appellant Edward Fossum and his ex-wife, respondent Sandra Fossum purchased a house in 1994. To obtain the best interest rate, the property was purchased in Edward's[1] name alone, but later title was placed in both spouses' names. In 1998, the parties agreed to enter into the same arrangement in order to obtain a good interest rate on a loan to refinance their home. Sandra quitclaimed her interest in the property to Edward, but he never restored Sandra's name to title. Following trial in this action, the trial court determined the house was community property. Edward contends that ruling was in error. We affirm.
Prior to the parties' separation, Sandra took a cash advance on a credit card of $24,000, but never disclosed the transaction to Edward. The trial court found Sandra had breached her statutory fiduciary duty to her spouse. (Fam. Code, § 721, subd. (b).)[2] Edward contends the trial court erred when it refused to award him attorney fees, which are mandated under section 1101, subdivision (g), for Sandra's fiduciary violation. On this point, Court conclude Edward is correct.

Defendant and appellant Jose Armas was convicted, following a plea of nolo contendere, of one count of lewd conduct with a person under 14.[1] Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant was sentenced to probation, subject to several conditions, including sex offender registration.[2] Defendant was released from jail immediately following sentencing. Less than two months later, defendant was arrested for violating the Sex Offender Registration Act (the Act). His probation was revoked and the matter set for a probation violation hearing. Defendant was also charged by information with three violations of the Act; his probation violation hearing trailed the proceedings in the new case. A jury found defendant guilty of all three counts; the trial court subsequently concluded defendant had violated probation and declined to reinstate probation. Defendant appeals from his conviction for violating the Act and from the probation violation. Defendant contends insufficient evidence supports the conclusion that he violated the Act (and that the jury was misinstructed). Court agree with defendant's contentions with respect to two counts of violating the Act, but the third count is well supported. Court thus reverse defendant's conviction of two counts and remand for resentencing. Court affirm the probation violation.

This appeal requires an interpretation of the Sales and Use Tax Law. (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 6001 et seq.)[1] Nortel Networks Inc. sells telephone switching equipment in California. Income from switch hardware sales is indisputably taxable by the State of California. The question is whether sales tax is imposed on the software that Nortel licenses to operate the switching equipment. The State Board of Equalization (the Board) determined that Nortel owes sales tax on software it licensed between January 1994 and December 1997. Nortel paid the tax then sued for a refund. Court conclude that the software licensed by Nortel is exempt from sales tax under the Technology Transfer Agreement (TTA) statutes because it (1) is copyrighted, (2) contains patented processes, and (3) enables the licensee to copy the software, and to make and sell products--telephone calls embodying the patents and copyright. (§§ 6011, subd. (c)(10)(D), 6012, subd. (c)(10)(D).) The Board's attempt to limit the scope of the TTA statutes by excluding prewritten computer programs is an invalid exercise of its regulatory power. The TTA statutes encompass â€