CA Pub. Decisions

Plaintiff James Sheppard was a part‑time instructor employed by defendant North Orange County Regional Occupational Program (NOCROP). NOCROP was created by four public school districts. During his employment, Sheppard was required to spend 20 minutes of unpaid time preparing for every hour he spent teaching. Sheppard sued NOCROP and sought compensation for his unpaid preparation time by asserting claims for violation of the minimum wage law, pursuant to the Industrial Welfare Commission's (IWC) wage order No. 4‑2001 (Wage Order No. 4‑2001)[1] and Labor Code section 218, breach of contract, and quantum meruit. (All further statutory references are to the Labor Code unless otherwise specified.)
Following a series of challenges to Sheppard's pleadings, judgment was entered in favor of NOCROP. Sheppard contends the trial court erred by (1) ordering judgment on the pleadings as to the violation of the minimum wage law claim contained in the first amended complaint; (2) sustaining, without leave to amend, NOCROP's demurrer to Sheppard's breach of contract claim as contained in the original complaint; and (3) sustaining, without leave to amend, NOCROP's demurrer to his quantum meruit claim as contained in the third amended complaint.

This case concerns the construction and application of the federal Clean Water Act (Clean Water Act; 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq.) and the Porter-Cologne Water Quality Control Act (Porter-Cologne Act; Wat. Code, § 13000 et seq., unless otherwise stated, all further statutory references are to the Water Code).
The superior court entered a judgment issuing a writ of mandate that vacated a resolution by defendant California Regional Water Quality Control Board, Los Angeles Region (Regional Board) after it completed a periodic review of its water quality control plan. The judgment further directed the Regional Board to either reopen the prior review proceeding or, during its next scheduled periodic review, conduct a public
hearing on the plan's water quality objectives applicable to storm water or urban

This case concerns the construction and application of the federal Clean Water Act (Clean Water Act; 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq.) and the Porter-Cologne Water Quality Control Act (Porter-Cologne Act; Wat. Code, § 13000 et seq., unless otherwise stated, all further statutory references are to the Water Code).
The superior court entered a judgment issuing a writ of mandate that vacated a resolution by defendant California Regional Water Quality Control Board, Los Angeles Region (Regional Board) after it completed a periodic review of its water quality control plan. The judgment further directed the Regional Board to either reopen the prior review proceeding or, during its next scheduled periodic review, conduct a public
hearing on the plan's water quality objectives applicable to storm water or urban

The juvenile court declared Sean A. a ward of the court (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) and placed him on probation after Sean admitted to possessing a controlled substance for sale in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11378.
Sean appeals, contending that the juvenile court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of a search of his person by a public high school official premised on the fact that he left and returned to campus during the school day. Sean also challenges one of the conditions of his probation.
Court conclude that the search was lawful, and that Sean has waived any objection to his probation conditions by failing to object in the juvenile court.

The juvenile court declared Sean A. a ward of the court (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) and placed him on probation after Sean admitted to possessing a controlled substance for sale in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11378.
Sean appeals, contending that the juvenile court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of a search of his person by a public high school official premised on the fact that he left and returned to campus during the school day. Sean also challenges one of the conditions of his probation.
Court conclude that the search was lawful, and that Sean has waived any objection to his probation conditions by failing to object in the juvenile court.

Since 2001, this long running dispute has traveled back and forth between state and federal courts at the respective trial and appellate levels. We now have before us the trial court's appealable orders vacating certain judgments of dismissal of an action, in which plaintiff, respondent and cross-appellant, Bruce R. Talley (Talley) asserted tort claims (fraud and related theories), based upon the different roles of several sets of defendants in alleged securities fraud activities in the 1990's, that allegedly ruined his career by drawing him into the schemes, in the role of a salesman of worthless bonds to private clients, who then sued him and the others.

Since 2001, this long running dispute has traveled back and forth between state and federal courts at the respective trial and appellate levels. We now have before us the trial court's appealable orders vacating certain judgments of dismissal of an action, in which plaintiff, respondent and cross-appellant, Bruce R. Talley (Talley) asserted tort claims (fraud and related theories), based upon the different roles of several sets of defendants in alleged securities fraud activities in the 1990's, that allegedly ruined his career by drawing him into the schemes, in the role of a salesman of worthless bonds to private clients, who then sued him and the others.

A jury found defendant Larry Steven Smith guilty of rape of an intoxicated woman (count I), rape of an unconscious woman (count II), and misdemeanor sexual battery. The trial court sentenced defendant to prison for eight years (the upper term on count I, with the terms on the other two counts run concurrently and stayed under Penal Code section 654).
On appeal, defendant contends: (1) the trial court gave misleading and incomplete instructions on rape of an intoxicated woman that require reversal of both rape convictions; and (2) because there is no crime of sexual battery of an intoxicated or unconscious woman, his conviction for sexual battery must be reversed. We reject these arguments; however, we conclude that only one of defendant's rape convictions can stand because both convictions are based on the same act of sexual intercourse. Accordingly, Court will modify the judgment to strike the second rape conviction.

Defendant, Vincent Woods, appeals from his convictions for cocaine possession (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a)) and misdemeanor marijuana possession. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11357, subd. (b).) In the published portion of this opinion, we address the issue of whether, when a defendant is placed on probation pursuant to Penal Code section 1210.1, subdivision (a) (Proposition 36 probation), the following may be stayed: a Government Code section 70373, subdivision (a) court facility assessment; a Penal Code section 1202.4, subdivision (b)(1) restitution fine; and a Penal Code section 1465.8, subdivision (a)(1) court security fee. We conclude they may not be stayed. In the unpublished portion of the opinion, we address other sentencing issues. Court affirm the judgment in all other respects.

In the underlying action, real parties in interest sought to recover civil penalties from petitioner Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. (Home Depot) under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 ((PAGA); Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.).[1] The trial court overruled Home Depot's demurrer to the first amended complaint, which contains a claim under PAGA based on Home Depot's alleged failure to provide seating to its employees pursuant to section 1198 and Wage Order 7-2001 (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 11070). Home Depot challenges this ruling by petition for writ of mandate or other relief. We conclude that the complaint states a claim under PAGA, and thus deny the petition on its merits.

Appellants appeal from a judgment based on, inter alia, a determination that they were judicially estopped from denying that they are bound by a settlement agreement. We hold that even if the settlement agreement had not been binding, appellants were judicially estopped from denying the enforceability of that agreement because they represented to the trial court that the case had settled and the trial court discharged the jury in reliance on that representation.

The trial court was not justified in asserting dependency jurisdiction over the child in this case, who had never been abused or neglected by anyone. The child, V.M., came to the attention of the Department of Children and Family Services after her father asserted his right to custody of his daughter, seeking to gradually remove the child from the only home she had ever known where she lived with her maternal grandparents after her mother's death.

This case is closer to the recent decision in Jackson v. Superior Court (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1051 (Jackson). In that case, the defendant was sentenced following judgments of conviction on two felony counts. (Id. p. 1056.) The defendant thereafter filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Court of Appeal contending that he was entitled to a new trial because the prosecutor had failed to disclose certain evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83. (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal issued an order to show cause returnable in the trial court why the defendant was not entitled to the relief requested. (Ibid.) In response, the trial court issued an order granting the habeas corpus petition without specifying the relief to which the defendant was entitled. (Ibid.) The prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that additional facts had come to light. (Ibid.) The trial court granted that motion and vacated its previous order granting the habeas corpus petition. (Ibid.)

Defendant and appellant Michael Nesbitt (defendant) was convicted on six felony counts based upon the sexual abuse of three of his children.[1] On appeal, defendant contends, inter alia, that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to vacate an order entered in the minutes dismissing counts 4 and 5.
We hold that the trial court had the inherent authority to reconsider its order dismissing counts 4 and 5 and therefore affirm the trial court's order vacating the dismissal of those counts and reinstating them, as well as the judgments of conviction on those counts. In the unpublished portion of this opinion, Court otherwise affirm the judgment, except as to matters regarding the sentence and reimbursement of attorney fees.