CA Pub. Decisions

A group of public entities composed of various California counties and cities (collectively referred to as the public entities) are prosecuting a public-nuisance action against numerous businesses that manufactured lead paint (collectively referred to as defendants). The public entities are represented both by their own government attorneys and by several private law firms. The private law firms are retained by the public entities on a contingent-fee basis. After summary judgment was granted in favor of defendants on various tort causes of action initially advanced by the public entities, the complaint eventually was amended to leave the public-nuisance action as the sole claim, and abatement as the sole remedy.
Defendants moved to bar the public entities from compensating their privately retained counsel by means of contingent fees. The superior court, relying upon this court's decision in People ex rel. Clancy v. Superior Court (1985) 39 Cal.3d 740 (Clancy), ordered the public entities barred from compensating their private counsel by means of any contingent-fee agreement, reasoning that under Clancy, all attorneys prosecuting public-nuisance actions must be â€

A group of public entities composed of various California counties and cities (collectively referred to as the public entities) are prosecuting a public-nuisance action against numerous businesses that manufactured lead paint (collectively referred to as defendants). The public entities are represented both by their own government attorneys and by several private law firms. The private law firms are retained by the public entities on a contingent-fee basis. After summary judgment was granted in favor of defendants on various tort causes of action initially advanced by the public entities, the complaint eventually was amended to leave the public-nuisance action as the sole claim, and abatement as the sole remedy.
Defendants moved to bar the public entities from compensating their privately retained counsel by means of contingent fees. The superior court, relying upon this court's decision in People ex rel. Clancy v. Superior Court (1985) 39 Cal.3d 740 (Clancy), ordered the public entities barred from compensating their private counsel by means of any contingent-fee agreement, reasoning that under Clancy, all attorneys prosecuting public-nuisance actions must be â€

A group of public entities composed of various California counties and cities (collectively referred to as the public entities) are prosecuting a public-nuisance action against numerous businesses that manufactured lead paint (collectively referred to as defendants). The public entities are represented both by their own government attorneys and by several private law firms. The private law firms are retained by the public entities on a contingent-fee basis. After summary judgment was granted in favor of defendants on various tort causes of action initially advanced by the public entities, the complaint eventually was amended to leave the public-nuisance action as the sole claim, and abatement as the sole remedy.
Defendants moved to bar the public entities from compensating their privately retained counsel by means of contingent fees. The superior court, relying upon this court's decision in People ex rel. Clancy v. Superior Court (1985) 39 Cal.3d 740 (Clancy), ordered the public entities barred from compensating their private counsel by means of any contingent-fee agreement, reasoning that under Clancy, all attorneys prosecuting public-nuisance actions must be â€

Plaintiff Alan Richard Klein was riding a bicycle for recreation on a two-lane paved road in Angeles National Forest in Southern California when he was struck head-on by an automobile driven by a part-time volunteer working for the United States Fish and Wildlife Service. Having been seriously injured in the collision, plaintiff sued the United States government (the owner of the national forest land) and its volunteer worker.
At issue here is the scope and applicability of California's Civil Code section 846, which provides, as relevant here, that a landowner â€

Plaintiff Alan Richard Klein was riding a bicycle for recreation on a two-lane paved road in Angeles National Forest in Southern California when he was struck head-on by an automobile driven by a part-time volunteer working for the United States Fish and Wildlife Service. Having been seriously injured in the collision, plaintiff sued the United States government (the owner of the national forest land) and its volunteer worker.
At issue here is the scope and applicability of California's Civil Code section 846, which provides, as relevant here, that a landowner â€

Plaintiff Alan Richard Klein was riding a bicycle for recreation on a two-lane paved road in Angeles National Forest in Southern California when he was struck head-on by an automobile driven by a part-time volunteer working for the United States Fish and Wildlife Service. Having been seriously injured in the collision, plaintiff sued the United States government (the owner of the national forest land) and its volunteer worker.
At issue here is the scope and applicability of California's Civil Code section 846, which provides, as relevant here, that a landowner â€

Defendant fired a single bullet at a distance of 60 feet, from a car going 10 to 15 miles per hour, at a group of seven peace officers and a civilian who were standing less than 15 feet apart from one another in a dimly lit parking lot late on the night in question. There was evidence that defendant believed he was shooting at a group of rival gang members, but no evidence he was targeting any particular individual when he fired at the group. The bullet hit one officer in the hand, nearly severing his finger, but killed no one. The jury returned special findings that defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the victims were peace officers, and convicted defendant of, among other crimes, seven counts of premeditated attempted murder of a peace officer and one count of premeditated attempted murder (the civilian victim).
The Court of Appeal reasoned that the jury could find on this evidence that â€

Court granted review in these two cases to determine the proper scope of an order directed to the Board of Parole Hearings (the Board) when a reviewing court concludes that a decision to deny parole by the Board is not supported by â€

Court granted review in these two cases to determine the proper scope of an order directed to the Board of Parole Hearings (the Board) when a reviewing court concludes that a decision to deny parole by the Board is not supported by â€

Jose Melchor and Natalie Melchor, by and through their guardians ad litem, Martin Melchor and Ramona Melchor, appeal from a judgment entered after the court granted the summary judgment motion of respondent Fresno Community Hospital and Medical Center (Fresno Community). Appellants contend that the court erred in overruling their objections to the evidence submitted by Fresno Community, and a triable issue of material fact precluded the grant of summary judgment. We will affirm the judgment.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In December 2006, Jose and Natalie Melchor, through their guardians ad litem, filed a complaint alleging professional negligence on the part of numerous defendants including Fresno Community (erroneously sued as â€

Jose Melchor and Natalie Melchor, by and through their guardians ad litem, Martin Melchor and Ramona Melchor, appeal from a judgment entered after the court granted the summary judgment motion of respondents Jorge Pena, M.D. and Gina Marie Adair, M.D. Appellants contend: a triable issue of material fact precluded the grant of summary judgment; the court erred in permitting the summary judgment hearing to be heard on less than the statutory-required notice; and the court erroneously denied their request for a continuance of the motion hearing. Court affirm the judgment.

DeSilva Gates Construction, L.P. (DeSilva Gates) appeals from a determination of the Alameda County Superior Court, following a jury trial, that subcontractor M. Bumgarner, Inc. (MBI) owed DeSilva Gates neither a duty to defend nor a duty to indemnify under the terms of the subcontract between the two. DeSilva Gates and others had been sued by Ramona Schlicker and other plaintiffs for personal injuries and other damages plaintiffs had sustained in two separate automobile accidents occurring in February 2003 on Interstate 580. The central question presented here is whether the trial court properly allowed the jury to determine whether the plaintiffs' claims â€

A modification decision.

The Los Angeles City Employees Retirement System (LACERS) appeals from a judgment in favor of Abraham Khan (Khan) granting his petition for writ of mandate compelling LACERS to approve his request for concurrent deferred retirement benefits with LACERS and the Judicial Retirement System (JRS).[1] The sole issue on appeal is whether LACERS and JRS have reciprocity provisions such that Khan, a Judge of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County who had worked for the City of Los Angeles (City) as a City Attorney, may retire from LACERS at his higher judicial salary. We conclude they do not, and reverse and remand with directions that the trial court enter judgment in favor of LACERS.