CA Pub. Decisions

The Los Angeles City Employees Retirement System (LACERS) appeals from a judgment in favor of Abraham Khan (Khan) granting his petition for writ of mandate compelling LACERS to approve his request for concurrent deferred retirement benefits with LACERS and the Judicial Retirement System (JRS).[1] The sole issue on appeal is whether LACERS and JRS have reciprocity provisions such that Khan, a Judge of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County who had worked for the City of Los Angeles (City) as a City Attorney, may retire from LACERS at his higher judicial salary. We conclude they do not, and reverse and remand with directions that the trial court enter judgment in favor of LACERS.

Respondent Los Angeles Unified School District (the District) acquired by eminent domain property on which appellants Rudy and Teresa Casasola (the Casasolas) operated a small business. The Casasolas relocated their business to a new, larger property and spent nearly $1.4 million moving their equipment and repurposing the new property to accommodate their business. They then sought reimbursement from the District for their relocation expenses. The District paid the Casasolas $224,252 in moving and reestablishment expenses, but rejected the remainder of the claim.
The Casasolas challenge this determination on appeal, contending that their reasonable relocation expenses are reimbursable as expenses incurred to mitigate loss of business goodwill. They also challenge the trial court's award to the District of $180,000 in penalties, contending that the penalties are unconscionable. Court affirm.

Respondent Los Angeles Unified School District (the District) acquired by eminent domain property on which appellants Rudy and Teresa Casasola (the Casasolas) operated a small business. The Casasolas relocated their business to a new, larger property and spent nearly $1.4 million moving their equipment and repurposing the new property to accommodate their business. They then sought reimbursement from the District for their relocation expenses. The District paid the Casasolas $224,252 in moving and reestablishment expenses, but rejected the remainder of the claim.
The Casasolas challenge this determination on appeal, contending that their reasonable relocation expenses are reimbursable as expenses incurred to mitigate loss of business goodwill. They also challenge the trial court's award to the District of $180,000 in penalties, contending that the penalties are unconscionable. Court affirm.

Defendants, Thomas Bundy, Misty Sanchez, Kevin Prevost and David Godina, appeal from an order vacating partial arbitration awards against plaintiffs, Countrywide Financial Corporation and Full Spectrum Lending, Inc. Judge Elizabeth A. White vacated the partial arbitration awards on the ground the arbitrator committed a number of legal errors. Because of the unambiguous choice of law language in the agreements to arbitrate, we conclude Court must apply the vacatur provisions applicable before a United States District Court in a case subject to the Federal Arbitration Act. (9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.) When we apply the vacatur provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act, we conclude no grounds permitted the partial awards to be vacated. Although it is uncertain whether the manifest disregard of the law vacatur rule remains extant, we apply it and the federal excess of powers standard of judicial review to the partial awards. Thus, we reverse the order vacating the partial arbitration awards. Court do not address the parties' other contentions including their statute of limitations analysis.

Defendants, Thomas Bundy, Misty Sanchez, Kevin Prevost and David Godina, appeal from an order vacating partial arbitration awards against plaintiffs, Countrywide Financial Corporation and Full Spectrum Lending, Inc. Judge Elizabeth A. White vacated the partial arbitration awards on the ground the arbitrator committed a number of legal errors. Because of the unambiguous choice of law language in the agreements to arbitrate, we conclude we must apply the vacatur provisions applicable before a United States District Court in a case subject to the Federal Arbitration Act. (9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.) When we apply the vacatur provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act, we conclude no grounds permitted the partial awards to be vacated. Although it is uncertain whether the manifest disregard of the law vacatur rule remains extant, we apply it and the federal excess of powers standard of judicial review to the partial awards. Thus, we reverse the order vacating the partial arbitration awards. Court do not address the parties' other contentions including their statute of limitations analysis.

Weinberg, Roger & Rosenfeld, James Rutkowski and Alan Crowley; Robert Hunt, General Counsel SEIU Local 721, for Real Party in Interest and Respondent.
Plaintiff and appellant Dan Mariscal (Mariscal) appeals from the trial court's denial of his petition for writ of mandate challenging an administrative decision rendered by defendant Employee Relations Board (ERB) for the City of Los Angeles (City) recognizing real party in interest and respondent Service Employees International Union Local 721 (Local 721) as the exclusive bargaining representative for certain City employees. court affirm the judgment.

Jose T.'s parental rights were terminated pursuant to Family Code section 7822, subdivision (a)(3),[1] after the family law court found he had abandoned his three genetic children, Vanessa Q. (born in May 1993), Christopher Q. (born in February 1995) and Rebecca Q. (born in March 1997). The children had been in the exclusive care of their mother, L.O. (Mother), and her husband, Martin O., for more than eight years.

Petitioner was convicted of failing to update his sex offender registration within five working days of his birthday (former Pen. Code, § 290, subd. (a)(1)(D))[1] and, due to his prior criminal convictions, was sentenced to 25 years to life pursuant to the Three Strikes law (Pen. Code, § 1170.12 subds. (b)-(i)).
In response to an order issued by the California Supreme Court, we consider whether, in light of the holding in People v. Carmony (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1066 (Carmony), petitioner's sentence violates the Eighth Amendment. We conclude petitioner's sentence does not violate the Eighth Amendment and respectfully disagree with Carmony.

The trial court granted defendant Mike Kenney's motion to vacate a default judgment entered in favor of plaintiff Stephen O. Trackman, finding that the evidence showed no actual service on Kenney. Trackman appealed, and argues the trial court mistakenly relied on evidence instead of determining whether the proof of service is void on its face.
Kenney does not defend the trial court's reasoning. As we shall explain, because Kenney's motion was filed more than two years after entry of judgment, the trial court's review was limited to the face of the record, and therefore the trial court erred by considering the evidence attached to Kenney's motion.
Kenney instead argues that the proof of service is void on its face, because the name of the person given the summons was stated as â€

A jury found defendant Andrew Benson Busch guilty of transportation of more than 28.5 grams of marijuana (Health & Saf. Code, § 11360, subd. (a); undesignated statutory references are to the Health and Safety Code), possession of more than 28.5 grams of marijuana (§ 11357, subd. (c); and driving with a suspended license (Veh. Code, § 14601.1, subd. (a)). The court suspended imposition of sentence on the marijuana offenses and placed him on formal probation.[1]
On appeal, defendant contends his convictions for transportation and possession of marijuana must be reversed because the jury was not instructed that defendant had to know he transported or possessed more than 28.5 grams of marijuana. He contends further that his conviction for possession of marijuana must be reversed as a lesser-included offense of transportation, and there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction for possession of marijuana. Finding no error, Court shall affirm the judgment.

We here decide how to calculate a victim's property damages for purposes of a victim restitution order. When a criminal damages a victim's vehicle, we conclude the trial court may in its discretion award the victim the cost of repairing the vehicle, even if that amount exceeds the replacement value of the vehicle. In doing so, we agree with In re Dina V. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 486 (Dina V.) and disagree with People v. Yanez (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1622 (Yanez).

Plaintiff Susan Henderson's counsel went â€

A Kern County jury found defendant Robert Wesley Cowan guilty of the first degree murders of Clifford and Alma Merck (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189)[1] and found true the special circumstance allegations of multiple murder (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)) and murder during the commission of robbery and burglary (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A), (G)).[2] As to both murders, the jury found that a principal had been armed with a firearm (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)), and the court found that defendant had suffered a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)). The jury was unable to reach a verdict on a murder count involving a third victim, Jewell Russell, resulting in a mistrial on that count.
At the penalty phase of the trial, the jury returned verdicts of death for Alma's murder and life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for Clifford's murder. The trial court denied defendant's automatic application to modify the verdict (§ 190.4, subd. (e)) and imposed the death sentence with a one-year arming enhancement for Alma's murder, a consecutive sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole plus a one-year arming enhancement for Clifford's murder, and a five-year enhancement for the prior serious felony conviction.
This appeal is automatic. (§ 1239, subd. (b).) Court affirm the judgment.

A Kern County jury found defendant Robert Wesley Cowan guilty of the first degree murders of Clifford and Alma Merck (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189)[1] and found true the special circumstance allegations of multiple murder (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)) and murder during the commission of robbery and burglary (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A), (G)).[2] As to both murders, the jury found that a principal had been armed with a firearm (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)), and the court found that defendant had suffered a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)). The jury was unable to reach a verdict on a murder count involving a third victim, Jewell Russell, resulting in a mistrial on that count.
At the penalty phase of the trial, the jury returned verdicts of death for Alma's murder and life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for Clifford's murder. The trial court denied defendant's automatic application to modify the verdict (§ 190.4, subd. (e)) and imposed the death sentence with a one-year arming enhancement for Alma's murder, a consecutive sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole plus a one-year arming enhancement for Clifford's murder, and a five-year enhancement for the prior serious felony conviction.
This appeal is automatic. (§ 1239, subd. (b).) Court affirm the judgment.