CA Pub. Decisions

A Kern County jury found defendant Robert Wesley Cowan guilty of the first degree murders of Clifford and Alma Merck (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189)[1] and found true the special circumstance allegations of multiple murder (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)) and murder during the commission of robbery and burglary (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A), (G)).[2] As to both murders, the jury found that a principal had been armed with a firearm (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)), and the court found that defendant had suffered a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)). The jury was unable to reach a verdict on a murder count involving a third victim, Jewell Russell, resulting in a mistrial on that count.
At the penalty phase of the trial, the jury returned verdicts of death for Alma's murder and life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for Clifford's murder. The trial court denied defendant's automatic application to modify the verdict (§ 190.4, subd. (e)) and imposed the death sentence with a one-year arming enhancement for Alma's murder, a consecutive sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole plus a one-year arming enhancement for Clifford's murder, and a five-year enhancement for the prior serious felony conviction.
This appeal is automatic. (§ 1239, subd. (b).) Court affirm the judgment.

A Kern County jury found defendant Robert Wesley Cowan guilty of the first degree murders of Clifford and Alma Merck (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189)[1] and found true the special circumstance allegations of multiple murder (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)) and murder during the commission of robbery and burglary (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A), (G)).[2] As to both murders, the jury found that a principal had been armed with a firearm (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)), and the court found that defendant had suffered a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)). The jury was unable to reach a verdict on a murder count involving a third victim, Jewell Russell, resulting in a mistrial on that count.
At the penalty phase of the trial, the jury returned verdicts of death for Alma's murder and life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for Clifford's murder. The trial court denied defendant's automatic application to modify the verdict (§ 190.4, subd. (e)) and imposed the death sentence with a one-year arming enhancement for Alma's murder, a consecutive sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole plus a one-year arming enhancement for Clifford's murder, and a five-year enhancement for the prior serious felony conviction.
This appeal is automatic. (§ 1239, subd. (b).) Court affirm the judgment.

A defendant shoplifts property from a store in a shopping mall and forcibly resists the mall security guards who apprehend him and recover the property. Can the guards be victims of a robbery when they are not the owners of the stolen property and are not directly employed by the store that owned the property? We conclude the answer in this case is yes, because the guards had a special relationship with the store and had the duty and authority to retrieve its stolen property. We also reject the defendant's claims that the jury instructions on this point were defective and that his mid-trial motion for self-representation under Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806, 834-835 (Faretta) should have been granted.

Appellant Universal Paragon Corporation, formerly known as Tuntex (USA), Inc. (UPC) hired respondent law firm Cotchett, Pitre and McCarthy (CP&M) to represent it in complex environmental litigation. After a settlement in the underlying action was reached, UPC and CP&M were unable to agree on the amount of fees owned to CP&M under their written fee agreement. The parties proceeded to binding arbitration, as provided for in the agreement, and the arbitrator awarded CP&M $7,554,149.13 in attorney fees and expenses. UPC appeals the superior court judgment confirming the award (Code Civ. Proc., § 1285 et seq.), arguing that the amount is unconscionable and violates public policy. Court affirm.

The California Legislature enacted a statute -- Government Code[1] section 66427.5 -- that facilitates the conversion of mobilehome parks to resident ownership by limiting a local authority's traditional power to regulate development within the local authority's territory when the proposed development is the conversion of a mobilehome park. That statute imposes certain specific requirements on the subdivider seeking the conversion (aimed at preventing the displacement of current residents, particularly those with lower incomes), and provides that the scope of the hearing at which the local authority may approve, conditionally approve, or deny the tentative map â€

The California Legislature enacted a statute -- Government Code[1] section 66427.5 -- that facilitates the conversion of mobilehome parks to resident ownership by limiting a local authority's traditional power to regulate development within the local authority's territory when the proposed development is the conversion of a mobilehome park. That statute imposes certain specific requirements on the subdivider seeking the conversion (aimed at preventing the displacement of current residents, particularly those with lower incomes), and provides that the scope of the hearing at which the local authority may approve, conditionally approve, or deny the tentative map â€

Government Code section 66427.5 contains state-mandated procedures for converting a mobilehome park from landlord ownership to resident ownership.[1] It requires, among other things, that parties seeking conversion to resident ownership obtain a â€

Government Code section 66427.5 contains state-mandated procedures for converting a mobilehome park from landlord ownership to resident ownership.[1] It requires, among other things, that parties seeking conversion to resident ownership obtain a â€

Petitioner Michael Donnell Brown filed the instant petition for a writ of mandate to challenge the trial court's denial of his double jeopardy motion to preclude retrial after a jury acquitted him of some counts, convicted him of a lesser included offense as to one count, and hung on the remaining counts. We conclude that double jeopardy bars retrial of all of the charges the trial court permitted to be retried because, (1) in the case of one victim, the jury acquitted petitioner of offenses, all of which were alleged to have been committed within the same five-month interval, and the prosecutor failed to show that none of the acquittals pertained to the offense the court agreed to permit the prosecutor to retry, which was also alleged to have been committed in the same five-month interval; and (2) in the case of the other victim, the jury acquitted petitioner of continuous sexual abuse of a minor based upon the same conduct and during the same 22-month interval alleged in four counts the court agreed to permit the prosecutor to retry. Accordingly, Court grant the petition.

Petitioner Michael Donnell Brown filed the instant petition for a writ of mandate to challenge the trial court's denial of his double jeopardy motion to preclude retrial after a jury acquitted him of some counts, convicted him of a lesser included offense as to one count, and hung on the remaining counts. We conclude that double jeopardy bars retrial of all of the charges the trial court permitted to be retried because, (1) in the case of one victim, the jury acquitted petitioner of offenses, all of which were alleged to have been committed within the same five-month interval, and the prosecutor failed to show that none of the acquittals pertained to the offense the court agreed to permit the prosecutor to retry, which was also alleged to have been committed in the same five-month interval; and (2) in the case of the other victim, the jury acquitted petitioner of continuous sexual abuse of a minor based upon the same conduct and during the same 22-month interval alleged in four counts the court agreed to permit the prosecutor to retry. Accordingly, Court grant the petition.

Penal Code section 1054.9 allows a convicted defendant who has been sentenced to death or life in prison without the possibility of parole to obtain discovery materials â€

Force Framing, Inc. (Force Framing) sued Chinatrust Bank (U.S.A.), Corp. (Chinatrust) for a bonded stop notice.[1] (Civ. Code, § 3083.) The trial court granted Chinatrust's cross-motion for summary judgment (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c), because Force Framing served the statutorily required 20-day preliminary notice (Civ. Code, § 3097) on East West Bank, not Chinatrust. Force Framing contends that the trial court erred by granting Chinatrust's cross-motion for summary judgment because East West Bank qualified as the â€

This case is important for two reasons. First, it presents a challenging problem in public contracting law: How to distinguish a â€

This case is important for two reasons. First, it presents a challenging problem in public contracting law: How to distinguish a â€