CA Pub. Decisions

Plaintiffs and appellants Rose, Austin, and Logan Sprinkles[1] are the heirs of a motorcyclist who died in an accident caused by an employee, Juan Bibinz (Bibinz), of Sinco Co., Inc. (Sinco). Sinco had an automobile liability policy issued by General Insurance Company of America (General), an excess and umbrella policy issued by Fireman's Fund Insurance Company (Fireman's Fund), and a commercial general liability (CGL) policy issued by Fireman's Fund.[2] Plaintiffs partially settled with Sinco and Bibinz for the full policy limits under the automobile policy and the excess and umbrella policy. Fireman's Fund denied coverage under the CGL policy and, under that policy, refused to defend an action by plaintiffs against Sinco. In the partial settlement, plaintiffs, Sinco, and Bibinz agreed to arbitrate plaintiffs' claims, and plaintiffs took an assignment of Sinco's claims under the CGL policy against Fireman's Fund.

In exchange for a maximum prison term, defendant Christopher Allen Jones, Sr., pleaded no contest to several counts of criminal conduct and admitted a prior serious felony conviction and a prior prison term. To comply with the plea agreement and avoid the sentencing requirements of the â€

In exchange for a maximum prison term, defendant Christopher Allen Jones, Sr., pleaded no contest to several counts of criminal conduct and admitted a prior serious felony conviction and a prior prison term. To comply with the plea agreement and avoid the sentencing requirements of the â€

In exchange for a maximum prison term, defendant Christopher Allen Jones, Sr., pleaded no contest to several counts of criminal conduct and admitted a prior serious felony conviction and a prior prison term. To comply with the plea agreement and avoid the sentencing requirements of the â€

A modification decision.

Once again, we confront a familiar and moral/legal dilemma that the Legislature has attempted to resolve: when should the state intervene to care for the nondangerous mentally ill? This dilemma pits our belief in individual liberties against our desire to protect the helpless, incapacitated individual in need of immediate assistance.
Here, a jury found defendant, 62-year-old Carol K., gravely disabled beyond a reasonable doubt. The court appointed the public guardian to act as Carol's conservator under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPS Act; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5000 et seq.). The court ordered Carol placed in a locked skilled nursing facility as the least restrictive placement. Carol appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding that she is gravely disabled and cannot obtain food, clothing, or shelter. Court shall affirm the judgment.

Once again, we confront a familiar and moral/legal dilemma that the Legislature has attempted to resolve: when should the state intervene to care for the nondangerous mentally ill? This dilemma pits our belief in individual liberties against our desire to protect the helpless, incapacitated individual in need of immediate assistance.
Here, a jury found defendant, 62-year-old Carol K., gravely disabled beyond a reasonable doubt. The court appointed the public guardian to act as Carol's conservator under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPS Act; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5000 et seq.). The court ordered Carol placed in a locked skilled nursing facility as the least restrictive placement. Carol appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding that she is gravely disabled and cannot obtain food, clothing, or shelter. Court shall affirm the judgment.

C.S. (appellant), the father of H.S. and S.S. (the minors), appeals from the denial of his petition to modify prior orders of the juvenile court adjudicating the minors to be dependent children and removing them from parental custody. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 388, 395.)
The question posed is whether the belated submission of an expert's opinion, formed based on evidence that was available at the jurisdiction hearing, constitutes â€

The governing board of Selma Community Hospital (also SCH) terminated the hospital privileges of Brenton R. Smith, M.D., and Smith filed a petition for writ of mandamus seeking to have his hospital privileges reinstated. Smith prevailed in the writ proceeding and also won when the hospital appealed. (Smith v. Selma Community Hospital (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1478 [superior court's issuance of writ affirmed].) After the appeal, Smith filed a motion for attorney fees pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 809.9.[1] The trial court denied the motion, and Smith appealed.
Section 809.9 provides that the court shall award attorney fees â€

The governing board of Selma Community Hospital (also SCH) terminated the hospital privileges of Brenton R. Smith, M.D., and Smith filed a petition for writ of mandamus seeking to have his hospital privileges reinstated. Smith prevailed in the writ proceeding and also won when the hospital appealed. (Smith v. Selma Community Hospital (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1478 [superior court's issuance of writ affirmed].) After the appeal, Smith filed a motion for attorney fees pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 809.9.[1] The trial court denied the motion, and Smith appealed.
Section 809.9 provides that the court shall award attorney fees â€

The governing board of Selma Community Hospital (also SCH) terminated the hospital privileges of Brenton R. Smith, M.D., and Smith filed a petition for writ of mandamus seeking to have his hospital privileges reinstated. Smith prevailed in the writ proceeding and also won when the hospital appealed. (Smith v. Selma Community Hospital (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1478 [superior court's issuance of writ affirmed].) After the appeal, Smith filed a motion for attorney fees pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 809.9.[1] The trial court denied the motion, and Smith appealed.
Section 809.9 provides that the court shall award attorney fees â€

B.L., the presumed father of A., appeals from the dispositional order in this dependency case. The court, after declaring A. a dependent of the juvenile court, ordered her returned to the custody of her mother – with whom she resided prior to the initiation of the dependency case – and the provision to B.L. of what the social worker referred to as family â€

A modification decision.

A modification decision.