CA Pub. Decisions

A Modification decision.

A modification decision.

Plaintiff Robert Sandell appeals from a judgment entered after the court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant Taylor Listug, Inc. (Taylor-Listug) on Sandell's claims for disability and age discrimination. Sandell was employed as vice-president of sales at Taylor Listug, a guitar manufacturer, from 2004 to 2007.
Approximately six months into his employment at Taylor-Listug, Sandell suffered a stroke after receiving a chiropractic adjustment. Sandell returned to work at Taylor-Listug in late 2004. During the remainder of Sandell's employment at Taylor-Listug, he required a cane to walk, and his speech was noticeably slower than it had been prior to his stroke. Taylor-Listug's chief executive officer terminated Sandell's employment in late 2007, a few days after Sandell's 60th birthday, citing displeasure with Sandell's performance as vice president of sales .
The trial court concluded that there were no triable issues of fact with respect to Sandell's discrimination claims, and granted summary judgment in favor of Taylor-Listug. Having reviewed the record presented on summary judgment, we conclude that Sandell presented evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie case of disability and age discrimination, and in response to Taylor-Listug's proffer of legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating his employment, Sandell presented sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the motivation for his termination was discriminatory. We therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the matter for further proceedings.

Plaintiff Robert Sandell appeals from a judgment entered after the court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant Taylor Listug, Inc. (Taylor-Listug) on Sandell's claims for disability and age discrimination. Sandell was employed as vice-president of sales at Taylor Listug, a guitar manufacturer, from 2004 to 2007.
Approximately six months into his employment at Taylor-Listug, Sandell suffered a stroke after receiving a chiropractic adjustment. Sandell returned to work at Taylor-Listug in late 2004. During the remainder of Sandell's employment at Taylor-Listug, he required a cane to walk, and his speech was noticeably slower than it had been prior to his stroke. Taylor-Listug's chief executive officer terminated Sandell's employment in late 2007, a few days after Sandell's 60th birthday, citing displeasure with Sandell's performance as vice president of sales .
The trial court concluded that there were no triable issues of fact with respect to Sandell's discrimination claims, and granted summary judgment in favor of Taylor-Listug. Having reviewed the record presented on summary judgment, we conclude that Sandell presented evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie case of disability and age discrimination, and in response to Taylor-Listug's proffer of legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating his employment, Sandell presented sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the motivation for his termination was discriminatory. We therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the matter for further proceedings.

A modification decision.

In this appeal, we address the validity of the Hotel Service Charge Reform Ordinance (Ordinance) enacted by the City of Los Angeles (the City), requiring non-unionized hotels in the Century Corridor near Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) to pass along mandatory service charges to workers who render the services for which the charges have been collected. The Ordinance is based upon the City's determination that LAX-area hotels reap economic benefits from their location and have the responsibility and ability to pay these workers a decent compensation. Service workers have seen their income decline as a result of the hotels' practice of imposing mandatory service charges because patrons assume these charges are paid to the workers and therefore do not leave them a gratuity.

In this appeal, we address the validity of the Hotel Service Charge Reform Ordinance (Ordinance) enacted by the City of Los Angeles (the City), requiring non-unionized hotels in the Century Corridor near Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) to pass along mandatory service charges to workers who render the services for which the charges have been collected. The Ordinance is based upon the City's determination that LAX-area hotels reap economic benefits from their location and have the responsibility and ability to pay these workers a decent compensation. Service workers have seen their income decline as a result of the hotels' practice of imposing mandatory service charges because patrons assume these charges are paid to the workers and therefore do not leave them a gratuity.

A modification decision.

In this appeal, we consider the question of how much process is due a probationer in a probation extension proceeding. Defendant appeals an order granting a probation officer's request to extend by two years a three-year period of probation imposed following defendant's no contest plea to unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor. (Pen. Code, § 261.5, subd. (c).)[1] The request was made in a probation progress report to the court, which detailed defendant's failure to make progress in a sex offender therapy program mandated as a condition of probation. Defendant argues that a probationer in an extension proceeding is entitled to the same rights that obtain in a probation revocation proceeding and asserts that his federal due process rights of notice, confrontation, and factual findings were violated. We disagree with his initial premise and shall conclude that defendant was provided adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to the extension of his probation, and that his rights of procedural due process were not violated in any respect. Court also find adequate support in the record for the court's order extending probation. Court affirm.

In this appeal, we consider the question of how much process is due a probationer in a probation extension proceeding. Defendant appeals an order granting a probation officer's request to extend by two years a three-year period of probation imposed following defendant's no contest plea to unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor. (Pen. Code, § 261.5, subd. (c).)[1] The request was made in a probation progress report to the court, which detailed defendant's failure to make progress in a sex offender therapy program mandated as a condition of probation. Defendant argues that a probationer in an extension proceeding is entitled to the same rights that obtain in a probation revocation proceeding and asserts that his federal due process rights of notice, confrontation, and factual findings were violated. Court disagree with his initial premise and shall conclude that defendant was provided adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to the extension of his probation, and that his rights of procedural due process were not violated in any respect. We also find adequate support in the record for the court's order extending probation. Court affirm.

Appellants V.G. (mother) and J.V. (father) appeal from the juvenile court's orders terminating their parental rights as to the two children, V.V. (born January 2005) and Va.V. (born August 2008). ( ADDIN BA xc <@st> xl 34 s YCMGJH000001 xpl 1 l "Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 395, 366.26" Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 395, 366.26.)[1] The mother contends she was not notified of the section 388" section 388 hearing where her reunification services were terminated, and the juvenile court should have applied the parent-child and sibling bond exceptions to adoption. The father contends the juvenile court erred by preventing him from discharging retained counsel. Court shall affirm the juvenile court's orders.

Following a jury trial, Anthony Ireland (appellant) was convicted of four counts of forcible rape (Pen. Code, § 261, subd. (a)(2)).[1] As to each count, the jury found true the allegations that appellant used a deadly weapon (§ 12022.3, subd. (a)) and that he committed the crimes against multiple victims and with a deadly weapon (§ 667.61, subd. (e)(4), (5)). The trial court sentenced appellant to a total term of 100 years in state prison, consisting of four consecutive 25-year-to-life terms.
On appeal, appellant contends: (1) there is insufficient evidence to sustain his forcible rape convictions; (2) CALCRIM No. 1000 as given was insufficient; (3) CALCRIM No. 250 was given in error; (4) the trial court erred in failing to instruct on assault and battery as lesser included offenses; (5) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of an uncharged act; (6) CALCRIM Nos. 1191 and 2616 were given in error; and (7) trial counsel was ineffective. Court find no prejudicial error and affirm.

Following a jury trial, Anthony Ireland (appellant) was convicted of four counts of forcible rape (Pen. Code, § 261, subd. (a)(2)).[1] As to each count, the jury found true the allegations that appellant used a deadly weapon (§ 12022.3, subd. (a)) and that he committed the crimes against multiple victims and with a deadly weapon (§ 667.61, subd. (e)(4), (5)). The trial court sentenced appellant to a total term of 100 years in state prison, consisting of four consecutive 25-year-to-life terms.
On appeal, appellant contends: (1) there is insufficient evidence to sustain his forcible rape convictions; (2) CALCRIM No. 1000 as given was insufficient; (3) CALCRIM No. 250 was given in error; (4) the trial court erred in failing to instruct on assault and battery as lesser included offenses; (5) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of an uncharged act; (6) CALCRIM Nos. 1191 and 2616 were given in error; and (7) trial counsel was ineffective. Court find no prejudicial error and affirm.

A modification decision.