CA Pub. Decisions

Defendant was arrested on August 11, 2009, after a patsearch at Oakland International Airport revealed that he was carrying 900 grams (about two pounds) of crystal methamphetamine hidden in pockets of spandex shorts under his clothing. Defendant was charged with one felony count of possession of methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378--count 1), with an enhancement for possessing for sale more than 57 grams of the substance (Pen. Code, § 1203.073, subd. (b)(2)), and one felony count of transportation of methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a)--count 2). The information further alleged a prior strike (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subd. (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)). A jury convicted defendant of both counts and found the enhancement true, and defendant admitted the prior strike in a bifurcated proceeding.
The probation department reported that defendant was not a United States citizen, and that United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement had been notified of that fact on December 10, 2009. The probation department recommended that the court order that if defendant was deported, that he not return to the United States illegally.
After it first denied defendant's motion to dismiss his prior strike (People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497), the trial court sentenced defendant to the upper term of four years on the transportation count, doubled because of the strike, for a total of eight years in prison.[1] At the sentencing hearing, the trial court also ordered â€

In this dependency case (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300 et seq.), Dolly B., the mother of the minor child Scott. B. (Mother and Scott, respectively), appeals from a section 366.26 order that terminated her parental rights. At issue in the appeal is the applicability of a statutory exception to termination of parental rights the parent-child relationship exception. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) Mother contends the exception applies to her relationship with Scott and therefore the dependency court committed reversible error when it chose adoption as a permanent plan for Scott and terminated her parental rights. She contends the trial court should have identified legal guardianship as the appropriate permanent plan for the minor child. Our review of the record convinces us that Mother's position is well taken. Court will therefore reverse the order that identified adoption as Scott's permanent plan and terminated Mother's parental rights.

The CASA's and Department's final reports were for the October 22, 2009 section 366.26 hearing. The CASA's report states Scott was in a fifth grade special education class. He told the CASA he was doing well and was happy and he related the nice time he had on his birthday outings. He stated he was visiting with Mother every week and she was doing well. He stated he still wants to live with Mother but if he can't he wants to live with his foster mother.
The foster mother reported things had settled down at her home since Scott began working with a therapist and behaviorist. Scott was no longer acting out and was well-behaved except for some recent incidents of his lying to her and occasional anger issues, and he did acknowledge the lies when she asked him directly about them. She stated she had resumed having conversations with Scott about adoption because she was ready to move forward with it, and he was handling it much better than before. She stated Scott seemed to understand that he would not be living with Mother again and he wanted to continue living with the foster family. She said she told him that if she adopts him he will be able to continue to see Mother regularly. She reported Scott continued to look forward to his weekly visits with Mother.

A binder is a contract of insurance that provides coverage pending the issuance of the insurance policy. (Adams v. Explorer Ins. Co. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 438, 451 (Adams).) The central issue in this case is whether a document entitled â€

A binder is a contract of insurance that provides coverage pending the issuance of the insurance policy. (Adams v. Explorer Ins. Co. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 438, 451 (Adams).) The central issue in this case is whether a document entitled â€

A jury found defendant Gregory O. Tate guilty of the first degree murder of Sarah LaChapelle. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 189.)[1] The jury also found that defendant personally used a dangerous and deadly weapon, a knife (§ 12022), and that robbery-murder and burglary-murder special circumstances were true (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)). Defendant was sentenced to death. This appeal is automatic. We will affirm the judgment in its entirety.

A jury found defendant Gregory O. Tate guilty of the first degree murder of Sarah LaChapelle. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 189.)[1] The jury also found that defendant personally used a dangerous and deadly weapon, a knife (§ 12022), and that robbery-murder and burglary-murder special circumstances were true (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)). Defendant was sentenced to death. This appeal is automatic. We will affirm the judgment in its entirety.

A jury found defendant Gregory O. Tate guilty of the first degree murder of Sarah LaChapelle. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 189.)[1] The jury also found that defendant personally used a dangerous and deadly weapon, a knife (§ 12022), and that robbery-murder and burglary-murder special circumstances were true (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)). Defendant was sentenced to death. This appeal is automatic. Court will affirm the judgment in its entirety.

A jury found defendant Gregory O. Tate guilty of the first degree murder of Sarah LaChapelle. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 189.)[1] The jury also found that defendant personally used a dangerous and deadly weapon, a knife (§ 12022), and that robbery-murder and burglary-murder special circumstances were true (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)). Defendant was sentenced to death. This appeal is automatic. Court will affirm the judgment in its entirety.

A jury found defendant Gregory O. Tate guilty of the first degree murder of Sarah LaChapelle. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 189.)[1] The jury also found that defendant personally used a dangerous and deadly weapon, a knife (§ 12022), and that robbery-murder and burglary-murder special circumstances were true (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)). Defendant was sentenced to death. This appeal is automatic. Court will affirm the judgment in its entirety.

A jury found defendant Gregory O. Tate guilty of the first degree murder of Sarah LaChapelle. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 189.)[1] The jury also found that defendant personally used a dangerous and deadly weapon, a knife (§ 12022), and that robbery-murder and burglary-murder special circumstances were true (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)). Defendant was sentenced to death. This appeal is automatic. Court will affirm the judgment in its entirety.

A jury found defendant Gregory O. Tate guilty of the first degree murder of Sarah LaChapelle. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 189.)[1] The jury also found that defendant personally used a dangerous and deadly weapon, a knife (§ 12022), and that robbery-murder and burglary-murder special circumstances were true (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)). Defendant was sentenced to death. This appeal is automatic. Court will affirm the judgment in its entirety.

On June 4, 1980, Julie Cross, an agent of the United States Secret Service, was murdered in the line of duty. Over a decade later, defendant Andre Stephen Alexander was charged with Cross's murder. In 1996, a jury convicted him of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187),[1] and found true allegations that he personally used a firearm and that a principal was armed with a firearm (§§ 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022, subd. (a)). The jury also found true special circumstance allegations that defendant previously had been convicted of murder (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(2)) and that the murder of Cross had been committed in the course of a robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)). At the penalty phase of the trial, the jury returned a verdict of death. The trial court denied a motion for a new trial and the automatic motion to modify the penalty verdict (§ 190.4, subd. (e)), and it imposed the death sentence. Appeal to this court is automatic. (§ 1239, subd. (b).) Court affirm the judgment.

On June 4, 1980, Julie Cross, an agent of the United States Secret Service, was murdered in the line of duty. Over a decade later, defendant Andre Stephen Alexander was charged with Cross's murder. In 1996, a jury convicted him of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187),[1] and found true allegations that he personally used a firearm and that a principal was armed with a firearm (§§ 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022, subd. (a)). The jury also found true special circumstance allegations that defendant previously had been convicted of murder (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(2)) and that the murder of Cross had been committed in the course of a robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)). At the penalty phase of the trial, the jury returned a verdict of death. The trial court denied a motion for a new trial and the automatic motion to modify the penalty verdict (§ 190.4, subd. (e)), and it imposed the death sentence. Appeal to this court is automatic. (§ 1239, subd. (b).) Court affirm the judgment.