CA Pub. Decisions

On June 4, 1980, Julie Cross, an agent of the United States Secret Service, was murdered in the line of duty. Over a decade later, defendant Andre Stephen Alexander was charged with Cross's murder. In 1996, a jury convicted him of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187),[1] and found true allegations that he personally used a firearm and that a principal was armed with a firearm (§§ 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022, subd. (a)). The jury also found true special circumstance allegations that defendant previously had been convicted of murder (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(2)) and that the murder of Cross had been committed in the course of a robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)). At the penalty phase of the trial, the jury returned a verdict of death. The trial court denied a motion for a new trial and the automatic motion to modify the penalty verdict (§ 190.4, subd. (e)), and it imposed the death sentence. Appeal to this court is automatic. (§ 1239, subd. (b).) Court affirm the judgment.

On June 4, 1980, Julie Cross, an agent of the United States Secret Service, was murdered in the line of duty. Over a decade later, defendant Andre Stephen Alexander was charged with Cross's murder. In 1996, a jury convicted him of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187),[1] and found true allegations that he personally used a firearm and that a principal was armed with a firearm (§§ 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022, subd. (a)). The jury also found true special circumstance allegations that defendant previously had been convicted of murder (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(2)) and that the murder of Cross had been committed in the course of a robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)). At the penalty phase of the trial, the jury returned a verdict of death. The trial court denied a motion for a new trial and the automatic motion to modify the penalty verdict (§ 190.4, subd. (e)), and it imposed the death sentence. Appeal to this court is automatic. (§ 1239, subd. (b).) Court affirm the judgment.

On June 4, 1980, Julie Cross, an agent of the United States Secret Service, was murdered in the line of duty. Over a decade later, defendant Andre Stephen Alexander was charged with Cross's murder. In 1996, a jury convicted him of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187),[1] and found true allegations that he personally used a firearm and that a principal was armed with a firearm (§§ 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022, subd. (a)). The jury also found true special circumstance allegations that defendant previously had been convicted of murder (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(2)) and that the murder of Cross had been committed in the course of a robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)). At the penalty phase of the trial, the jury returned a verdict of death. The trial court denied a motion for a new trial and the automatic motion to modify the penalty verdict (§ 190.4, subd. (e)), and it imposed the death sentence. Appeal to this court is automatic. (§ 1239, subd. (b).) Court affirm the judgment.

On June 4, 1980, Julie Cross, an agent of the United States Secret Service, was murdered in the line of duty. Over a decade later, defendant Andre Stephen Alexander was charged with Cross's murder. In 1996, a jury convicted him of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187),[1] and found true allegations that he personally used a firearm and that a principal was armed with a firearm (§§ 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022, subd. (a)). The jury also found true special circumstance allegations that defendant previously had been convicted of murder (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(2)) and that the murder of Cross had been committed in the course of a robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)). At the penalty phase of the trial, the jury returned a verdict of death. The trial court denied a motion for a new trial and the automatic motion to modify the penalty verdict (§ 190.4, subd. (e)), and it imposed the death sentence. Appeal to this court is automatic. (§ 1239, subd. (b).) Court affirm the judgment.

On June 4, 1980, Julie Cross, an agent of the United States Secret Service, was murdered in the line of duty. Over a decade later, defendant Andre Stephen Alexander was charged with Cross's murder. In 1996, a jury convicted him of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187),[1] and found true allegations that he personally used a firearm and that a principal was armed with a firearm (§§ 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022, subd. (a)). The jury also found true special circumstance allegations that defendant previously had been convicted of murder (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(2)) and that the murder of Cross had been committed in the course of a robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)). At the penalty phase of the trial, the jury returned a verdict of death. The trial court denied a motion for a new trial and the automatic motion to modify the penalty verdict (§ 190.4, subd. (e)), and it imposed the death sentence. Appeal to this court is automatic. (§ 1239, subd. (b).) Court affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted defendant of two robberies, with a murder in the course of the second. It found he had used a firearm in all the offenses and found true a robbery-murder special circumstance. Because the jury set the penalty at death, this appeal is automatic. Court affirm.

A jury convicted defendant of two robberies, with a murder in the course of the second. It found he had used a firearm in all the offenses and found true a robbery-murder special circumstance. Because the jury set the penalty at death, this appeal is automatic. Court affirm.

A jury convicted defendant of two robberies, with a murder in the course of the second. It found he had used a firearm in all the offenses and found true a robbery-murder special circumstance. Because the jury set the penalty at death, this appeal is automatic. Court affirm.

A jury convicted defendant of two robberies, with a murder in the course of the second. It found he had used a firearm in all the offenses and found true a robbery-murder special circumstance. Because the jury set the penalty at death, this appeal is automatic. Court affirm.

A jury convicted defendant of two robberies, with a murder in the course of the second. It found he had used a firearm in all the offenses and found true a robbery-murder special circumstance. Because the jury set the penalty at death, this appeal is automatic. Court affirm.

On May 22, 1992, petitioner Alfredo Valdez was sentenced to death for the April 30, 1989 murder of Ernesto Macias. On June 14, 2002, while the automatic appeal to this court was pending, Valdez filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus. On January 6, 2004, in the automatic appeal, we affirmed the judgment of death in People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73.
On November 17, 2004, we issued an order to show cause why relief should not be granted on the ground that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. On February 7, 2007, following the filing of a return and reply, we ordered the Los Angeles Superior Court to appoint a referee to conduct an evidentiary hearing and make findings on several questions. Judge Charles E. Horan was appointed and, following an evidentiary hearing, filed his referee's report on December 4, 2008, answering each question and concluding that petitioner did not establish that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel.
Having considered the parties' briefs and exceptions to the referee's report, for the reasons that follow we adopt the referee's report and deny the petition for writ of habeas corpus.

The order to show cause is discharged and the petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied.

In California, labor relations between most local public entities and their employees are governed by the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA) (Gov. Code, § 3500 et seq.), which recognizes the right of public employees to bargain collectively with their employers over wages and other terms of employment. The administrative agency authorized to adjudicate unfair labor practice charges under the MMBA is the California Public Employment Relations Board (PERB). Subject to certain exceptions, local public agencies and their employees must exhaust their administrative remedies under the MMBA by applying to PERB for relief before they can ask a court to intervene in a labor dispute.
California allows public employees to go on strike to enforce their collective bargaining demands unless the striking employees perform jobs that are essential to public welfare. But whether a particular employee's job is so essential that the employee may not legally strike is a complex and fact-intensive matter, and one on which public employee organizations and public entities may disagree.
Here, we address this issue: If a public entity is of the view that a threatened strike by its employees will be unlawful because a strike by some or all of the employees creates a substantial and imminent threat to public health and safety, must the public entity first file an unfair labor practice complaint with PERB and await PERB's adjudication of the complaint before asking a court for an injunction prohibiting the strike?

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