CA Pub. Decisions

Court have long recognized that â€

Defendant was convicted of leaving the scene of an accident resulting in death,[1] and was placed on felony probation pursuant to Penal Code section 1203.1.[2] As a condition of probation, the court ordered defendant to pay restitution for the victim's final hospital expenses. After the prosecutor represented that the deceased had no â€

Defendant Honorio Moreno Herrera was a member of the criminal street gang known as â€

Defendant Honorio Moreno Herrera was a member of the criminal street gang known as â€

Charged by felony complaint with threatening and resisting an arresting officer in the performance of his duties (Pen. Code, §§ 422, 69), petitioner Moises Galindo brought a Pitchess motion (see Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531; Evid. Code, §§ 1043-1045) for disclosure of prior citizen complaints made against the arresting officer and four other officers involved in the incident.
Pitchess motions are so named after this court's 1974 decision in Pitchess v. Superior Court, supra, 11 Cal.3d 531, which afforded criminal defendants a judicially created right to discovery of prior citizen complaints alleging misconduct by California peace officers. In 1978, the Legislature codified the right and set forth which officer records are subject to Pitchess discovery. (Pen.
Code, §§ 832.7, 832.8; Evid. Code, §§ 1043-1045.) As relevant here, these statutes permit a criminal defendant to â€

Charged by felony complaint with threatening and resisting an arresting officer in the performance of his duties (Pen. Code, §§ 422, 69), petitioner Moises Galindo brought a Pitchess motion (see Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531; Evid. Code, §§ 1043-1045) for disclosure of prior citizen complaints made against the arresting officer and four other officers involved in the incident.
Pitchess motions are so named after this court's 1974 decision in Pitchess v. Superior Court, supra, 11 Cal.3d 531, which afforded criminal defendants a judicially created right to discovery of prior citizen complaints alleging misconduct by California peace officers. In 1978, the Legislature codified the right and set forth which officer records are subject to Pitchess discovery. (Pen.



Code, §§ 832.7, 832.8; Evid. Code, §§ 1043-1045.) As relevant here, these statutes permit a criminal defendant to â€

Travis Eugene Blair appeals from six orders denying his petitions for waiver of restitution and courts fees in six cases which we consider and disposed of together. (Rebney v. Wells Fargo Bank (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 1117, 1128.)
In six cases in Ventura Superior Court, appellant was convicted of seven offenses: he was convicted twice of possessing of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a), Nos. CR45191 & CR46644), twice of committing identity theft (Pen. Code, § 530.5, subd. (a),[1] No. 2002005046), twice of committing petty theft with a prior (§ 666, Nos. 2003038976 & 2006038254), and once of receiving stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a), No. 2008045120).

Torrey Hills Community Coalition (Torrey Hills) appeals a judgment dismissing its petition for writ of mandate challenging the City of San Diego's (the City) approval of a development project by real parties in interest Westbrook Torrey Hills, L.P., AME Torrey View, LLC, and Pacific Centre Carmel Valley, LLC (collectively Westbrook). The trial court found Torrey Hills (1) violated Government Code section 66499.37, which applies to claims made under the Subdivision Map Act (SMA) (Gov. Code, § 66410 et seq.), by not serving a summons within 90 days of the City's approval of the project; and (2) violated Public Resources Code section 21167.4, subdivision (a), by not filing a written request for a hearing within 90 days of the filing of the writ petition on claims brought under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.). As to the first issue, Torrey Hills contends the 90-day period was tolled under Code of Civil Procedure section 583.240, subdivision (d) for impossibility. As to the second issue, Torrey Hills contends the court misinterpreted Public Resources Code section 21167.4, subdivision (a) to require a written request, and it raises an impossibility argument. Court affirm the judgment.

In separate incidents, Tommy Angel Mesa, a gang member, shot and severely wounded two complete strangers. He used the same gun in both incidents, and later was found in possession of the gun and several rounds of ammunition. Mesa was convicted of two counts of assault with a firearm, three counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm, one count of being a felon in possession of ammunition, and two counts of actively participating in a criminal street gang.
With respect to the assault convictions, the jury found true great bodily injury and personal firearm allegations. With respect to one of the assault convictions and one of firearm possession counts, the jury found gang participation allegations true.

In separate incidents, Tommy Angel Mesa, a gang member, shot and severely wounded two complete strangers. He used the same gun in both incidents, and later was found in possession of the gun and several rounds of ammunition. Mesa was convicted of two counts of assault with a firearm, three counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm, one count of being a felon in possession of ammunition, and two counts of actively participating in a criminal street gang.
With respect to the assault convictions, the jury found true great bodily injury and personal firearm allegations. With respect to one of the assault convictions and one of firearm possession counts, the jury found gang participation allegations true.

Defendant and appellant Safety National Casualty Corporation (the surety) appeals the trial court's denial of its motion to set aside forfeiture of a bail bond and to exonerate bail. The surety contends that the trial court lost jurisdiction to declare the forfeiture because it contends that the clerk failed to give notice of the forfeiture as required. For the reasons that follow, we reject the surety's contention and affirm the court's order.

Eagle Ranch Residential, LLC, doing business as Tanamera Homes and Resort Communities, LLC (Tanamera), constructed a residential development in Victorville known as Shenandoah at Eagle Ranch (Eagle Ranch). Clarendon America Insurance Company (Clarendon) and North American Capacity Insurance Company (NAC), the parties to the present action, insured Tanamera under separate and consecutive general commercial liability policies.
In the present action, Clarendon sued NAC for declaratory relief, equitable contribution, and partial equitable indemnity, seeking a proportionate or equitable share of sums Clarendon expended to defend Tanamera in a construction defect action brought by the owners of 43 Eagle Ranch homes (the Bradley action).[1] NAC moved for summary judgment on the ground its duty to defend Tanamera in the Bradley action never arose because Tanamera never paid a $25,000 â€

Eagle Ranch Residential, LLC, doing business as Tanamera Homes and Resort Communities, LLC (Tanamera), constructed a residential development in Victorville known as Shenandoah at Eagle Ranch (Eagle Ranch). Clarendon America Insurance Company (Clarendon) and North American Capacity Insurance Company (NAC), the parties to the present action, insured Tanamera under separate and consecutive general commercial liability policies.
In the present action, Clarendon sued NAC for declaratory relief, equitable contribution, and partial equitable indemnity, seeking a proportionate or equitable share of sums Clarendon expended to defend Tanamera in a construction defect action brought by the owners of 43 Eagle Ranch homes (the Bradley action).[1] NAC moved for summary judgment on the ground its duty to defend Tanamera in the Bradley action never arose because Tanamera never paid a $25,000 â€

This is an appeal by Cesar Garcia, plaintiff and appellant (hereafter plaintiff), from the summary judgment entered against him, both as an individual and as the representative of the estate of his daughter, Alexis Garcia, and in favor of defendant and respondent W&W Community Development, Inc., doing business as Children's Plus Foster Agency (hereafter defendant), on plaintiff's complaint seeking damages based on negligence and wrongful death. In the operative first amended complaint, plaintiff alleged that his two-year-old daughter Alexis drowned on August 16, 2006, when her foster mother, Irma Henry, left the child unattended for up to five minutes in a bathtub half filled with water. According to the complaint, defendant, a state licensed foster family agency, had placed Alexis and her four-year-old brother in the licensed foster home of Irma Henry and her husband Walter after the County of Riverside declared the children dependents of the court and removed them from the custody of their mother.