CA Pub. Decisions

A modification decision.

In this action for insurance bad faith, plaintiff S.B.C.C., doing business as South Bay Construction Company (South Bay) alleged that its insurer, defendant St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company (St. Paul) had wrongfully refused to defend South Bay in an action brought by its competitor, San Jose Construction, Inc. (SJC). The superior court found no duty to defend because an exclusion in South Bay's liability policy eliminated any potential coverage for advertising injury, and the harm to SJC was not "personal injury" within the meaning of the policy language. The court accordingly denied South Bay's motion for summary adjudication and granted summary judgment to St. Paul. We conclude that the allegations of SJC's complaint did not trigger a duty to defend South Bay under the contract terms. We therefore must affirm the judgment.

The aim and purpose of Welfare and Institutions Code section 387[1] is the removal of a dependent child from the custody of a parent, guardian, relative, or friend and the placement of that child in a foster home or county institution. The section provides the procedure by which such placement change is made, and is, by design to be used for children who have not been freed for adoption. Section 387 does not contemplate placement in an adoptive home, and is not appropriate for children for whom parental rights have been terminated.
The aim and purpose of section 388 is to provide a means for any person having an interest in a dependent child to petition the court for a hearing to change or modify a previous court order. The section is broad in scope, and encompasses any change in circumstances affecting the dependent child. Section 388 is appropriate for a child who has been freed for adoption, and provides a procedural vehicle to change the child's placement based on changed circumstances.

This is an appeal from an order denying the defendants' motion to compel arbitration. Applying the law to the undisputed facts and exercising our independent judgment, we reverse the trial court's ruling. As we explain below, the plaintiff cannot avoid arbitrating its claims against the signatory defendant, because those claims are within the reach of the arbitration clause. And the plaintiff cannot avoid arbitrating its claims against the nonsignatory defendant, because those claims are inextricably bound up with the obligations arising out of the agreement containing the arbitration clause.

This is an appeal from an order denying the defendants' motion to compel arbitration. Applying the law to the undisputed facts and exercising our independent judgment, we reverse the trial court's ruling. As we explain below, the plaintiff cannot avoid arbitrating its claims against the signatory defendant, because those claims are within the reach of the arbitration clause. And the plaintiff cannot avoid arbitrating its claims against the nonsignatory defendant, because those claims are inextricably bound up with the obligations arising out of the agreement containing the arbitration clause.

This is an appeal from an order denying the defendants' motion to compel arbitration. Applying the law to the undisputed facts and exercising our independent judgment, we reverse the trial court's ruling. As we explain below, the plaintiff cannot avoid arbitrating its claims against the signatory defendant, because those claims are within the reach of the arbitration clause. And the plaintiff cannot avoid arbitrating its claims against the nonsignatory defendant, because those claims are inextricably bound up with the obligations arising out of the agreement containing the arbitration clause.

This is an appeal from an order denying the defendants' motion to compel arbitration. Applying the law to the undisputed facts and exercising our independent judgment, we reverse the trial court's ruling. As we explain below, the plaintiff cannot avoid arbitrating its claims against the signatory defendant, because those claims are within the reach of the arbitration clause. And the plaintiff cannot avoid arbitrating its claims against the nonsignatory defendant, because those claims are inextricably bound up with the obligations arising out of the agreement containing the arbitration clause.

For years Revenue and Taxation Code[1] section 24402 allowed California corporate taxpayers to deduct a portion of the dividends they received from another corporation when those dividends were included in the payer's measure of California franchise, income or alternative minimum tax. The court in Farmer Bros. Co. v. Franchise Tax Board (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 976, 980, 986-987 (Farmer Bros.) held that section 24402 violates the commerce clause of the United States Constitution by allowing the dividends received deduction where the dividend-paying corporation was subject to California tax, but disallowing it where such corporation was not subject to California tax.

Court affirm the judgment (1) dismissing River Garden's cause of action for a refund of taxes based on the section 24402 dividends received deduction, following the sustaining of the FTB's demurrer without leave to amend; and (2) granting summary judgment in favor of the FTB on River Garden's cause of action for refund of the amnesty penalties.

A modification decision.

A modification decision.

R. Brian Hines and Jane Hines appeal from the San Francisco Superior Court's denial of their petition for writ of administrative mandate. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5.) Appellants' writ petition sought to overturn the approval by the Sonoma County Board of Supervisors (Board) of a coastal permit to construct a residence and a use permit allowing reduction of the riparian corridor setback from 100 feet to 50 feet for the project. The writ petition also challenged the California Coastal Commission's (Coastal Commission or Commission) refusal to exercise jurisdiction over appellants' appeal on the grounds that the appeal presented â€

R. Brian Hines and Jane Hines appeal from the San Francisco Superior Court's denial of their petition for writ of administrative mandate. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5.) Appellants' writ petition sought to overturn the approval by the Sonoma County Board of Supervisors (Board) of a coastal permit to construct a residence and a use permit allowing reduction of the riparian corridor setback from 100 feet to 50 feet for the project. The writ petition also challenged the California Coastal Commission's (Coastal Commission or Commission) refusal to exercise jurisdiction over appellants' appeal on the grounds that the appeal presented â€

Plaintiff David B. Reeves, age 56, applied for a position as a staff attorney with defendant MV Transportation, Inc. He was not one of the people chosen to be interviewed, and the job was given to someone forty years old. He sued defendant for age discrimination, and the court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff contends that there are triable issues arising from his superior qualifications for the position, defendant's inconsistent explanations for not hiring him, and defendant's spoliation of evidence. Court disagree and affirm the judgment for defendant.