CA Pub. Decisions

Appellant Matthew Donald Thompson (Thompson) is a white police officer who has been employed by the City of Monrovia Police Department (Department) since 1997. In 2008, he sued the Department for harassment and hostile work environment arising from offensive remarks and behavior directed at an African American colleague, retaliation for Thompson's reports of the misconduct, and failure to investigate his claims of harassment and retaliation. The trial court granted the Department's motion for summary judgment. Court affirm.

Appellant Matthew Donald Thompson (Thompson) is a white police officer who has been employed by the City of Monrovia Police Department (Department) since 1997. In 2008, he sued the Department for harassment and hostile work environment arising from offensive remarks and behavior directed at an African American colleague, retaliation for Thompson's reports of the misconduct, and failure to investigate his claims of harassment and retaliation. The trial court granted the Department's motion for summary judgment. Court affirm.

Petitioner Adolfo Davis was charged with the attempted murder of David Ochoa, who, along with other witnesses, identified Davis as the man who shot him. A confidential informant also told police officers that he saw Davis shoot Ochoa. When Davis filed a motion to obtain the name of that informant and percipient witness, the trial court denied it. Davis petitioned this court for a writ of mandate[1] and argued that disclosure was mandatory. We disagree that disclosure of the confidential informant's identity was mandatory simply because the informant was also a percipient witness, but we agree that an in camera hearing should be held. We therefore grant the petition for a writ of mandate and order the trial court to hold an in camera hearing.

Orlando C., a minor (minor), appeals from an order declaring him a ward of the juvenile court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602[1] by reason of his having willfully disobeyed a court order (Pen. Code, § 166, subd. (a)(4)) by violating a gang injunction. The juvenile court placed him on informal probation for six months, setting a maximum term of confinement of six months. Minor contends that vacation of the judgment and dismissal of the section 602 petition are required because (1) he was not a person subject to the gang injunction, (2) there was no evidence his parent had been served with, or had knowledge of, the gang injunction, and (3) the gang injunction is constitutionally overbroad, violating his constitutional rights to freedom of association and travel or movement. Minor also requests that we correct the minute order of May 12, 2009, to accurately identify the petition that the juvenile court sustained and the petition that it dismissed. Court affirm with directions.

In this personal injury lawsuit, plaintiff Katya Bozzi appeals from the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants Nordstrom, Inc., South Bay Center, LLC (collectively Nordstrom), and Kone, Inc. (Kone). Bozzi was riding the down escalator to the first floor of a Nordstrom department store when the escalator stopped abruptly due to a power outage that was apparently caused by a nearby traffic accident. We affirm the judgment, finding plaintiff did not show there was a triable issue of fact that defendants breached any duty of care or that the escalator was defective.

This appeal involves a question of first impression. We are asked to determine the proper calculation under Revenue and Taxation Code section 97.75 of the fee a county may charge local governmental entities within its jurisdiction for the services counties perform under two specifically designated tax statutes, the so-called Triple Flip (§ 97.68) and the VLF Swap (§ 97.70). Appellants (plaintiffs below), 47[1] of the 88 general law or charter cities in the County of Los Angeles, petitioned the trial court for a writ of administrative mandamus contending that defendants, the County of Los Angeles and Wendy Watanabe in her official capacity as the County's Auditor-Controller (together the County), failed to follow the law and violated a clear and plain duty in calculating the section 97.75 service fee. A referee found that the County was faithfully following the law. Petitioners appeal from the judgment adopting the referee's ruling. We conclude the statute is clear on its face and hold that the County's method of calculating its fee under section 97.75 was unlawful. Accordingly, Court reverse the judgment and remand for further proceedings.

Appellant Baishali Das asserted claims based on the elder abuse statutes (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15600 et seq.), alleging that respondent Bank of America, N.A., failed to report financial abuse involving her father (now deceased), and engaged in other misconduct regarding him.[1] After sustaining demurrers to appellant's claims without leave to amend, the trial court entered a judgment of dismissal. Although appellant's complaints vividly depict the reprehensible victimization of her father by third parties, they allege no facts supporting claims against respondent. Court therefore affirm.

The judgment is affirmed. Respondent is awarded its costs on appeal.

Penal Code section 3001, subdivision (a)[1] provides that a person who has been released on parole for five years, and has been on parole continuously for three years since release from confinement, shall be discharged within 30 days, unless it is decided for good cause, that the person will be retained on parole.
Nicholas Torres (petitioner) was released to serve a five-year parole term in November 2005. Torres was on parole continuously for three years. In December 2008, during the 30-day review period when the Board of Parole Hearings (Board) was required to determine whether to retain petitioner on parole, petitioner was returned to custody on a parole violation charge. The Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (Department) did not recommend that petitioner be retained on parole, and the Board did not retain petitioner on parole, during the 30-day review period.

In an effort to force a nationwide laundry company to employ only union members and to improve their working conditions, a labor union commenced a campaign utilizing a variation of a technique known as secondary picketing. The campaign was directed at a group of hospitals that used the services of the laundry company. The union mailed postcards to prospective clients of the hospitals, warning them that the hospitals had their laundry cleaned by a company that did not ensure the cleaned linens would be free of blood, feces, and other harmful pathogens. The postcards were intended to (1) dissuade people from using the hospitals because of the laundry company's shortcomings, thus (2) put pressure on the hospitals to stop using the laundry company's services, which would (3) persuade the laundry company to agree to the union's demands in order to avoid the loss of the hospitals' business.
The hospitals fought back. Armed with evidence that their inspection control and linen handling policies ensured the delivery of hygienically clean laundry to all their patients, but that the union's postcard campaign had caused fewer patients to use the hospitals, the hospitals sued the union for defamation, trade libel, and intentional interference with prospective economic relations.

In an effort to force a nationwide laundry company to employ only union members and to improve their working conditions, a labor union commenced a campaign utilizing a variation of a technique known as secondary picketing. The campaign was directed at a group of hospitals that used the services of the laundry company. The union mailed postcards to prospective clients of the hospitals, warning them that the hospitals had their laundry cleaned by a company that did not ensure the cleaned linens would be free of blood, feces, and other harmful pathogens. The postcards were intended to (1) dissuade people from using the hospitals because of the laundry company's shortcomings, thus (2) put pressure on the hospitals to stop using the laundry company's services, which would (3) persuade the laundry company to agree to the union's demands in order to avoid the loss of the hospitals' business.
The hospitals fought back. Armed with evidence that their inspection control and linen handling policies ensured the delivery of hygienically clean laundry to all their patients, but that the union's postcard campaign had caused fewer patients to use the hospitals, the hospitals sued the union for defamation, trade libel, and intentional interference with prospective economic relations.

The Reporting by School Employees of Improper Governmental Activities Act (Act), a whistle-blower act, (Ed. Code, §§ 44110-44114),[1] in section 44113, makes school officials liable in damages for interfering with the right of a school teacher to disclose evidence of improper governmental activities to an administrator or school board.
Plaintiff, Christina Conn, a second year probationary teacher, was denied tenure when she was not reelected to a third year of employment.[2] She claims that her nonreelection was intended to interfere with her right to disclose â€

The Reporting by School Employees of Improper Governmental Activities Act (Act), a whistle-blower act, (Ed. Code, §§ 44110-44114),[1] in section 44113, makes school officials liable in damages for interfering with the right of a school teacher to disclose evidence of improper governmental activities to an administrator or school board.
Plaintiff, Christina Conn, a second year probationary teacher, was denied tenure when she was not reelected to a third year of employment.[2] She claims that her nonreelection was intended to interfere with her right to disclose â€

In this appeal we conclude that the property of a guarantor of a debt‑‑a debt which is secured by the real property of the principal debtor and also that of a joint and several co-guarantor‑‑is subject to attachment where the guarantor has contractually waived the benefit of that security.
Accordingly, we shall affirm the trial court's appealable orders of attachment (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(5)),[1] which reached the same conclusion.