CA Pub. Decisions

In this case, a union peacefully picketed in front of a grocery store, a private forum, contrary to the grocery store's demands that the union not use the private property for its expressive activities (its â€

In this case, a union peacefully picketed in front of a grocery store, a private forum, contrary to the grocery store's demands that the union not use the private property for its expressive activities (its â€

Following the death of his ex-wife, William C. Schopfer (father) shared custody of his daughter, Jennifer, with her stepfather, Daniel C. Bonebrake (stepfather). Pursuant to a court order, father also paid stepfather $900 each month in child support. Four months before Jennifer was expected to graduate from high school, however, and a month before she was to turn 18, father moved to reduce his child support obligation to zero. The trial court denied his motion.

Jewel Jackson sued the County of Amador and its recorder (collectively, the County), alleging that the county recorder violated section 27203 of the Government Code by â€

On May 22, 2008, plaintiff filed a COMPLAINT FOR PERSONAL INJURIES against Formela, alleging that plaintiff, a Sacramento County resident, sustained injuries in an automobile accident with Formela in San Mateo County on December 11, 2004. The complaint alleged Formela was a citizen and resident of Germany and had been absent from California since December 12, 2004, such that section 351 tolled the limitations period.
Plaintiff served process on the director of the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV), as authorized by Vehicle Code section 17451, post, but asserted difficulty in locating a correct address for Formela in Germany.
On September 17, 2008, plaintiff filed an amended complaint, alleging Formela was deceased and changing the named defendant to â€

In this case, the services of an appointed counsel and a deputy attorney general, together with three justices and staff of this court, are applied to the resolution of a single issue: whether the court's order imposing a $34 fine on defendant was proper under Penal Code section 1202.5, subdivision (a) (hereafter § 1202.5(a)).[1] Defendant argues the court erred and the fine must be reduced to $10.
We shall conclude that indeed the court erred, but the error benefitted defendant and, as the Attorney General correctly asserts, the court should have imposed a total fine of $66. Court shall modify the judgment accordingly and affirm in all other respects.

In this case, on review from the Appellate Division of the Yolo County Superior Court, we hold that a person who held a commercial driver's license at the time of violation of a traffic offense, but who surrendered the license, is barred from completing traffic school in lieu of adjudicating the traffic offense pursuant to Vehicle Code section 42005, subdivision (c), notwithstanding that the section refers to the present tense â€

The main issue in this appeal is whether the California Department of Personnel Administration (DPA) has authority to direct the State Controller temporarily to defer paying state employees' salaries (except for federally-mandated minimum wages) when appropriations are unavailable due to the state Legislature's failure to enact a timely state budget. (Gov. Code, § 12440.[1]) Although DPA merely sought to implement a California Supreme Court decision (White v. Davis (2003) 30 Cal.4th 528), the Controller disagrees with DPA's interpretation of the judicial opinion.
Plaintiffs DPA and its director David A. Gilb (collectively, DPA) sought declaratory and other relief against defendants State Controller John Chiang and the Office of State Controller (collectively, the Controller). Various state employee groups intervened in support of the Controller.[2]
Despite â€

The main issue in this appeal is whether the California Department of Personnel Administration (DPA) has authority to direct the State Controller temporarily to defer paying state employees' salaries (except for federally-mandated minimum wages) when appropriations are unavailable due to the state Legislature's failure to enact a timely state budget. (Gov. Code, § 12440.[1]) Although DPA merely sought to implement a California Supreme Court decision (White v. Davis (2003) 30 Cal.4th 528), the Controller disagrees with DPA's interpretation of the judicial opinion.
Plaintiffs DPA and its director David A. Gilb (collectively, DPA) sought declaratory and other relief against defendants State Controller John Chiang and the Office of State Controller (collectively, the Controller). Various state employee groups intervened in support of the Controller.[2]
Despite â€

The main issue in this appeal is whether the California Department of Personnel Administration (DPA) has authority to direct the State Controller temporarily to defer paying state employees' salaries (except for federally-mandated minimum wages) when appropriations are unavailable due to the state Legislature's failure to enact a timely state budget. (Gov. Code, § 12440.[1]) Although DPA merely sought to implement a California Supreme Court decision (White v. Davis (2003) 30 Cal.4th 528), the Controller disagrees with DPA's interpretation of the judicial opinion.
Plaintiffs DPA and its director David A. Gilb (collectively, DPA) sought declaratory and other relief against defendants State Controller John Chiang and the Office of State Controller (collectively, the Controller). Various state employee groups intervened in support of the Controller.[2]
Despite â€

A modification decision.

Petitioner Warren Granard Watford petitions for a writ of habeas corpus directing the Placer County Superior Court to vacate its judgment of conviction for failing to register as a sex offender because the predicate sex offense has been vacated and will not be retried. Petitioner asserts the predicate offense is now void ab initio, and thus he was never required to register and cannot be held for failing to register.
We disagree and deny the petition.

In this case an employee at a municipal water treatment plant was injured on the job. When she was recovering from her injury, she was notified she had been terminated because the city did not believe she could perform the essential functions of her job. She then brought an action under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), Government Code[1] section 12940 et seq. in which she alleged the city had failed to attempt to accommodate her disability and that she was capable of performing the essential functions of her job.
The trial court agreed with the employee, but found reinstatement was not appropriate because it would require that the city discharge another employee. The trial court awarded the employee back pay and emotional distress damages. However, the court declined to award the employee any compensation for future lost wages or so-called "front pay."
On appeal the city argues that because, following notice to her that it believed she could not perform her job, the employee never expressly requested an accommodation or otherwise indicated that she wanted to continue working, it had no duty to offer any accommodation. For her part, by way of a cross-appeal, the employee argues the trial court should have awarded her future lost wages.
We agree with the city's contention it did not have to offer the employee any accommodation. The record shows that almost one year after the employee was injured, the city's workers compensation administrator advised her that its doctor did not believe she would be able to return to her job and offered her rehabilitation and retraining benefits. The employee accepted the benefits and did not directly contact her employer about her status. More than 18 months after the employee was injured, the city formally terminated her employment. This record shows the employee was given ample opportunity to express interest in retaining her job. For more than 18 months she failed to do so, but instead accepted retraining benefits for another career. Given these circumstances, where the employee failed to express any meaningful or definitive interest in retaining her job, FEHA did not require that her employer discuss with or offer her accommodations for her disability.

In this case, Pearson Ford Co., an automobile dealer, backdated a contract it had entered into with Reginald Nelson, the vehicle buyer. Backdating the contract rendered inaccurate the disclosed annual percentage rate (APR), and resulted in Nelson paying interest for a time period that no contract existed. Pearson Ford also failed to list in the contract Nelson's purchase of automobile liability insurance, and erroneously added the insurance premium to the sales price of the vehicle.
Nelson sued Pearson Ford alleging violations of the Automobile Sales Finance Act (ASFA) (Civ. Code, § 2981 et seq.), California's unfair competition law (UCL) (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.), and the Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) (Civ. Code, § 1750 et seq.) (All undesignated statutory references are to the Civil Code.) The trial court certified the matter as a class action, with two classes: the backdating class and the insurance class. After a bench trial, the trial court found Pearson Ford not liable under the ASFA to the backdating class, but liable under the ASFA to the insurance class. It also found Pearson Ford liable to both classes under the UCL, but not the CLRA. The trial court issued certain remedies under the ASFA and the UCL, and awarded Nelson his attorney fees and costs under the ASFA. Both parties appeal.
Nelson asserts the trial court erred in finding Pearson Ford not liable to the backdating class under the ASFA, and not liable under the CLRA. Nelson also contends the trial court erred in the remedies it awarded under the UCL. On cross-appeal, Pearson Ford asserts it complied with the ASFA as to both classes, the class representative (Nelson) lacked standing under the UCL, and the trial court erred in the remedies it awarded under the ASFA and the UCL. Pearson Ford also contends the trial court erred in finding the Code of Civil Procedure section 998 offer it made to Nelson invalid; accordingly, it asserts that the attorney fee and costs award should be reversed.
We conclude that the portion of the judgment finding Pearson Ford not liable to the backdating class under the ASFA and the CLRA must be reversed. We agree with Pearson Ford that the trial court erred in the remedies it awarded under the ASFA and the UCL, and that the court erred in issuing a permanent injunction under the UCL as to the insurance class. We agree with Nelson that the portion of the judgment returning to Pearson Ford any sums remaining after the payment of all valid claims must be reversed, and direct the trial court to comply with Code of Civil Procedure section 384 as to both classes. We remand the matter to determine, consistent with the views expressed in this opinion, appropriate statutory remedies for: both classes under the ASFA; the insurance class under the ASFA and the UCL; and the backdating class under the CLRA. Finally, we agree with the trial court's conclusion regarding the invalidity of Pearson Ford's Code of Civil Procedure section 998 offer.