CA Pub. Decisions

Defendants, Freddie Howard Jones, Shawney Jackson, and Jamie Cox, appeal from their convictions for murder (Pen. Code,[1] § 187, subd. (a)) and the jurors' findings that a principal personally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury and death (§§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c), (d)) and the murder was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang. (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C).) Ms. Cox and Mr. Jackson were convicted of first degree murder. Mr. Jones was convicted of second degree murder. We affirm the judgments with modifications.
In the published portion of this opinion, we discuss defendants' arguments that the trial court failed to discharge the jury panel after the prosecutor exercised nine peremptory challenges against African-American jurors. Court conclude the trial court complied with its constitutional obligation to engage in a sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate the nondiscriminatory justifications provided by the deputy district attorney. Thus, no constitutional error occurred during the jury selection process.

Defendants, Freddie Howard Jones, Shawney Jackson, and Jamie Cox, appeal from their convictions for murder (Pen. Code,[1] § 187, subd. (a)) and the jurors' findings that a principal personally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury and death (§§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c), (d)) and the murder was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang. (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C).) Ms. Cox and Mr. Jackson were convicted of first degree murder. Mr. Jones was convicted of second degree murder. We affirm the judgments with modifications.
In the published portion of this opinion, we discuss defendants' arguments that the trial court failed to discharge the jury panel after the prosecutor exercised nine peremptory challenges against African-American jurors. Court conclude the trial court complied with its constitutional obligation to engage in a sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate the nondiscriminatory justifications provided by the deputy district attorney. Thus, no constitutional error occurred during the jury selection process.

Defendants, Freddie Howard Jones, Shawney Jackson, and Jamie Cox, appeal from their convictions for murder (Pen. Code,[1] § 187, subd. (a)) and the jurors' findings that a principal personally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury and death (§§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c), (d)) and the murder was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang. (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C).) Ms. Cox and Mr. Jackson were convicted of first degree murder. Mr. Jones was convicted of second degree murder. We affirm the judgments with modifications.
In the published portion of this opinion, we discuss defendants' arguments that the trial court failed to discharge the jury panel after the prosecutor exercised nine peremptory challenges against African-American jurors. We conclude the trial court complied with its constitutional obligation to engage in a sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate the nondiscriminatory justifications provided by the deputy district attorney. Thus, no constitutional error occurred during the jury selection process.

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420, a party who unreasonably denies a request for admission may be required to pay the requesting party its reasonable expenses (including reasonable attorney's fees) incurred in proving the truth of the matter at trial. In this case, a will contestant, Nancy Brown, denied requests for admission which, if admitted, would have resolved the entire case in favor of the executor, Terri Wilson. When Wilson then prevailed at trial, she sought an award of costs of proof in the amount of all of her legal fees incurred after the date of the denial of the requests for admission. The trial court granted the motion, ordering Brown, and her counsel, Attorney Larry Lewellyn and Attorney Dawn Clark-Johnson, to pay Wilson the full amount of her legal fees.
In this appeal, we consider whether a costs of proof order may be directed to the denying party's counsel, as well as the denying party. We conclude that costs of proof may be imposed only against a party, not the party's counsel. We therefore reverse that portion of the trial court's order requiring Brown's attorneys to pay a share of the costs of proof in this case. In the unpublished portion of this opinion, we consider whether the trial court properly awarded costs of proof with respect to requests for admission pertaining to every theory on which Brown challenged the will, and, therefore, whether the trial court properly calculated the costs of proof as Wilson's entire attorney fee bill. Court conclude that the trial court abused its discretion, and remand for a recalculation of the costs of proof pertaining only to those requests for admission for which Brown lacked a reasonable ground to believe that she would prevail at trial.

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420, a party who unreasonably denies a request for admission may be required to pay the requesting party its reasonable expenses (including reasonable attorney's fees) incurred in proving the truth of the matter at trial. In this case, a will contestant, Nancy Brown, denied requests for admission which, if admitted, would have resolved the entire case in favor of the executor, Terri Wilson. When Wilson then prevailed at trial, she sought an award of costs of proof in the amount of all of her legal fees incurred after the date of the denial of the requests for admission. The trial court granted the motion, ordering Brown, and her counsel, Attorney Larry Lewellyn and Attorney Dawn Clark-Johnson, to pay Wilson the full amount of her legal fees.
In this appeal, we consider whether a costs of proof order may be directed to the denying party's counsel, as well as the denying party. We conclude that costs of proof may be imposed only against a party, not the party's counsel. We therefore reverse that portion of the trial court's order requiring Brown's attorneys to pay a share of the costs of proof in this case. In the unpublished portion of this opinion, we consider whether the trial court properly awarded costs of proof with respect to requests for admission pertaining to every theory on which Brown challenged the will, and, therefore, whether the trial court properly calculated the costs of proof as Wilson's entire attorney fee bill. Court conclude that the trial court abused its discretion, and remand for a recalculation of the costs of proof pertaining only to those requests for admission for which Brown lacked a reasonable ground to believe that she would prevail at trial.

On June 18, 2005, Christopher Anthony Hall fled police in a vehicle pursuit which resulted in the deaths of Lillian Arrevalo, and 16-year-old Brian McWright. A jury convicted appellant Hall of multiple counts, including second degree murder, assault upon a peace officer, and driving under the influence causing injury. Hall contends the trial court committed reversible error by: (1) admitting testimony regarding the blood-alcohol level of a blood sample over his chain of custody objection, and (2) denying his motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. Court affirm.

In this case, the plaintff and appellant, Ben Soifer, appeals a judgment entered after the trial court sustained a demurrer to his first amended complaint without leave to amend. In Southland Title Corp. v. Superior Court (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 530 (Southland), we held that a title company could not be held liable for the negligent preparation of a preliminary report of title. Rather, if a representation was sought from the title company as to the condition of the title to a particular property, an abstract of title should have been obtained. Here, plaintiff neither sought, obtained nor desired a policy of title insurance or an abstract of title, but nonetheless seeks to hold the respondent, Chicago Title Company (Chicago), liable in both tort and contract for alleged negligence and misrepresentations with respect to the seniority status of encumbrances on certain properties that were in the process of trust deed foreclosure.
We adhere to our analysis in Southland and extend and apply it here to the several claims asserted by plaintiff. We hold that a plaintiff cannot recover for errors in a title company's statements regarding the condition of title to a property in the absence of a policy of title insurance or the purchase of an abstract of title. Court therefore will affirm the judgment.

A modification decisions.

Physicians Committee for Responsible Medicine (PCRM) appeals from the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of chain restaurant corporations. The trial court concluded that federal law preempted Proposition 65 warnings that grilled chicken contains a known carcinogen. Court reverse.

In a workers' compensation proceeding for death benefits, a panel qualified medical evaluator (Lab. Code, § 4062.2)[1] requested a copy of certain records in an ex parte telephone conversation with defense counsel. The claimant objected to the ex parte communication and petitioned, inter alia, for a new panel qualified medical evaluator under section 4062.3, subdivision (f), which prohibits ex parte communications between a party and a panel qualified medical evaluator and, in the event of a violation, allows the other party to seek a new panel qualified medical evaluator from another panel. The Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) denied the petition, reasoning that the ex parte communication was not prohibited by the statute because the communication was initiated by the panel qualified medical evaluator, not a party, and involved â€

Plaintiffs Karoleen and Magda Mito appeal from an order dismissing their complaint with prejudice for failure to file it within the statute of limitations. Plaintiffs presented their complaint for filing to the superior court clerk on July 24, 2008, which date was within the applicable two-year statute of limitations. The clerk rejected it on the ground that plaintiffs failed to attach the â€

Mayall, Hurley, Knutsen, Smith & Green, Mark E. Berry, Jesmin Alam for Defendant and Respondent.
In this case we primarily consider whether, in a negligence action against a nonpublic defendant, the reduction of a plaintiff's award of past medical expense damages to the dollar amount ultimately paid by the plaintiff's private health insurance to his health care providers is appropriate under the collateral source rule. In light of the public policy conclusions expressed by our state Supreme Court and the Legislature's enactment of specific statutes governing the operation of the collateral source rule in limited kinds of cases, we conclude reduction is inappropriate in this case. Therefore, the trial court erred in reducing the award here.[1]
In the unpublished portion of this opinion, we reject plaintiff's other contentions of reversible error.
We shall reverse the amended judgment on verdict and remand the matter to the trial court with directions to reinstate the jury's award of past medical expense damages and enter a new judgment in favor of plaintiff with interest and costs consistent with such award.

In Government Code section 985 (section 985), the Legislature has addressed the application of the collateral source rule to public defendants in personal injury or wrongful death actions. Section 985 retains the evidentiary portion of the collateral source rule by expressly prohibiting the introduction of any evidence of collateral source payments at trial. (§ 985, subd. (b).) â€

A Modification decision.