CA Pub. Decisions

A San Bernardino County jury found defendant Martin Carl Jennings guilty of the first degree murder of his five-year-old son, Arthur Jennings. (Pen. Code, § 187.)[1] The jury further found true the special circumstance that the murder was intentional and involved the infliction of torture (§ 190.2, subd (a)(18)), but found not true the special circumstance that defendant intentionally killed Arthur by the administration of poison (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(19)). Following the penalty phase of the trial, the jury returned a verdict of death. After denying defendant's motion for a new trial and his application for modification of the judgment (§ 190.4, subd. (e)), the trial court sentenced defendant to death. This appeal is automatic. (§ 1239, subd. (b).) We affirm the judgment in its entirety.

Labor Code[1] section 351 prohibits employers from taking any gratuity patrons leave for their employees, and declares that such gratuity is â€

Under California's unfair competition law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.), plaintiffs, who are senior citizens, sued an insurance company, alleging deceptive business practices relating to the purchase and sale of annuity contracts. Plaintiffs sought a monetary award, and they asserted that statutory law entitled them to a trebling of the award.
Plaintiffs rely on Civil Code section 3345, which provides that in an action brought by senior citizens to redress unfair competition, a trier of fact may award up to three times the amount imposed as â€

James Howard, a young man molested as a child by a Catholic priest, sued the Bishop who retained the priest in the diocese. A jury found the Bishop liable for negligent retention, and the court entered judgment in the amount of $5.5 million: $2.5 million in compensatory damages and $3 million in punitive damages. The Bishop settled with Howard while the case was on appeal, and agreed to join Howard in an action against the Bishop's insurers to recover on the judgment and for bad faith failure to defend, settle, and indemnify the molestation case. This action against one of the defendant insurers, American National Fire Insurance Company (American), was adjudicated in a bench trial. The court found American liable for breach of contract and bad faith failure to defend, settle, and indemnify. The court awarded almost $3 million in damages. American appeals the judgment, and plaintiffs appeal the denial of prejudgment interest. In a separate appeal, American challenges the legal costs awarded to plaintiffs in a postjudgment order. We consolidated the two appeals for purposes of oral argument and decision. As discussed below, we modify the judgment to award prejudgment interest but affirm the judgment in all other respects. Court also affirm the postjudgment order awarding costs, with one modification.

Respondents Edward and Carol Walton asserted claims for negligence and strict liability against appellant The William Powell Company (Powell), alleging that asbestos-laden materials associated with valves made by Powell injured Edward Walton. After the jury returned a verdict in the Waltons favor, a judgment was entered awarding them $5,660,624.39 in damages. We conclude that because Edward Waltons injuries stemmed entirely from exposure to asbestos-laden products for which Powell is not liable, Court must reverse.

Mark Sokolsky appeals from a jury verdict adjudicating him a sexually violent predator under Welfare and Institutions Code section 6600 et seq. (Sexually Violent Predators Act (SVPA)).[1] Appellant argues he is entitled to a hearing on his right to represent himself in propria persona in this court. He also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence of his risk of reoffending, and contends that his involuntary commitment violates his due process rights. Appellant asserts that the Static-99 test employed by the psychological evaluators should not have been admitted without an evidentiary hearing under People v. Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24 (Kelly). Respondent contends that the two-year commitment imposed was unauthorized under Proposition 83.

In the published portion of this opinion we conclude appellant has no right to self-representation on appeal and that summary denial of his application was not an abuse of discretion. We decline appellants renewed request to represent himself made at oral argument. We also agree with respondent that the proper term of commitment was indeterminate and modify the term of commitment on that ground. In the unpublished portion of this opinion (parts II and III) we find sufficient evidence of appellants risk of reoffending and reject his argument that a Kelly hearing was required as to the Static-99 test. As modified, the judgment is affirmed.

A modification decision.

The Sexually Violent Predators Act (SVPA) (Welf. & Inst. Code, 6600 et seq.)[1]authorizes the state to identify individuals who suffer from mental disorders that predispose them to commit violent sexual crimes and to confine and treat them until they no longer threaten society. (People v. Allen (2008) 44 Cal.4th 843, 857 (Allen).) A proceeding under the SVPA is civil in nature and, although it may result in the involuntary commitment of the defendant, is not equivalent to a criminal prosecution. (Id. at pp. 860-861.) Nonetheless, because it involves a significant deprivation of liberty, a defendant in an SVPA proceeding is entitled to due process protections. (Id. at p. 862; see People v. McKee (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1172, 1188 (McKee) [[t]here is no question that civil commitment itself is constitutional so long as it is accompanied by the appropriate constitutional protections].)

In Allen, supra, 44 Cal.4th 843, applying the balancing test articulated in Mathews v. Eldridge (1976) 424 U.S. 319, 344 [96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18] and People v. Otto (2001) 26 Cal.4th 200, 210, a unanimous Supreme Court held the defendant in an SVPA proceeding has a right under the due process clauses of the federal and state Constitutions to testify over the objection of his or her counsel. (Allen, at pp. 869-870.) Does that same balancing test preclude the state from proceeding with an initial SVPA commitment trial[2]while the defendant is incompetentthat is, unable, as a result of mental disorder or developmental disability, to understand the nature of the proceedings or to assist his or her counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational manner? Although the issue is not free from doubt,[3]we believe the answer must be yes. The private interests at stake are high: a substantial limitation on the defendants liberty, the stigma of being classified as a sexually violent predator and subjection to unwanted treatment. The dignitary interest of the defendant subject to the SVPA commitment proceedinghis or her ability to be an active participant, rather than being relegated to the role of a mere spectatoris strong. And the risk of an erroneous finding that the defendant is a sexually violent predator and the probable value in reducing this risk by proceeding on an SVPA petition only against a competent defendant are at least as great as in Allen, in which the defendant sought to testify on his own behalf over the objection of his counsel in an SVPA extension proceeding. On the other hand, the states compelling interest in both protecting the public and providing appropriate treatment to those individuals found to be sexually violent predators will not be significantly burdened by a threshold requirement that defendants in initial SVPA proceedings be mentally competent.

Accordingly, we grant the petition for writ of mandate filed by Mark Richard Wilson and direct respondent Los Angeles Superior Court to suspend the SVPA commitment proceedings now pending against Wilson, to conduct a hearing to determine his ability to understand the nature of the proceedings and to rationally assist his counsel in the conduct of a defense and, if Wilson is not now competent, to order Wilson to remain in appropriate custody pending restoration of his competency.

The Sexually Violent Predators Act (SVPA) (Welf. & Inst. Code, 6600 et seq.)[1]authorizes the state to identify individuals who suffer from mental disorders that predispose them to commit violent sexual crimes and to confine and treat them until they no longer threaten society. (People v. Allen (2008) 44 Cal.4th 843, 857 (Allen).) A proceeding under the SVPA is civil in nature and, although it may result in the involuntary commitment of the defendant, is not equivalent to a criminal prosecution. (Id. at pp. 860-861.) Nonetheless, because it involves a significant deprivation of liberty, a defendant in an SVPA proceeding is entitled to due process protections. (Id. at p. 862; see People v. McKee (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1172, 1188 (McKee) [[t]here is no question that civil commitment itself is constitutional so long as it is accompanied by the appropriate constitutional protections].)

In Allen, supra, 44 Cal.4th 843, applying the balancing test articulated in Mathews v. Eldridge (1976) 424 U.S. 319, 344 [96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18] and People v. Otto (2001) 26 Cal.4th 200, 210, a unanimous Supreme Court held the defendant in an SVPA proceeding has a right under the due process clauses of the federal and state Constitutions to testify over the objection of his or her counsel. (Allen, at pp. 869-870.) Does that same balancing test preclude the state from proceeding with an initial SVPA commitment trial[2]while the defendant is incompetentthat is, unable, as a result of mental disorder or developmental disability, to understand the nature of the proceedings or to assist his or her counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational manner? Although the issue is not free from doubt,[3]we believe the answer must be yes. The private interests at stake are high: a substantial limitation on the defendants liberty, the stigma of being classified as a sexually violent predator and subjection to unwanted treatment. The dignitary interest of the defendant subject to the SVPA commitment proceedinghis or her ability to be an active participant, rather than being relegated to the role of a mere spectatoris strong. And the risk of an erroneous finding that the defendant is a sexually violent predator and the probable value in reducing this risk by proceeding on an SVPA petition only against a competent defendant are at least as great as in Allen, in which the defendant sought to testify on his own behalf over the objection of his counsel in an SVPA extension proceeding. On the other hand, the states compelling interest in both protecting the public and providing appropriate treatment to those individuals found to be sexually violent predators will not be significantly burdened by a threshold requirement that defendants in initial SVPA proceedings be mentally competent.

Accordingly, we grant the petition for writ of mandate filed by Mark Richard Wilson and direct respondent Los Angeles Superior Court to suspend the SVPA commitment proceedings now pending against Wilson, to conduct a hearing to determine his ability to understand the nature of the proceedings and to rationally assist his counsel in the conduct of a defense and, if Wilson is not now competent, to order Wilson to remain in appropriate custody pending restoration of his competency.

A jury convicted defendant George Milward of assault with a deadly weapon and assault by a life prisoner with a deadly weapon. (Pen. Code, 245, subd. (a)(1), 4500.)[1] The jury also found defendant had two strike convictions (for murder and attempted murder, arising out of the same case), one of which was also charged as a serious felony. ( 667, subds. (a), (b)-(i), 1170.12.)

The trial court sentenced defendant to state prison for life without parole for 27 years for assault by a life prisoner (nine years tripled per 667, subd. (e)(2)(A)(i)), consecutive to a five-year term for a prior serious felony, consecutive to defendants current sentence (Super. Ct., Riverside County, 1993, No. ICR17175),[2] and imposed but stayed ( 654) a 25-year-to-life sentence for assault with a deadly weapon.

A jury convicted defendant Barry Allen Turnage of maliciously placing a false or facsimile bomb in 2006 with the intent to cause others to fear for their safety (Pen. Code, 148.1, subd. (d)),[1] found he was legally sane at the time of the commission of the offense, and found he had two prior convictions that came within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (d). Based on the evidence it heard at trial regarding the present offense, the trial court found that defendant violated his probation in a 2004 drug case, in which there was a suspended imposition of sentence. The court sentenced defendant to state prison for the upper term on the 2004 offense, with a consecutive indeterminate prison term of 25 years to life for the present offense. ( 667, subd. (e)(2)(A)(ii).)

On appeal, defendant contends his felony sentence for placing a false bomb violates his constitutional right to equal protection, because placing a false weapon of mass destruction (WMD) under similar circumstances (without causing sustained fear) is only a misdemeanor ( 11418.1, 11418.5, subd. (b)), and to due process, because false or facsimile bomb is too vague a term. He contends the trial court should have granted his motion for acquittal ( 1118.1) because there was insufficient evidence of a false bomb, or of his intent to cause others to fear for their safety. He also claims that there is insufficient evidence to support the recidivist finding based on his 1985 entry of a guilty plea, because the 1985 court did not have jurisdiction to accept a withdrawal of his 1978 plea of not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI) to the charge. Finally, he contends that if we reverse his present conviction we must reverse the courts finding that he violated probation and remand for further proceedings in the 2004 case.

In the published portion of this opinion, we agree that defendant is similarly situated to someone convicted of the misdemeanor of placing a false WMD that did not cause sustained fear, and the legislative history of the latter provision shows that no reason exists to treat the two offenses differently for purposes of punishment. Therefore, we conclude that a violation of section 148.1, subdivision (d) (hereafter 148.1(d)) is punishable only as a misdemeanor. We reject the remainder of defendants arguments in the unpublished part. We therefore vacate the sentence on the 2006 offense and remand the matter for resentencing.

A jury convicted defendant Barry Allen Turnage of maliciously placing a false or facsimile bomb in 2006 with the intent to cause others to fear for their safety (Pen. Code, 148.1, subd. (d)),[1] found he was legally sane at the time of the commission of the offense, and found he had two prior convictions that came within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (d). Based on the evidence it heard at trial regarding the present offense, the trial court found that defendant violated his probation in a 2004 drug case, in which there was a suspended imposition of sentence. The court sentenced defendant to state prison for the upper term on the 2004 offense, with a consecutive indeterminate prison term of 25 years to life for the present offense. ( 667, subd. (e)(2)(A)(ii).)

On appeal, defendant contends his felony sentence for placing a false bomb violates his constitutional right to equal protection, because placing a false weapon of mass destruction (WMD) under similar circumstances (without causing sustained fear) is only a misdemeanor ( 11418.1, 11418.5, subd. (b)), and to due process, because false or facsimile bomb is too vague a term. He contends the trial court should have granted his motion for acquittal ( 1118.1) because there was insufficient evidence of a false bomb, or of his intent to cause others to fear for their safety. He also claims that there is insufficient evidence to support the recidivist finding based on his 1985 entry of a guilty plea, because the 1985 court did not have jurisdiction to accept a withdrawal of his 1978 plea of not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI) to the charge. Finally, he contends that if we reverse his present conviction we must reverse the courts finding that he violated probation and remand for further proceedings in the 2004 case.

In the published portion of this opinion, we agree that defendant is similarly situated to someone convicted of the misdemeanor of placing a false WMD that did not cause sustained fear, and the legislative history of the latter provision shows that no reason exists to treat the two offenses differently for purposes of punishment. Therefore, we conclude that a violation of section 148.1, subdivision (d) (hereafter 148.1(d)) is punishable only as a misdemeanor. We reject the remainder of defendants arguments in the unpublished part. We therefore vacate the sentence on the 2006 offense and remand the matter for resentencing.

This is an appeal by Cesar Garcia, plaintiff and appellant (hereafter plaintiff), from the summary judgment entered against him, both as an individual and as the representative of the estate of his daughter, Alexis Garcia, and in favor of defendant and respondent W&W Community Development, Inc., doing business as Childrens Plus Foster Agency (hereafter defendant), on plaintiffs complaint seeking damages based on negligence and wrongful death. In the operative first amended complaint, plaintiff alleged that his two-year-old daughter Alexis drowned on August 16, 2006, when her foster mother, Irma Henry, left the child unattended for up to five minutes in a bathtub half filled with water. According to the complaint, defendant, a state licensed foster family agency, had placed Alexis and her four-year-old brother in the licensed foster home of Irma Henry and her husband Walter after the County of Riverside declared the children dependents of the court and removed them from the custody of their mother.

J.C. (father) appeals from an order terminating parental rights (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26) to his son, K.[1] At the same hearing that resulted in the termination, the trial court also denied a petition for relative placement ( 388) brought by the childs paternal grandparents (grandparents). Fathers sole contention is that the court erred in denying the relative placement request. On review, we affirm. We hold father does not have appellate standing to contest the denial order.