CA Pub. Decisions

A county flood control and water conservation district held an election on whether to impose a new storm drainage fee. The election was mandated by article XIII D of the California Constitution, which was adopted by voter initiative in 1996 as Proposition 218. In the district's election, voters' names and addresses were printed on the ballots and voters were directed to sign their ballots. The fee was approved. However, a voter contested the election, claiming the election procedures violated the voting secrecy requirement of article II, section 7 of the California Constitution. The superior court denied the election contest.
This appeal requires us to construe article XIII D and specifically article XIII D, section 6, subdivision (c)[1], which imposes the election requirement for certain new or increased real property fees. We conclude the voters who adopted Proposition 218 intended voting to be secret in these fee elections. We set aside the district's election results because voters' names were printed on the ballots and ballots had to be signed, yet voters were provided no assurances that their votes would be kept secret.

Artichoke Joe's Casino (Artichoke Joe's or the casino) implemented a mandatory tip pooling policy for the dealers. A dealer, Harvey Grodensky, filed a class action and alleged claims for conversion and violating Labor Code sections 351 and 1194. He also claimed in his representative capacity that the casino had violated the Unfair Competition Law (UCL). After a bench trial, the trial court found that a mandatory tip pool was legal. However, it determined the shift managers were agents of the casino and therefore the casino violated Labor Code section 351 by distributing a portion of the tip money to the shift managers. The court also found that this violation of the Labor Code supported Grodensky's UCL claim. The court ordered restitution for the amount of tip money given to the shift managers and issued an injunction. It also ruled that Grodensky was entitled to an award of attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. Both parties appealed and we, on our own motion, consolidated the appeals.
On appeal, Artichoke Joe's asserts that a protective order issued by the trial court was unlawful, that Labor Code section 351 did not provide Grodensky with a private right of action, and that restitution was not a proper remedy. It also challenges the court's award of attorney fees to Grodensky and the class. We agree that the lower court did not apply the proper test under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 when determining that Grodensky was entitled to attorney fees and remand for the court to consider whether to award attorney fees using the proper test. We otherwise reject the casino's arguments.
In the appeal by Grodensky and the class, they argue that the trial court erred in finding that the mandatory tipping pool did not violate Labor Code section 351 and that the casino did not violate Labor Code section 1194. They also object to the lower court's rulings that the floor managers were not agents under Labor Code section 350, subdivision (d), that Grodensky could not bring a claim of conversion, and that Grodensky and the class did not have a UCL claim based on alleged violations of Labor Code sections 221 and 450. We are not persuaded by any of Grodensky and the class's arguments.

Artichoke Joe's Casino (Artichoke Joe's or the casino) implemented a mandatory tip pooling policy for the dealers. A dealer, Harvey Grodensky, filed a class action and alleged claims for conversion and violating Labor Code sections 351 and 1194. He also claimed in his representative capacity that the casino had violated the Unfair Competition Law (UCL). After a bench trial, the trial court found that a mandatory tip pool was legal. However, it determined the shift managers were agents of the casino and therefore the casino violated Labor Code section 351 by distributing a portion of the tip money to the shift managers. The court also found that this violation of the Labor Code supported Grodensky's UCL claim. The court ordered restitution for the amount of tip money given to the shift managers and issued an injunction. It also ruled that Grodensky was entitled to an award of attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. Both parties appealed and we, on our own motion, consolidated the appeals.
On appeal, Artichoke Joe's asserts that a protective order issued by the trial court was unlawful, that Labor Code section 351 did not provide Grodensky with a private right of action, and that restitution was not a proper remedy. It also challenges the court's award of attorney fees to Grodensky and the class. We agree that the lower court did not apply the proper test under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 when determining that Grodensky was entitled to attorney fees and remand for the court to consider whether to award attorney fees using the proper test. We otherwise reject the casino's arguments.
In the appeal by Grodensky and the class, they argue that the trial court erred in finding that the mandatory tipping pool did not violate Labor Code section 351 and that the casino did not violate Labor Code section 1194. They also object to the lower court's rulings that the floor managers were not agents under Labor Code section 350, subdivision (d), that Grodensky could not bring a claim of conversion, and that Grodensky and the class did not have a UCL claim based on alleged violations of Labor Code sections 221 and 450. We are not persuaded by any of Grodensky and the class's arguments.

Artichoke Joe's Casino (Artichoke Joe's or the casino) implemented a mandatory tip pooling policy for the dealers. A dealer, Harvey Grodensky, filed a class action and alleged claims for conversion and violating Labor Code sections 351 and 1194. He also claimed in his representative capacity that the casino had violated the Unfair Competition Law (UCL). After a bench trial, the trial court found that a mandatory tip pool was legal. However, it determined the shift managers were agents of the casino and therefore the casino violated Labor Code section 351 by distributing a portion of the tip money to the shift managers. The court also found that this violation of the Labor Code supported Grodensky's UCL claim. The court ordered restitution for the amount of tip money given to the shift managers and issued an injunction. It also ruled that Grodensky was entitled to an award of attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. Both parties appealed and we, on our own motion, consolidated the appeals.
On appeal, Artichoke Joe's asserts that a protective order issued by the trial court was unlawful, that Labor Code section 351 did not provide Grodensky with a private right of action, and that restitution was not a proper remedy. It also challenges the court's award of attorney fees to Grodensky and the class. We agree that the lower court did not apply the proper test under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 when determining that Grodensky was entitled to attorney fees and remand for the court to consider whether to award attorney fees using the proper test. We otherwise reject the casino's arguments.
In the appeal by Grodensky and the class, they argue that the trial court erred in finding that the mandatory tipping pool did not violate Labor Code section 351 and that the casino did not violate Labor Code section 1194. They also object to the lower court's rulings that the floor managers were not agents under Labor Code section 350, subdivision (d), that Grodensky could not bring a claim of conversion, and that Grodensky and the class did not have a UCL claim based on alleged violations of Labor Code sections 221 and 450. We are not persuaded by any of Grodensky and the class's arguments.

Artichoke Joe's Casino (Artichoke Joe's or the casino) implemented a mandatory tip pooling policy for the dealers. A dealer, Harvey Grodensky, filed a class action and alleged claims for conversion and violating Labor Code sections 351 and 1194. He also claimed in his representative capacity that the casino had violated the Unfair Competition Law (UCL). After a bench trial, the trial court found that a mandatory tip pool was legal. However, it determined the shift managers were agents of the casino and therefore the casino violated Labor Code section 351 by distributing a portion of the tip money to the shift managers. The court also found that this violation of the Labor Code supported Grodensky's UCL claim. The court ordered restitution for the amount of tip money given to the shift managers and issued an injunction. It also ruled that Grodensky was entitled to an award of attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. Both parties appealed and we, on our own motion, consolidated the appeals.
On appeal, Artichoke Joe's asserts that a protective order issued by the trial court was unlawful, that Labor Code section 351 did not provide Grodensky with a private right of action, and that restitution was not a proper remedy. It also challenges the court's award of attorney fees to Grodensky and the class. We agree that the lower court did not apply the proper test under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 when determining that Grodensky was entitled to attorney fees and remand for the court to consider whether to award attorney fees using the proper test. We otherwise reject the casino's arguments.
In the appeal by Grodensky and the class, they argue that the trial court erred in finding that the mandatory tipping pool did not violate Labor Code section 351 and that the casino did not violate Labor Code section 1194. They also object to the lower court's rulings that the floor managers were not agents under Labor Code section 350, subdivision (d), that Grodensky could not bring a claim of conversion, and that Grodensky and the class did not have a UCL claim based on alleged violations of Labor Code sections 221 and 450. We are not persuaded by any of Grodensky and the class's arguments.

There is no dispute that methylmercury is a reproductive toxin that can harm a developing fetus, and that the primary path for human exposure to methylmercury is consumption of fish. All canned tuna distributed by respondents[1] in California contain traces of methylmercury, yet no warnings appear on tuna cans or accompany the sale of canned tuna in this state. This litigation, prosecuted by appellant State of California (State)[2] against the Tuna Companies under the authority of Proposition 65, the Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986 (Health & Saf. Code,[3] § 25249.5 et seq.), seeks to require the companies to warn pregnant women and women of childbearing age that they are exposed to methylmercury when they consume canned tuna.
Following a six-week bench trial, with a parade of expert witnesses, the trial court handed the Tuna Companies a complete victory. The trial court ruled that the State was not entitled to any of the relief requested, elaborating three distinct and separate bases: (1) Proposition 65, as applied to the Tuna Companies, was preempted because it conflicts with federal law; (2) the amount of methylmercury in canned tuna does not rise to the threshold level that would trigger the warning requirement for this chemical; and (3) virtually all methylmercury is â€

There is no dispute that methylmercury is a reproductive toxin that can harm a developing fetus, and that the primary path for human exposure to methylmercury is consumption of fish. All canned tuna distributed by respondents[1] in California contain traces of methylmercury, yet no warnings appear on tuna cans or accompany the sale of canned tuna in this state. This litigation, prosecuted by appellant State of California (State)[2] against the Tuna Companies under the authority of Proposition 65, the Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986 (Health & Saf. Code,[3] § 25249.5 et seq.), seeks to require the companies to warn pregnant women and women of childbearing age that they are exposed to methylmercury when they consume canned tuna.
Following a six-week bench trial, with a parade of expert witnesses, the trial court handed the Tuna Companies a complete victory. The trial court ruled that the State was not entitled to any of the relief requested, elaborating three distinct and separate bases: (1) Proposition 65, as applied to the Tuna Companies, was preempted because it conflicts with federal law; (2) the amount of methylmercury in canned tuna does not rise to the threshold level that would trigger the warning requirement for this chemical; and (3) virtually all methylmercury is â€

Defendant Jeffrey Dean appeals from a judgment and order committing him to the State Department of Mental Health as a sexually violent predator (SVP).[1]
Defendant contends: (1) the trial court erroneously permitted plaintiff's experts to testify to inadmissible hearsay; (2) as implemented in Riverside County, the appointment of only one expert for defendant violated his due process rights; and (3) his recommitment is illegal in that the protocols relied upon by plaintiff's experts had not been adopted as administrative regulations. We affirm the judgment and order of recommitment.

Defendant Jeffrey Dean appeals from a judgment and order committing him to the State Department of Mental Health as a sexually violent predator (SVP).[1]
Defendant contends: (1) the trial court erroneously permitted plaintiff's experts to testify to inadmissible hearsay; (2) as implemented in Riverside County, the appointment of only one expert for defendant violated his due process rights; and (3) his recommitment is illegal in that the protocols relied upon by plaintiff's experts had not been adopted as administrative regulations. We affirm the judgment and order of recommitment.

Plaintiff Thomas E. Troyk filed a class action against defendants Farmers Group, Inc., doing business as Farmers Underwriters Association (FGI), and Farmers Insurance Exchange (FIE) (together Farmers) alleging causes of action for breach of contract and violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200 (Unfair Competition Law, hereafter UCL). He alleged FIE required him to pay a service charge for the payment of the premium for his automobile insurance policy's one-month term and, because the service charge was not stated in his policy, FIE violated the requirement of Insurance Code section 381, subdivision (f),[1] that "premium" be stated in an insurance policy.
The trial court granted Troyk's request for class certification, granted Troyk's motion for summary judgment, and denied Farmers' motion for summary judgment. The court then entered judgment awarding Troyk and the other class members $115,556,827 for service charges paid by those members.
On appeal, Farmers contend: (1) the trial court erred by interpreting the term "premium," as used in section 381, subdivision (f), to include the service charge imposed for payment in full of the stated premium for the policy's one-month term; (2) even if the service charge is premium, they complied, either actually (because of incorporation by reference to other documents) or substantially, with section 381, subdivision (f)'s disclosure requirement; (3) the court erred by concluding Troyk proved his breach of contract and UCL causes of action and by awarding the class members full restitution for the service charges they paid; and (4) the judgment violates their constitutional right to due process of law.
Following oral argument in this appeal, we requested, and have received and considered, supplemental briefing by the parties on the issues whether: (1) Troyk had standing under Business and Professions Code section 17204 to bring this action; and (2) the issue of standing was raised in the trial court by Farmers and, if not, has that issue been waived.
Because we interpret the term "premium," as used in section 381, subdivision (f), to include a service charge imposed for the payment in full of the stated premium for an insurance policy's one-month term, we conclude Farmers violated that statute's disclosure requirement. However, because in moving for summary judgment Troyk did not show there is no triable issue on the element of causation regarding his standing to prosecute the UCL cause of action, we conclude the trial court erred by granting his motion for summary judgment.

Plaintiff Thomas E. Troyk filed a class action against defendants Farmers Group, Inc., doing business as Farmers Underwriters Association (FGI), and Farmers Insurance Exchange (FIE) (together Farmers) alleging causes of action for breach of contract and violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200 (Unfair Competition Law, hereafter UCL). He alleged FIE required him to pay a service charge for the payment of the premium for his automobile insurance policy's one-month term and, because the service charge was not stated in his policy, FIE violated the requirement of Insurance Code section 381, subdivision (f),[1] that "premium" be stated in an insurance policy.
The trial court granted Troyk's request for class certification, granted Troyk's motion for summary judgment, and denied Farmers' motion for summary judgment. The court then entered judgment awarding Troyk and the other class members $115,556,827 for service charges paid by those members.
On appeal, Farmers contend: (1) the trial court erred by interpreting the term "premium," as used in section 381, subdivision (f), to include the service charge imposed for payment in full of the stated premium for the policy's one-month term; (2) even if the service charge is premium, they complied, either actually (because of incorporation by reference to other documents) or substantially, with section 381, subdivision (f)'s disclosure requirement; (3) the court erred by concluding Troyk proved his breach of contract and UCL causes of action and by awarding the class members full restitution for the service charges they paid; and (4) the judgment violates their constitutional right to due process of law.
Following oral argument in this appeal, we requested, and have received and considered, supplemental briefing by the parties on the issues whether: (1) Troyk had standing under Business and Professions Code section 17204 to bring this action; and (2) the issue of standing was raised in the trial court by Farmers and, if not, has that issue been waived.
Because we interpret the term "premium," as used in section 381, subdivision (f), to include a service charge imposed for the payment in full of the stated premium for an insurance policy's one-month term, we conclude Farmers violated that statute's disclosure requirement. However, because in moving for summary judgment Troyk did not show there is no triable issue on the element of causation regarding his standing to prosecute the UCL cause of action, we conclude the trial court erred by granting his motion for summary judgment.

Plaintiff Thomas E. Troyk filed a class action against defendants Farmers Group, Inc., doing business as Farmers Underwriters Association (FGI), and Farmers Insurance Exchange (FIE) (together Farmers) alleging causes of action for breach of contract and violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200 (Unfair Competition Law, hereafter UCL). He alleged FIE required him to pay a service charge for the payment of the premium for his automobile insurance policy's one-month term and, because the service charge was not stated in his policy, FIE violated the requirement of Insurance Code section 381, subdivision (f),[1] that "premium" be stated in an insurance policy.
The trial court granted Troyk's request for class certification, granted Troyk's motion for summary judgment, and denied Farmers' motion for summary judgment. The court then entered judgment awarding Troyk and the other class members $115,556,827 for service charges paid by those members.
On appeal, Farmers contend: (1) the trial court erred by interpreting the term "premium," as used in section 381, subdivision (f), to include the service charge imposed for payment in full of the stated premium for the policy's one-month term; (2) even if the service charge is premium, they complied, either actually (because of incorporation by reference to other documents) or substantially, with section 381, subdivision (f)'s disclosure requirement; (3) the court erred by concluding Troyk proved his breach of contract and UCL causes of action and by awarding the class members full restitution for the service charges they paid; and (4) the judgment violates their constitutional right to due process of law.
Following oral argument in this appeal, we requested, and have received and considered, supplemental briefing by the parties on the issues whether: (1) Troyk had standing under Business and Professions Code section 17204 to bring this action; and (2) the issue of standing was raised in the trial court by Farmers and, if not, has that issue been waived.
Because we interpret the term "premium," as used in section 381, subdivision (f), to include a service charge imposed for the payment in full of the stated premium for an insurance policy's one-month term, we conclude Farmers violated that statute's disclosure requirement. However, because in moving for summary judgment Troyk did not show there is no triable issue on the element of causation regarding his standing to prosecute the UCL cause of action, we conclude the trial court erred by granting his motion for summary judgment.

Plaintiff Thomas E. Troyk filed a class action against defendants Farmers Group, Inc., doing business as Farmers Underwriters Association (FGI), and Farmers Insurance Exchange (FIE) (together Farmers) alleging causes of action for breach of contract and violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200 (Unfair Competition Law, hereafter UCL). He alleged FIE required him to pay a service charge for the payment of the premium for his automobile insurance policy's one-month term and, because the service charge was not stated in his policy, FIE violated the requirement of Insurance Code section 381, subdivision (f),[1] that "premium" be stated in an insurance policy.
The trial court granted Troyk's request for class certification, granted Troyk's motion for summary judgment, and denied Farmers' motion for summary judgment. The court then entered judgment awarding Troyk and the other class members $115,556,827 for service charges paid by those members.
On appeal, Farmers contend: (1) the trial court erred by interpreting the term "premium," as used in section 381, subdivision (f), to include the service charge imposed for payment in full of the stated premium for the policy's one-month term; (2) even if the service charge is premium, they complied, either actually (because of incorporation by reference to other documents) or substantially, with section 381, subdivision (f)'s disclosure requirement; (3) the court erred by concluding Troyk proved his breach of contract and UCL causes of action and by awarding the class members full restitution for the service charges they paid; and (4) the judgment violates their constitutional right to due process of law.
Following oral argument in this appeal, we requested, and have received and considered, supplemental briefing by the parties on the issues whether: (1) Troyk had standing under Business and Professions Code section 17204 to bring this action; and (2) the issue of standing was raised in the trial court by Farmers and, if not, has that issue been waived.
Because we interpret the term "premium," as used in section 381, subdivision (f), to include a service charge imposed for the payment in full of the stated premium for an insurance policy's one-month term, we conclude Farmers violated that statute's disclosure requirement. However, because in moving for summary judgment Troyk did not show there is no triable issue on the element of causation regarding his standing to prosecute the UCL cause of action, we conclude the trial court erred by granting his motion for summary judgment.

A verdict form provided to the jury on a charge of robbery mistakenly identified the offense as carjacking. The mistake went unnoticed when the guilty verdict was read and the jury polled, and judgment was imposed as though the jury had returned a verdict of guilty of robbery. Because every stage of this case identified the offense as robbery--the charging document, the opening statement, arguments of counsel, and the jury instructions--we hold the jury's intent to convict on robbery was unmistakably clear. The clerical error in the verdict form does not affect the validity of the verdict.