CA Pub. Decisions

Laura and Douglas Montgomery (the Montgomerys) are the plaintiffs in a medical malpractice action against physician Mark Knight. They petition for relief from the order of the trial court removing their only expert witness on the medical standard of care and causation. The trial court found the expert created an irreconcilable conflict of interest for Knights counsel because he had represented the expert 10 years before. The petitioners contend the prophylactic removal was unnecessary because their expert waived any conflict of interest arising out of the previous representation. Court agree and grant the petition.

Defendant and appellant Delfino Castro-Fierro appeals the imposition of a prison sentence after he was found in willful violation of the terms of his probation, granted in 2000. Defendant urges that the evidence was sufficient to find that his failure to comply with the condition of probation that he report to serve 180 days in the county jail was not willful, because he had been deported before his report date. The People respond that defendant had ample opportunity to comply, notwithstanding his deportation, in the years since defendants return to the United States. Court affirm.

In this employment discrimination case, the same person who terminated plaintiff had previously hired and promoted her. Defendant, the employer, relies on several California and federal cases to argue that this same actor evidence compels a reversal of the trial courts denial of defendants motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) on the issue of liability. Court conclude such evidence is entitled to no special weight and does not modify the standard of review, which requires us to affirm if substantial evidence supports the jurys verdict.

In this employment discrimination case, the same person who terminated plaintiff had previously hired and promoted her. Defendant, the employer, relies on several California and federal cases to argue that this same actor evidence compels a reversal of the trial courts denial of defendants motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) on the issue of liability. Court conclude such evidence is entitled to no special weight and does not modify the standard of review, which requires us to affirm if substantial evidence supports the jurys verdict.

Plaintiff Lawrence OBrien brought this putative class action lawsuit against defendants Camisasca Automotive Manufacturing, Inc. and Volkswagen of America, Inc. (Volkswagen), alleging defendants violated the Unfair Competition Law (Bus. & Prof. Code[1] (the UCL)), the False Advertising Law (the FAL),[2] and the Consumers Legal Remedies Act (the CLRA)[3] by falsely representing that the license plate frames defendants offered for sale were Made in USA. The trial court granted defendants motions for summary judgment on the ground that OBrien did not have standing under Proposition 64s amendments to the UCL and the FAL. The amendments authorize a lawsuit under those statutes only by a person who has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of a violation of these acts.

Plaintiff Lawrence OBrien brought this putative class action lawsuit against defendants Camisasca Automotive Manufacturing, Inc. and Volkswagen of America, Inc. (Volkswagen), alleging defendants violated the Unfair Competition Law (Bus. & Prof. Code[1] (the UCL)), the False Advertising Law (the FAL),[2] and the Consumers Legal Remedies Act (the CLRA)[3] by falsely representing that the license plate frames defendants offered for sale were Made in USA. The trial court granted defendants motions for summary judgment on the ground that OBrien did not have standing under Proposition 64s amendments to the UCL and the FAL. The amendments authorize a lawsuit under those statutes only by a person who has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of a violation of these acts.

A modification decision.

A jury found defendant Victor Correa guilty of seven counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm (Pen. Code, 12021, subd. (a)(1))[1]and one count of receiving stolen property ( 496d, subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of 200 years to life. Defendant appeals, contending that (1) six of the seven sentence terms for firearm possession must be stayed pursuant to section 654, and (2) the sentence of multiple, consecutive life terms without the requisite jury findings violated his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights under Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. [166 L.Ed.2d 856] (Cunningham), Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296 [159 L.Ed.2d 403] (Blakely), and Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 [147 L.Ed.2d 435] (Apprendi). Court shall order the abstract amended but otherwise affirm the judgment.

In September 1982, Ronald Singler murdered his wife with a shotgun during a heated domestic argument. He was convicted of second degree murder and was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 15 years to life in state prison. In 2006, the Board of Parole Hearings (the Board) found that Singler was not suitable for parole. Members of the Board acknowledged that what Singler has been doing while . . . in prison is very impressive, i.e., his conduct as a prisoner has been extremely positive both for self enhancement and for the enhancement of other peoples lives in that Singler has benefited, as have others, from all the things that [he has] done while incarcerated. Nevertheless, because of the terrible manner in which he murdered his wife (after arguing with her, he went into the garage, loaded a shotgun, and fatally shot her in the living room while their two young children were in the house) and then disposed of the body (by dumping it in a rural area), Board members concluded Singler had not persuaded them that he has demonstrated sufficient insight regarding what caused him to deal with his anger in such a violent way to convince them that, if released on parole, he would not react in a violent manner if future events cause him to become angry. In other words, the Board found that Singler would pose a danger to public safety if released on parole at that time.

In September 1982, Ronald Singler murdered his wife with a shotgun during a heated domestic argument. He was convicted of second degree murder and was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 15 years to life in state prison. In 2006, the Board of Parole Hearings (the Board) found that Singler was not suitable for parole. Members of the Board acknowledged that what Singler has been doing while . . . in prison is very impressive, i.e., his conduct as a prisoner has been extremely positive both for self enhancement and for the enhancement of other peoples lives in that Singler has benefited, as have others, from all the things that [he has] done while incarcerated. Nevertheless, because of the terrible manner in which he murdered his wife (after arguing with her, he went into the garage, loaded a shotgun, and fatally shot her in the living room while their two young children were in the house) and then disposed of the body (by dumping it in a rural area), Board members concluded Singler had not persuaded them that he has demonstrated sufficient insight regarding what caused him to deal with his anger in such a violent way to convince them that, if released on parole, he would not react in a violent manner if future events cause him to become angry. In other words, the Board found that Singler would pose a danger to public safety if released on parole at that time.

A modification decision.

On the evening of November 22, 1983, Clarence Burdan shot and killed his wife while the two sat in her car in front of their residence discussing their marital problems. Burdan thereafter entered a negotiated plea of guilty to second degree murder and, on June 21, 1984, was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 15 years to life in state prison. On February 9, 2005, the Board of Parole Hearings (Board) conducted a parole consideration hearing and found Burdan suitable for parole. However, the Governor reversed the Boards decision, concluding Burdans release would pose an unreasonable risk to public safety because of the grave nature of the conviction offense.
Burdan filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the superior court, which that court denied on August 7, 2006. On June 29, 2007, Burdan filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this court. On August 16, 2007, we issued an order to show cause to Matthew C. Kramer, Warden of Folsom State Prison (the Warden) in order to review the Governors decision.

On the evening of November 22, 1983, Clarence Burdan shot and killed his wife while the two sat in her car in front of their residence discussing their marital problems. Burdan thereafter entered a negotiated plea of guilty to second degree murder and, on June 21, 1984, was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 15 years to life in state prison. On February 9, 2005, the Board of Parole Hearings (Board) conducted a parole consideration hearing and found Burdan suitable for parole. However, the Governor reversed the Boards decision, concluding Burdans release would pose an unreasonable risk to public safety because of the grave nature of the conviction offense.
Burdan filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the superior court, which that court denied on August 7, 2006. On June 29, 2007, Burdan filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this court. On August 16, 2007, we issued an order to show cause to Matthew C. Kramer, Warden of Folsom State Prison (the Warden) in order to review the Governors decision.

This case is before us for a second time, after a GVR[1]order from the United States Supreme Court directed that we reconsider our original opinion in Buell‑Wilson v. Ford Motor Company (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 525 (Buell‑Wilson I) in light of Philip Morris USA v. Williams (2007) 549 U.S. ___ [166 L.Ed.2d 940, 127 S.Ct. 1057] (Philip Morris). Philip Morris holds that upon request, courts must adopt procedures to ensure juries do not punish defendants for harm caused to third parties when determining the amount of punitive damages to award. The Supreme Court also reiterated, however, juries could consider harm to third parties in determining the reprehensibility of a defendant's conduct.
Ford asserts that based on Philip Morris it is entitled to a new trial (or at least a further reduction in the punitive damages award) because there is a "significant risk" the punitive damages verdict in this case was based on improper evidence and arguments concerning third party harm. Ford also asserts that we should reconsider our original decision's rejection of its arguments that (1) California's punitive damages statute (Civil Code section 3294) is unconstitutionally vague as applied to this case, and (2) the trial court erred in excluding its industry custom and practice evidence. We granted permission to the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America (the Chamber) and the Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc. (PLAC) to file amicus curiae briefs to support Ford's contentions on remand.