CA Pub. Decisions

This case is before us for a second time, after a GVR[1]order from the United States Supreme Court directed that we reconsider our original opinion in Buell‑Wilson v. Ford Motor Company (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 525 (Buell‑Wilson I) in light of Philip Morris USA v. Williams (2007) 549 U.S. ___ [166 L.Ed.2d 940, 127 S.Ct. 1057] (Philip Morris). Philip Morris holds that upon request, courts must adopt procedures to ensure juries do not punish defendants for harm caused to third parties when determining the amount of punitive damages to award. The Supreme Court also reiterated, however, juries could consider harm to third parties in determining the reprehensibility of a defendant's conduct.
Ford asserts that based on Philip Morris it is entitled to a new trial (or at least a further reduction in the punitive damages award) because there is a "significant risk" the punitive damages verdict in this case was based on improper evidence and arguments concerning third party harm. Ford also asserts that we should reconsider our original decision's rejection of its arguments that (1) California's punitive damages statute (Civil Code section 3294) is unconstitutionally vague as applied to this case, and (2) the trial court erred in excluding its industry custom and practice evidence. We granted permission to the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America (the Chamber) and the Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc. (PLAC) to file amicus curiae briefs to support Ford's contentions on remand.

This case is before us for a second time, after a GVR[1]order from the United States Supreme Court directed that we reconsider our original opinion in Buell‑Wilson v. Ford Motor Company (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 525 (Buell‑Wilson I) in light of Philip Morris USA v. Williams (2007) 549 U.S. ___ [166 L.Ed.2d 940, 127 S.Ct. 1057] (Philip Morris). Philip Morris holds that upon request, courts must adopt procedures to ensure juries do not punish defendants for harm caused to third parties when determining the amount of punitive damages to award. The Supreme Court also reiterated, however, juries could consider harm to third parties in determining the reprehensibility of a defendant's conduct.
Ford asserts that based on Philip Morris it is entitled to a new trial (or at least a further reduction in the punitive damages award) because there is a "significant risk" the punitive damages verdict in this case was based on improper evidence and arguments concerning third party harm. Ford also asserts that we should reconsider our original decision's rejection of its arguments that (1) California's punitive damages statute (Civil Code section 3294) is unconstitutionally vague as applied to this case, and (2) the trial court erred in excluding its industry custom and practice evidence. We granted permission to the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America (the Chamber) and the Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc. (PLAC) to file amicus curiae briefs to support Ford's contentions on remand.

This case is before us for a second time, after a GVR[1]order from the United States Supreme Court directed that we reconsider our original opinion in Buell‑Wilson v. Ford Motor Company (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 525 (Buell‑Wilson I) in light of Philip Morris USA v. Williams (2007) 549 U.S. ___ [166 L.Ed.2d 940, 127 S.Ct. 1057] (Philip Morris). Philip Morris holds that upon request, courts must adopt procedures to ensure juries do not punish defendants for harm caused to third parties when determining the amount of punitive damages to award. The Supreme Court also reiterated, however, juries could consider harm to third parties in determining the reprehensibility of a defendant's conduct.
Ford asserts that based on Philip Morris it is entitled to a new trial (or at least a further reduction in the punitive damages award) because there is a "significant risk" the punitive damages verdict in this case was based on improper evidence and arguments concerning third party harm. Ford also asserts that we should reconsider our original decision's rejection of its arguments that (1) California's punitive damages statute (Civil Code section 3294) is unconstitutionally vague as applied to this case, and (2) the trial court erred in excluding its industry custom and practice evidence. We granted permission to the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America (the Chamber) and the Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc. (PLAC) to file amicus curiae briefs to support Ford's contentions on remand.

This case is before us for a second time, after a GVR[1]order from the United States Supreme Court directed that we reconsider our original opinion in Buell‑Wilson v. Ford Motor Company (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 525 (Buell‑Wilson I) in light of Philip Morris USA v. Williams (2007) 549 U.S. ___ [166 L.Ed.2d 940, 127 S.Ct. 1057] (Philip Morris). Philip Morris holds that upon request, courts must adopt procedures to ensure juries do not punish defendants for harm caused to third parties when determining the amount of punitive damages to award. The Supreme Court also reiterated, however, juries could consider harm to third parties in determining the reprehensibility of a defendant's conduct.
Ford asserts that based on Philip Morris it is entitled to a new trial (or at least a further reduction in the punitive damages award) because there is a "significant risk" the punitive damages verdict in this case was based on improper evidence and arguments concerning third party harm. Ford also asserts that we should reconsider our original decision's rejection of its arguments that (1) California's punitive damages statute (Civil Code section 3294) is unconstitutionally vague as applied to this case, and (2) the trial court erred in excluding its industry custom and practice evidence. We granted permission to the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America (the Chamber) and the Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc. (PLAC) to file amicus curiae briefs to support Ford's contentions on remand.

This case is before us for a second time, after a GVR[1]order from the United States Supreme Court directed that we reconsider our original opinion in Buell‑Wilson v. Ford Motor Company (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 525 (Buell‑Wilson I) in light of Philip Morris USA v. Williams (2007) 549 U.S. ___ [166 L.Ed.2d 940, 127 S.Ct. 1057] (Philip Morris). Philip Morris holds that upon request, courts must adopt procedures to ensure juries do not punish defendants for harm caused to third parties when determining the amount of punitive damages to award. The Supreme Court also reiterated, however, juries could consider harm to third parties in determining the reprehensibility of a defendant's conduct.
Ford asserts that based on Philip Morris it is entitled to a new trial (or at least a further reduction in the punitive damages award) because there is a "significant risk" the punitive damages verdict in this case was based on improper evidence and arguments concerning third party harm. Ford also asserts that we should reconsider our original decision's rejection of its arguments that (1) California's punitive damages statute (Civil Code section 3294) is unconstitutionally vague as applied to this case, and (2) the trial court erred in excluding its industry custom and practice evidence. We granted permission to the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America (the Chamber) and the Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc. (PLAC) to file amicus curiae briefs to support Ford's contentions on remand.

A modification decision.

A jury convicted Tony Lessie of second degree murder (Pen. Code, 187, subd. (a)) and found true allegations that during its commission Lessie had intentionally and personally used and discharged a firearm, proximately causing great bodily injury and death to a person ( 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022.53, subd. (d)). The trial court sentenced Lessie to prison for a total term of 40 years to life.

Richard McKee appeals an order involuntarily committing him for an indeterminate term to the custody of the State Department of Mental Health (DMH) after a jury found him to be a sexually violent predator (SVP) within the meaning of the Sexually Violent Predators Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, 6600 et seq.) (the Act). McKee contends the order should be reversed because: (1) his indeterminate commitment pursuant to the Act, as amended in 2006, violated his federal constitutional rights to due process of law, against ex post facto laws, and to equal protection under the law; (2) the evidence is insufficient to support the finding he is an SVP; and (3) the trial court erred by refusing his proposed modification of a jury instruction.

Richard McKee appeals an order involuntarily committing him for an indeterminate term to the custody of the State Department of Mental Health (DMH) after a jury found him to be a sexually violent predator (SVP) within the meaning of the Sexually Violent Predators Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, 6600 et seq.) (the Act). McKee contends the order should be reversed because: (1) his indeterminate commitment pursuant to the Act, as amended in 2006, violated his federal constitutional rights to due process of law, against ex post facto laws, and to equal protection under the law; (2) the evidence is insufficient to support the finding he is an SVP; and (3) the trial court erred by refusing his proposed modification of a jury instruction.

Richard McKee appeals an order involuntarily committing him for an indeterminate term to the custody of the State Department of Mental Health (DMH) after a jury found him to be a sexually violent predator (SVP) within the meaning of the Sexually Violent Predators Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, 6600 et seq.) (the Act). McKee contends the order should be reversed because: (1) his indeterminate commitment pursuant to the Act, as amended in 2006, violated his federal constitutional rights to due process of law, against ex post facto laws, and to equal protection under the law; (2) the evidence is insufficient to support the finding he is an SVP; and (3) the trial court erred by refusing his proposed modification of a jury instruction.

Nicomedes Viray challenges Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger's reversal of a decision by the Board of Parole Hearings (the Board) finding him suitable for release on parole. Court conclude there was no evidence to support the Governor's ultimate conclusion that Viray was unsuitable for parole because he currently posed an unreasonable risk to public safety and therefore grant the requested relief.

The Committee for Green Foothills, a California nonprofit corporation, (Committee) brought a petition for a writ of mandamus to enforce the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (Pub. Res. Code, 21000 et seq.)[1] against the County of Santa Clara (County) and its Board of Supervisors (Board). The litigation arose from the Board's December 13, 2005 resolution approving an agreement to be entered with the Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University (Stanford)[2] to satisfy Condition I.2 of a General Use Permit approved in 2000 (GUP). The condition required Stanford to dedicate easements for, develop and maintain portions of trails, identified as the C1 and S1 trails on the 1995 Santa Clara Countywide Master Plan, that crossed Stanford's lands. The December 2005 resolution selected a final alignment for the S1 trail from among several potential alternative routes, certified the S1 Trail Alignment Environmental Impact Report (EIR) and made CEQA findings for the S1 trail alignment, determined "no further CEQA review is required by the County prior to execution" of the "Agreement for Trail Easements, Construction, Management and Maintenance and Grant of Easements" (trails agreement) with Stanford insofar as the agreement concerned the C1 and C2 trail alignments, and approved the execution of the trails agreement. Among other things, the trails agreement authorized portions of the C1 trail to be developed outside Santa Clara County in San Mateo County and the Town of Portola Valley instead of within the County, provided those other jurisdictions cooperated, and declared that the agreement's execution satisfied GUP Condition I.2.

The Committee for Green Foothills, a California nonprofit corporation, (Committee) brought a petition for a writ of mandamus to enforce the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (Pub. Res. Code, 21000 et seq.)[1] against the County of Santa Clara (County) and its Board of Supervisors (Board). The litigation arose from the Board's December 13, 2005 resolution approving an agreement to be entered with the Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University (Stanford)[2] to satisfy Condition I.2 of a General Use Permit approved in 2000 (GUP). The condition required Stanford to dedicate easements for, develop and maintain portions of trails, identified as the C1 and S1 trails on the 1995 Santa Clara Countywide Master Plan, that crossed Stanford's lands. The December 2005 resolution selected a final alignment for the S1 trail from among several potential alternative routes, certified the S1 Trail Alignment Environmental Impact Report (EIR) and made CEQA findings for the S1 trail alignment, determined "no further CEQA review is required by the County prior to execution" of the "Agreement for Trail Easements, Construction, Management and Maintenance and Grant of Easements" (trails agreement) with Stanford insofar as the agreement concerned the C1 and C2 trail alignments, and approved the execution of the trails agreement. Among other things, the trails agreement authorized portions of the C1 trail to be developed outside Santa Clara County in San Mateo County and the Town of Portola Valley instead of within the County, provided those other jurisdictions cooperated, and declared that the agreement's execution satisfied GUP Condition I.2.

A group of public entities are prosecuting a representative public nuisance action against a group of companies that manufactured lead paint. This action seeks abatement as the sole remedy, and it has not yet proceeded to trial. The companies filed a motion seeking to bar the public entities from compensating their private counsel by means of contingent fees. The superior court, relying on People ex rel. Clancy v. Superior Court (1985) 39 Cal.3d 740 (Clancy), issued an order barring the public entities from compensating their private counsel by means of any contingent fee agreement. The public entities seek writ relief from the superior courts order. They assert that Clancy does not bar all contingent fee agreements in public nuisance abatement actions, and that their contingent fee agreements are valid. Court conclude that Clancy does not bar the public entities contingent fee agreements with their private counsel, and Court issue a writ of mandate directing the superior court to vacate its order and issue a new order denying the companies motion.