CA Pub. Decisions

A group of public entities are prosecuting a representative public nuisance action against a group of companies that manufactured lead paint. This action seeks abatement as the sole remedy, and it has not yet proceeded to trial. The companies filed a motion seeking to bar the public entities from compensating their private counsel by means of contingent fees. The superior court, relying on People ex rel. Clancy v. Superior Court (1985) 39 Cal.3d 740 (Clancy), issued an order barring the public entities from compensating their private counsel by means of any contingent fee agreement. The public entities seek writ relief from the superior courts order. They assert that Clancy does not bar all contingent fee agreements in public nuisance abatement actions, and that their contingent fee agreements are valid. Court conclude that Clancy does not bar the public entities contingent fee agreements with their private counsel, and Court issue a writ of mandate directing the superior court to vacate its order and issue a new order denying the companies motion.

In February 2003, Robert Reese Bains III and a group of former Peregrine Systems, Inc. (Peregrine) shareholders (collectively plaintiffs) filed this action against former Peregrine directors John J. Moores, Charles E. Noell III, and Christopher A. Cole (collectively defendants), as well as several former Peregrine employees, Peregrine's former outside accounting firm, and two of Peregrine's former business partners.[1] In their complaint, plaintiffs alleged that they had been induced to hold Peregrine stock from May 1997 through 2002 by Peregrine's false, fraudulent and misleading financial reports.[2] Plaintiffs alleged that Peregrine engaged in various fraudulent accounting practices that led to the improper recognition of revenue in Peregrine's financial statements, for the purpose of increasing Peregrine's stock price. Plaintiffs further alleged that in May 2002, after the initial public disclosure of the improper practices, Peregrine's stock price fell dramatically, causing plaintiffs to suffer damages. Plaintiffs averred that in February 2003, Peregrine issued restated financial statements for fiscal years 2000 and 2001, and for the first three quarters of 2002, and that the financial statements reduced by $509 million previously reported revenue in the amount of $1.34 billion. Of the $509 million, $259 million was deducted for non-substantiated transactions. Plaintiffs' complaint contained various fraud and fraud related causes of action. Defendants filed motions for summary judgment in which they contended that plaintiffs could not prevail on any of their fraud or fraud related causes of action because there was no evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that defendants participated in, or knew about, any of the fraudulent accounting practices.[3] Plaintiffs filed a motion to stay the proceedings on the ground that they needed to obtain additional discovery from witnesses who had previously invoked their Fifth Amendment rights and refused to provide substantive testimony in this case. The trial court denied plaintiffs' motion for a stay, and granted defendants' motions for summary judgment.
On appeal, plaintiffs claim that the trial court erred in granting judgment for defendants as a matter of law on the fraud and fraud related causes of action. Specifically, plaintiffs claim that the trial court erred in concluding that plaintiffs failed to identify evidence from which a jury could find that defendants knew that Peregrine's financial reports contained false information. Plaintiffs also contend that there are triable issues of material fact with respect to whether defendants are liable on these causes of action pursuant to the group published information doctrine.[4] Plaintiffs further claim that the trial court erred in sustaining Noell's and Moores's demurrers[5] to plaintiffs' claim that they were liable for various California statutory securities law violations pursuant to Corporations Code section 25504.[6] Finally, plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in denying their motion to stay the proceedings. Court reject all of plaintiffs' claims and affirm the judgment.

In February 2003, Robert Reese Bains III and a group of former Peregrine Systems, Inc. (Peregrine) shareholders (collectively plaintiffs) filed this action against former Peregrine directors John J. Moores, Charles E. Noell III, and Christopher A. Cole (collectively defendants), as well as several former Peregrine employees, Peregrine's former outside accounting firm, and two of Peregrine's former business partners.[1] In their complaint, plaintiffs alleged that they had been induced to hold Peregrine stock from May 1997 through 2002 by Peregrine's false, fraudulent and misleading financial reports.[2] Plaintiffs alleged that Peregrine engaged in various fraudulent accounting practices that led to the improper recognition of revenue in Peregrine's financial statements, for the purpose of increasing Peregrine's stock price. Plaintiffs further alleged that in May 2002, after the initial public disclosure of the improper practices, Peregrine's stock price fell dramatically, causing plaintiffs to suffer damages. Plaintiffs averred that in February 2003, Peregrine issued restated financial statements for fiscal years 2000 and 2001, and for the first three quarters of 2002, and that the financial statements reduced by $509 million previously reported revenue in the amount of $1.34 billion. Of the $509 million, $259 million was deducted for non-substantiated transactions. Plaintiffs' complaint contained various fraud and fraud related causes of action. Defendants filed motions for summary judgment in which they contended that plaintiffs could not prevail on any of their fraud or fraud related causes of action because there was no evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that defendants participated in, or knew about, any of the fraudulent accounting practices.[3] Plaintiffs filed a motion to stay the proceedings on the ground that they needed to obtain additional discovery from witnesses who had previously invoked their Fifth Amendment rights and refused to provide substantive testimony in this case. The trial court denied plaintiffs' motion for a stay, and granted defendants' motions for summary judgment.
On appeal, plaintiffs claim that the trial court erred in granting judgment for defendants as a matter of law on the fraud and fraud related causes of action. Specifically, plaintiffs claim that the trial court erred in concluding that plaintiffs failed to identify evidence from which a jury could find that defendants knew that Peregrine's financial reports contained false information. Plaintiffs also contend that there are triable issues of material fact with respect to whether defendants are liable on these causes of action pursuant to the group published information doctrine.[4] Plaintiffs further claim that the trial court erred in sustaining Noell's and Moores's demurrers[5] to plaintiffs' claim that they were liable for various California statutory securities law violations pursuant to Corporations Code section 25504.[6] Finally, plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in denying their motion to stay the proceedings. Court reject all of plaintiffs' claims and affirm the judgment.

In February 2003, Robert Reese Bains III and a group of former Peregrine Systems, Inc. (Peregrine) shareholders (collectively plaintiffs) filed this action against former Peregrine directors John J. Moores, Charles E. Noell III, and Christopher A. Cole (collectively defendants), as well as several former Peregrine employees, Peregrine's former outside accounting firm, and two of Peregrine's former business partners.[1] In their complaint, plaintiffs alleged that they had been induced to hold Peregrine stock from May 1997 through 2002 by Peregrine's false, fraudulent and misleading financial reports.[2] Plaintiffs alleged that Peregrine engaged in various fraudulent accounting practices that led to the improper recognition of revenue in Peregrine's financial statements, for the purpose of increasing Peregrine's stock price. Plaintiffs further alleged that in May 2002, after the initial public disclosure of the improper practices, Peregrine's stock price fell dramatically, causing plaintiffs to suffer damages. Plaintiffs averred that in February 2003, Peregrine issued restated financial statements for fiscal years 2000 and 2001, and for the first three quarters of 2002, and that the financial statements reduced by $509 million previously reported revenue in the amount of $1.34 billion. Of the $509 million, $259 million was deducted for non-substantiated transactions. Plaintiffs' complaint contained various fraud and fraud related causes of action. Defendants filed motions for summary judgment in which they contended that plaintiffs could not prevail on any of their fraud or fraud related causes of action because there was no evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that defendants participated in, or knew about, any of the fraudulent accounting practices.[3] Plaintiffs filed a motion to stay the proceedings on the ground that they needed to obtain additional discovery from witnesses who had previously invoked their Fifth Amendment rights and refused to provide substantive testimony in this case. The trial court denied plaintiffs' motion for a stay, and granted defendants' motions for summary judgment.
On appeal, plaintiffs claim that the trial court erred in granting judgment for defendants as a matter of law on the fraud and fraud related causes of action. Specifically, plaintiffs claim that the trial court erred in concluding that plaintiffs failed to identify evidence from which a jury could find that defendants knew that Peregrine's financial reports contained false information. Plaintiffs also contend that there are triable issues of material fact with respect to whether defendants are liable on these causes of action pursuant to the group published information doctrine.[4] Plaintiffs further claim that the trial court erred in sustaining Noell's and Moores's demurrers[5] to plaintiffs' claim that they were liable for various California statutory securities law violations pursuant to Corporations Code section 25504.[6] Finally, plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in denying their motion to stay the proceedings. Court reject all of plaintiffs' claims and affirm the judgment.

In February 2003, Robert Reese Bains III and a group of former Peregrine Systems, Inc. (Peregrine) shareholders (collectively plaintiffs) filed this action against former Peregrine directors John J. Moores, Charles E. Noell III, and Christopher A. Cole (collectively defendants), as well as several former Peregrine employees, Peregrine's former outside accounting firm, and two of Peregrine's former business partners.[1] In their complaint, plaintiffs alleged that they had been induced to hold Peregrine stock from May 1997 through 2002 by Peregrine's false, fraudulent and misleading financial reports.[2] Plaintiffs alleged that Peregrine engaged in various fraudulent accounting practices that led to the improper recognition of revenue in Peregrine's financial statements, for the purpose of increasing Peregrine's stock price. Plaintiffs further alleged that in May 2002, after the initial public disclosure of the improper practices, Peregrine's stock price fell dramatically, causing plaintiffs to suffer damages. Plaintiffs averred that in February 2003, Peregrine issued restated financial statements for fiscal years 2000 and 2001, and for the first three quarters of 2002, and that the financial statements reduced by $509 million previously reported revenue in the amount of $1.34 billion. Of the $509 million, $259 million was deducted for non-substantiated transactions. Plaintiffs' complaint contained various fraud and fraud related causes of action. Defendants filed motions for summary judgment in which they contended that plaintiffs could not prevail on any of their fraud or fraud related causes of action because there was no evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that defendants participated in, or knew about, any of the fraudulent accounting practices.[3] Plaintiffs filed a motion to stay the proceedings on the ground that they needed to obtain additional discovery from witnesses who had previously invoked their Fifth Amendment rights and refused to provide substantive testimony in this case. The trial court denied plaintiffs' motion for a stay, and granted defendants' motions for summary judgment.
On appeal, plaintiffs claim that the trial court erred in granting judgment for defendants as a matter of law on the fraud and fraud related causes of action. Specifically, plaintiffs claim that the trial court erred in concluding that plaintiffs failed to identify evidence from which a jury could find that defendants knew that Peregrine's financial reports contained false information. Plaintiffs also contend that there are triable issues of material fact with respect to whether defendants are liable on these causes of action pursuant to the group published information doctrine.[4] Plaintiffs further claim that the trial court erred in sustaining Noell's and Moores's demurrers[5] to plaintiffs' claim that they were liable for various California statutory securities law violations pursuant to Corporations Code section 25504.[6] Finally, plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in denying their motion to stay the proceedings. Court reject all of plaintiffs' claims and affirm the judgment.

A modification decision.

Plaintiff and appellant Dartheatus Lloyd (Lloyd) appeals a judgment following a grant of summary judgment in favor of his former employer, defendant and respondent County of Los Angeles (the County). The essential issues presented are whether Lloyds action is barred by a failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and if not, whether a triable issue of material fact exists so as to preclude summary judgment.

Defendant Cameron Earle was charged in two separate cases with indecent exposure, a misdemeanor, and sexual assault, a felony. The charges arose from entirely distinct and dissimilar incidents with no apparent historical connection to one another. After first ordering the charges consolidated, the trial court denied a motion by defendant to sever them for trial.

In 2003 the Legislature enacted Probate Code section 1516.5, making it easier for children in probate guardianships to be adopted by their guardians. (Stats. 2003, ch. 251, 11; hereafter, section 1516.5.)[1] Section 1516.5 authorizes the termination of parental rights when the guardianship has continued for at least two years, and the court finds that adoption by the guardian would be in the childs best interest. In this case, a mother whose rights were terminated under section 1516.5 contends the statute is unconstitutional on its face because it allows the fundamental rights of parenthood to be extinguished without a showing that the parent is currently unfit, or that termination of parental rights is the alternative least detrimental to the child. Court hold that section 1516.5 is facially constitutional. Generally, due process requires some showing of parental unfitness before rights are terminated, to protect the parents fundamental interest in child custody. However, it is settled that a showing of current unfitness is not always necessary when a court terminates parental rights. Section 1516.5 applies to parents whose custody rights have been suspended during a probate guardianship. A termination proceeding under this statute occurs only when the parent has failed to exercise any custodial responsibility for a two-year period, with the possible exception of visitation. In this context, it would make little sense to require a showing that the parent is currently unfit. As guardianship continues for an extended period, the child develops an interest in a stable, continuing placement, and the guardian acquires a recognized interest in the care and custody of the child. Section 1516.5 appropriately requires the court to balance all the familial interests in deciding what is best for the child. The least detrimental alternative standard invoked by mother is effectively included in the determination of the childs best interest. Mother also claims it was improper to apply section 1516.5 retroactively in this case, because she had relied on preexisting law governing the termination of parental rights when she agreed to place her child in guardianship, two years before the statute was enacted. Court conclude that in the circumstances of this case, the trial courts application of section 1516.5 was consistent with due process and with the transitional provisions of Probate Code section 3, subdivision (h). As Court explain, trial courts have discretion to determine on a case by case basis whether to apply section 1516.5 to a guardianship in existence on its effective date.

Joshua Jackson suffered serious injuries when he attempted to dislodge a kite from a power line maintained by Pacific Gas & Electric Company (PG&E) on the property of Eve Prince. The parties do not dispute that PG&E is immune from direct liability to Jackson under Civil Code[1]section 846, which provides with certain exceptions that a property owner owes no duty of care to keep the premises safe for entry or use by others for any recreational purpose. The question here is whether Prince, who might be liable to Jackson under one of the statutory exceptions, may recover on her cross-complaint alleging PG&E is liable for implied contractual indemnity based on its breach of a contractual duty owed to her to maintain its power line easement in repair.
Court conclude that, even assuming a claim for implied contractual indemnity may be predicated on an alleged breach of an easement duty, PG&Es immunity from liability to Jackson under section 846 nonetheless bars Prince from recovering indemnification as a matter of law. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand the matter to that court with directions to enter judgment in favor of PG&E.

A defendant who is found to have committed a nonviolent drug possession offense is eligible to be placed on probation and ordered to drug treatment in accordance with the mandatory provisions of Proposition 36 if at the time of the commission of the offense he was on probation for other nonqualifying offenses.

In action between two water users in which plaintiff sued to establish that defendant had forfeited the portion of its appropriative right that exceeded defendant's historical use of the water, trial court correctly determined that minimization of the amount of forfeiture was appropriate, and its determination that a daily measurement period would best protect defendant's entitlement to a volume of water sufficient to meet historical uses was supported by the evidence. In measuring nonuse of water by junior water rights holders, trial court should have considered all water available to each junior appropriator as its "actual entitlement" up to the amount of its paper entitlement. Trial court's conclusion that release water cannot form the basis for measurement of actual entitlement because the amount of such release cannot be known in advance of the day of use was contrary to mandate of California Constitution and Water Code that forfeiture analysis reflect the actual historical use of water. Because forfeiture is of water rights and not of water itself, it is not necessarily erroneous to determine that the amount of forfeiture exceeds the total amount of water in the relevant body of water, nor would forfeiture necessarily create unappropriated water subject to appropriation through the Water Code permitting process.

Following a contested jurisdiction hearing, the juvenile court sustained a charge of second degree robbery while armed with a firearm against Eddie L., a minor. He was continued as a ward of the court and committed to the Sacramento County Boys Ranch. On appeal, the minor contends that remand is required for the juvenile court to (1) make a discretionary determination of his maximum period of confinement as provided in Welfare and Institutions Code section 726, subdivision (c) (section 726(c)), and (2) enter the minors maximum period of confinement in the minutes, and (3) conduct a hearing on whether the minors mother should be in charge of making his educational decisions. In the published portion of the opinion, we reject the first contention. As pertinent here, section 726(c) applies to minors who are removed from parental custody but not committed to the Division of Juvenile Facilities (DJF), formerly California Youth Authority (CYA). The statute requires the juvenile court to set the maximum term for such a minor by taking the upper term for the offense and adding a term for any enhancements that have been pled and proved. That is what the juvenile court did here. In the unpublished portion of the opinion, Court agree with the minors second and third contentions. We shall therefore remand to the juvenile court with instructions to enter the minors maximum period of confinement in the minutes and to clarify its order with respect to the role of the minors mother in his education.

This appeal and the companion appeal, RiverWatch v. County of San Diego Department of Environmental Health, Case No. D048259, are the latest in the lengthy course of litigation that followed 1994 voter approval of Proposition C, an initiative which paved the way for construction and operation of a privately owned solid waste facility in northern San Diego County. (San Diego County Sample Ballot and Voter Information Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 1994) Prop. C.) In the underlying action giving rise to these two appeals, plaintiffs RiverWatch, the Pala Band of Mission Indians (Pala Band), and the City of Oceanside (Oceanside) sought a writ of mandate alleging that defendants County of San Diego Department of Environmental Health and Gary Erbeck, Director of the County of San Diego Solid Waste Local Enforcement Agency, (collectively DEH), violated the California Environmental Quality Act (Pub. Res. Code, 21000 et seq.) (CEQA), Proposition C, the San Diego County general plan, and the California Code of Regulations when they approved various aspects of the landfill project. The trial court granted the petition in part and denied it in part. In case no. D048259, RiverWatch, the Pala Band and Oceanside appealed from the portions of the January 2006 judgment that were adverse to them. We affirmed the judgment, rejecting plaintiffs' claims that the landfill project violated Proposition C and the San Diego County general plan, and that the final environmental impact report violated CEQA.[1] In this appeal, Case No. D049216, DEH and real party in interest Gregory Canyon, Ltd. (GCL) challenge the June 2006 judgment awarding RiverWatch and the Pala Band attorney fees in the sum of $239,620 pursuant to the private attorney general doctrine set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 (section 1021.5). DEH and GCL assert that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees to RiverWatch and Pala Band under section 1021.5 because plaintiffs failed to satisfy at least two requirements for the award. Alternatively, DEH and GCL urge us to reduce the attorney fee award on grounds RiverWatch and the Pala Band had only limited success in their effort to prevent the landfill project from going forward. Court conclude there was no abuse of discretion. The litigation initiated by RiverWatch and Pala Band satisfied the requirements of section 1021.5, and the attorney fee award was consistent with the purpose of the private attorney general doctrine. The trial court presided over briefing and trial on the underlying petition, and fully understood the significance of the claims set forth in the petition. The court did, in fact, reduce the requested award for reasons it explained in detail. Court affirm the judgment.