CA Pub. Decisions

This appeal and the companion appeal, RiverWatch v. County of San Diego Department of Environmental Health, Case No. D048259, are the latest in the lengthy course of litigation that followed 1994 voter approval of Proposition C, an initiative which paved the way for construction and operation of a privately owned solid waste facility in northern San Diego County. (San Diego County Sample Ballot and Voter Information Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 1994) Prop. C.) In the underlying action giving rise to these two appeals, plaintiffs RiverWatch, the Pala Band of Mission Indians (Pala Band), and the City of Oceanside (Oceanside) sought a writ of mandate alleging that defendants County of San Diego Department of Environmental Health and Gary Erbeck, Director of the County of San Diego Solid Waste Local Enforcement Agency, (collectively DEH), violated the California Environmental Quality Act (Pub. Res. Code, 21000 et seq.) (CEQA), Proposition C, the San Diego County general plan, and the California Code of Regulations when they approved various aspects of the landfill project. The trial court granted the petition in part and denied it in part. In case no. D048259, RiverWatch, the Pala Band and Oceanside appealed from the portions of the January 2006 judgment that were adverse to them. We affirmed the judgment, rejecting plaintiffs' claims that the landfill project violated Proposition C and the San Diego County general plan, and that the final environmental impact report violated CEQA.[1] In this appeal, Case No. D049216, DEH and real party in interest Gregory Canyon, Ltd. (GCL) challenge the June 2006 judgment awarding RiverWatch and the Pala Band attorney fees in the sum of $239,620 pursuant to the private attorney general doctrine set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 (section 1021.5). DEH and GCL assert that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees to RiverWatch and Pala Band under section 1021.5 because plaintiffs failed to satisfy at least two requirements for the award. Alternatively, DEH and GCL urge us to reduce the attorney fee award on grounds RiverWatch and the Pala Band had only limited success in their effort to prevent the landfill project from going forward. Court conclude there was no abuse of discretion. The litigation initiated by RiverWatch and Pala Band satisfied the requirements of section 1021.5, and the attorney fee award was consistent with the purpose of the private attorney general doctrine. The trial court presided over briefing and trial on the underlying petition, and fully understood the significance of the claims set forth in the petition. The court did, in fact, reduce the requested award for reasons it explained in detail. Court affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted defendant Richard Wade Farley of the first degree murders of Joseph Silva, Wayne Williams, Glenda Moritz, Ronald Reed, Helen Lamparter, Ronald Doney, and Lawrence Kane (Pen. Code,[1] 187, 189), the attempted murders of Greg Scott, Richard Townsley, Randell Hemingway, William Drake, and Karen Mackey ( 187, 664), assault with a firearm upon Laura Black ( 245, subd. (a)(2),), second degree burglary ( 459, former 460, subd. (2), now 460, subd. (b)), and felony vandalism (former 594, subd. (b)(1)). The jury found true the special circumstance allegations that six of the murders were committed while defendant was engaged in the commission or attempted commission of a burglary ( 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(vii), now 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(G)), and that defendant was convicted of at least one crime of first degree murder and one or more crimes of first or second degree murder. ( 190.2, subd. (a)(3)). The jury also found true the allegations that all five counts of attempted murder were willful, deliberate, and premeditated ( 664, subd. (f)), the allegations pertaining to all counts of murder and attempted murder that defendant personally used a firearm ( 1203.06, 12022.5, subd. (a)), and the allegations regarding defendants personal infliction of great bodily injury on Scott, Townsley ( 12022.7, 1203.075), and Black ( 12022.7). Following the penalty phase of the trial, the jury returned a verdict of death. The trial court denied defendants motion for a new trial ( 1181), and the automatic application for modification of the verdict ( 190.4, subd. (e)). The court entered a judgment of death and also imposed sentence on the noncapital offenses. This appeal is automatic. (Cal. Const., art. VI, 11; 1239, subd. (b).) For the reasons that follow, Court affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted defendant Richard Wade Farley of the first degree murders of Joseph Silva, Wayne Williams, Glenda Moritz, Ronald Reed, Helen Lamparter, Ronald Doney, and Lawrence Kane (Pen. Code,[1] 187, 189), the attempted murders of Greg Scott, Richard Townsley, Randell Hemingway, William Drake, and Karen Mackey ( 187, 664), assault with a firearm upon Laura Black ( 245, subd. (a)(2),), second degree burglary ( 459, former 460, subd. (2), now 460, subd. (b)), and felony vandalism (former 594, subd. (b)(1)). The jury found true the special circumstance allegations that six of the murders were committed while defendant was engaged in the commission or attempted commission of a burglary ( 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(vii), now 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(G)), and that defendant was convicted of at least one crime of first degree murder and one or more crimes of first or second degree murder. ( 190.2, subd. (a)(3)). The jury also found true the allegations that all five counts of attempted murder were willful, deliberate, and premeditated ( 664, subd. (f)), the allegations pertaining to all counts of murder and attempted murder that defendant personally used a firearm ( 1203.06, 12022.5, subd. (a)), and the allegations regarding defendants personal infliction of great bodily injury on Scott, Townsley ( 12022.7, 1203.075), and Black ( 12022.7). Following the penalty phase of the trial, the jury returned a verdict of death. The trial court denied defendants motion for a new trial ( 1181), and the automatic application for modification of the verdict ( 190.4, subd. (e)). The court entered a judgment of death and also imposed sentence on the noncapital offenses. This appeal is automatic. (Cal. Const., art. VI, 11; 1239, subd. (b).) For the reasons that follow, Court affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted defendant Richard Wade Farley of the first degree murders of Joseph Silva, Wayne Williams, Glenda Moritz, Ronald Reed, Helen Lamparter, Ronald Doney, and Lawrence Kane (Pen. Code,[1] 187, 189), the attempted murders of Greg Scott, Richard Townsley, Randell Hemingway, William Drake, and Karen Mackey ( 187, 664), assault with a firearm upon Laura Black ( 245, subd. (a)(2),), second degree burglary ( 459, former 460, subd. (2), now 460, subd. (b)), and felony vandalism (former 594, subd. (b)(1)). The jury found true the special circumstance allegations that six of the murders were committed while defendant was engaged in the commission or attempted commission of a burglary ( 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(vii), now 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(G)), and that defendant was convicted of at least one crime of first degree murder and one or more crimes of first or second degree murder. ( 190.2, subd. (a)(3)). The jury also found true the allegations that all five counts of attempted murder were willful, deliberate, and premeditated ( 664, subd. (f)), the allegations pertaining to all counts of murder and attempted murder that defendant personally used a firearm ( 1203.06, 12022.5, subd. (a)), and the allegations regarding defendants personal infliction of great bodily injury on Scott, Townsley ( 12022.7, 1203.075), and Black ( 12022.7). Following the penalty phase of the trial, the jury returned a verdict of death. The trial court denied defendants motion for a new trial ( 1181), and the automatic application for modification of the verdict ( 190.4, subd. (e)). The court entered a judgment of death and also imposed sentence on the noncapital offenses. This appeal is automatic. (Cal. Const., art. VI, 11; 1239, subd. (b).) For the reasons that follow, Court affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted defendant Richard Wade Farley of the first degree murders of Joseph Silva, Wayne Williams, Glenda Moritz, Ronald Reed, Helen Lamparter, Ronald Doney, and Lawrence Kane (Pen. Code,[1] 187, 189), the attempted murders of Greg Scott, Richard Townsley, Randell Hemingway, William Drake, and Karen Mackey ( 187, 664), assault with a firearm upon Laura Black ( 245, subd. (a)(2),), second degree burglary ( 459, former 460, subd. (2), now 460, subd. (b)), and felony vandalism (former 594, subd. (b)(1)). The jury found true the special circumstance allegations that six of the murders were committed while defendant was engaged in the commission or attempted commission of a burglary ( 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(vii), now 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(G)), and that defendant was convicted of at least one crime of first degree murder and one or more crimes of first or second degree murder. ( 190.2, subd. (a)(3)). The jury also found true the allegations that all five counts of attempted murder were willful, deliberate, and premeditated ( 664, subd. (f)), the allegations pertaining to all counts of murder and attempted murder that defendant personally used a firearm ( 1203.06, 12022.5, subd. (a)), and the allegations regarding defendants personal infliction of great bodily injury on Scott, Townsley ( 12022.7, 1203.075), and Black ( 12022.7). Following the penalty phase of the trial, the jury returned a verdict of death. The trial court denied defendants motion for a new trial ( 1181), and the automatic application for modification of the verdict ( 190.4, subd. (e)). The court entered a judgment of death and also imposed sentence on the noncapital offenses. This appeal is automatic. (Cal. Const., art. VI, 11; 1239, subd. (b).) For the reasons that follow, Court affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted defendant Richard Wade Farley of the first degree murders of Joseph Silva, Wayne Williams, Glenda Moritz, Ronald Reed, Helen Lamparter, Ronald Doney, and Lawrence Kane (Pen. Code,[1] 187, 189), the attempted murders of Greg Scott, Richard Townsley, Randell Hemingway, William Drake, and Karen Mackey ( 187, 664), assault with a firearm upon Laura Black ( 245, subd. (a)(2),), second degree burglary ( 459, former 460, subd. (2), now 460, subd. (b)), and felony vandalism (former 594, subd. (b)(1)). The jury found true the special circumstance allegations that six of the murders were committed while defendant was engaged in the commission or attempted commission of a burglary ( 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(vii), now 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(G)), and that defendant was convicted of at least one crime of first degree murder and one or more crimes of first or second degree murder. ( 190.2, subd. (a)(3)). The jury also found true the allegations that all five counts of attempted murder were willful, deliberate, and premeditated ( 664, subd. (f)), the allegations pertaining to all counts of murder and attempted murder that defendant personally used a firearm ( 1203.06, 12022.5, subd. (a)), and the allegations regarding defendants personal infliction of great bodily injury on Scott, Townsley ( 12022.7, 1203.075), and Black ( 12022.7). Following the penalty phase of the trial, the jury returned a verdict of death. The trial court denied defendants motion for a new trial ( 1181), and the automatic application for modification of the verdict ( 190.4, subd. (e)). The court entered a judgment of death and also imposed sentence on the noncapital offenses. This appeal is automatic. (Cal. Const., art. VI, 11; 1239, subd. (b).) For the reasons that follow, Court affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted defendant Richard Wade Farley of the first degree murders of Joseph Silva, Wayne Williams, Glenda Moritz, Ronald Reed, Helen Lamparter, Ronald Doney, and Lawrence Kane (Pen. Code,[1] 187, 189), the attempted murders of Greg Scott, Richard Townsley, Randell Hemingway, William Drake, and Karen Mackey ( 187, 664), assault with a firearm upon Laura Black ( 245, subd. (a)(2),), second degree burglary ( 459, former 460, subd. (2), now 460, subd. (b)), and felony vandalism (former 594, subd. (b)(1)). The jury found true the special circumstance allegations that six of the murders were committed while defendant was engaged in the commission or attempted commission of a burglary ( 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(vii), now 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(G)), and that defendant was convicted of at least one crime of first degree murder and one or more crimes of first or second degree murder. ( 190.2, subd. (a)(3)). The jury also found true the allegations that all five counts of attempted murder were willful, deliberate, and premeditated ( 664, subd. (f)), the allegations pertaining to all counts of murder and attempted murder that defendant personally used a firearm ( 1203.06, 12022.5, subd. (a)), and the allegations regarding defendants personal infliction of great bodily injury on Scott, Townsley ( 12022.7, 1203.075), and Black ( 12022.7). Following the penalty phase of the trial, the jury returned a verdict of death. The trial court denied defendants motion for a new trial ( 1181), and the automatic application for modification of the verdict ( 190.4, subd. (e)). The court entered a judgment of death and also imposed sentence on the noncapital offenses. This appeal is automatic. (Cal. Const., art. VI, 11; 1239, subd. (b).) For the reasons that follow, Court affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted defendant Richard Wade Farley of the first degree murders of Joseph Silva, Wayne Williams, Glenda Moritz, Ronald Reed, Helen Lamparter, Ronald Doney, and Lawrence Kane (Pen. Code,[1] 187, 189), the attempted murders of Greg Scott, Richard Townsley, Randell Hemingway, William Drake, and Karen Mackey ( 187, 664), assault with a firearm upon Laura Black ( 245, subd. (a)(2),), second degree burglary ( 459, former 460, subd. (2), now 460, subd. (b)), and felony vandalism (former 594, subd. (b)(1)). The jury found true the special circumstance allegations that six of the murders were committed while defendant was engaged in the commission or attempted commission of a burglary ( 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(vii), now 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(G)), and that defendant was convicted of at least one crime of first degree murder and one or more crimes of first or second degree murder. ( 190.2, subd. (a)(3)). The jury also found true the allegations that all five counts of attempted murder were willful, deliberate, and premeditated ( 664, subd. (f)), the allegations pertaining to all counts of murder and attempted murder that defendant personally used a firearm ( 1203.06, 12022.5, subd. (a)), and the allegations regarding defendants personal infliction of great bodily injury on Scott, Townsley ( 12022.7, 1203.075), and Black ( 12022.7). Following the penalty phase of the trial, the jury returned a verdict of death. The trial court denied defendants motion for a new trial ( 1181), and the automatic application for modification of the verdict ( 190.4, subd. (e)). The court entered a judgment of death and also imposed sentence on the noncapital offenses. This appeal is automatic. (Cal. Const., art. VI, 11; 1239, subd. (b).) For the reasons that follow, Court affirm the judgment.

An employer who sexually harasses an employee can be liable for damages under both federal law (title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII)) and California law (the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA)) when the sexually harassing conduct is so pervasive or severe that it alters the conditions of employment. (See Lyle v. Warner Brothers Television Productions (2006) 38 Cal.4th 264, 283-284 (Lyle).) At issue here is Californias Civil Code section 51.9, which prohibits sexual harassment in certain business relationships outside the workplace. This statute, enacted after the federal laws Title VII and Californias FEHA, expressly limits liability to harassing conduct that is pervasive or severe, the same words used to define liability under Title VII and the FEHA. Considering the presence of those words in section 51.9 to be significant, the trial court in this case granted defendants motion for summary judgment, which the Court of Appeal affirmed in a two-to-one decision. Both courts concluded that by its use of the words pervasive or severe, Californias Legislature intended to incorporate into section 51.9 the liability limitations governing workplace sexual harassment suits brought under Title VII and the FEHA. Court agree, and Court affirm the Court of Appeals judgment.

When a school district lays off certificated employees because of a reduction of services, pursuant to Education Code section 44955, are part time employees with greater seniority entitled to bump a full time employee with lesser seniority? We agree with the trial court that they are not and, therefore, shall affirm its judgment denying the writ of mandate sought by part time certificated employees who were released while the school district retained a similarly credentialed full time employee with lesser seniority.

We hold statements by defendants that plaintiff, an automobile museum president, (1) demanded a commission or a finders fee to which he was not entitled, and (2) was fired because other employees would not work for him and would leave if he stayed, should have been presented to the jury as slander per quod rather than as slander per se. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment in favor of plaintiff. Because the jury found that plaintiff did not suffer actual damages, a necessary element of an action for slander per quod, defendants are entitled to judgment without a retrial.

Plaintiff and appellant Dartheatus Lloyd (Lloyd) appeals a judgment following a grant of summary judgment in favor of his former employer, defendant and respondent County of Los Angeles (the County). The essential issues presented are whether Lloyds action is barred by a failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and if not, whether a triable issue of material fact exists so as to preclude summary judgment. Lloyds claim he suffered a retaliatory dismissal for whistleblower activity did not constitute a claim of discrimination on the basis of a non-merit factor within the meaning of rule 25.01 of the Countys Civil Service Rules (rules). Therefore, Lloyd was not required to exhaust his administrative remedies under the Countys internal rules. In the unpublished portion of the opinion, we address the merits of Lloyds other causes of action. Court conclude the County met its burden to establish a legitimate justification for its employment decisions, and that Lloyd failed to raise a triable issue of material fact as to whether the Countys reasons were pretextual. Therefore, the judgment is affirmed.

Lloyds claim he suffered a retaliatory dismissal for whistleblower activity did not constitute a claim of discrimination on the basis of a non-merit factor within the meaning of rule 25.01 of the Countys Civil Service Rules (rules). Therefore, Lloyd was not required to exhaust his administrative remedies under the Countys internal rules. Court also hold Lloyds causes of action alleging statutory violations of the Labor Code are not barred by his failure to exhaust the administrative remedy afforded by Labor Code section 98.7. There is no requirement that a plaintiff pursue the Labor Code administrative procedure prior to pursuing a statutory cause of action. (Daly v. Exxon Corp. (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 39, 46, review den.; Murray v. Oceanside Unified School Dist. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1338, 1359, review den.)

We further hold Lloyds common law tort claims against the County, alleging retaliation and wrongful termination in violation of public policy, are barred by Government Code section 815s elimination of common law tort liability for public entities. (Miklosy v. Regents of University of California (2008) 44 Cal.4th 876, 899.) In the unpublished portion of the opinion, we address the merits of Lloyds other causes of action. Court conclude the County met its burden to establish a legitimate justification for its employment decisions, and that Lloyd failed to raise a triable issue of material fact as to whether the Countys reasons were pretextual. Therefore, the judgment is affirmed.

This appeal comes to us after an action was dismissed under Code of Civil Procedure sections 583.410 (hereafter, section 583.410) and 583.420 (hereafter, section 583.420) for failure to bring the matter to trial within three years of commencement of the action. The case presents an issue of federal law about which the federal courts, as well as state courts that have examined the issue, conflict. That issue concerns when a state court reassumes jurisdiction over a matter that has been removed to federal court and then remanded under Title 28, section 1447 of the United States Code (hereafter, section 1447). Based upon the language and history of section 1447, Court hold that jurisdiction is not transferred back to the state court until the clerk of the federal district court mails a certified copy of the order of remand to the clerk of the Superior Court.