CA Pub. Decisions

Trial court did not violate defendant's due process rights by instructing jury with CALCRIM No. 852, "Evidence of Uncharged Domestic Violence"; instruction that jurors may, but are not required to, treat uncharged crimes as proof of a propensity to commit domestic violence if the uncharged crimes are proven by a preponderance of the evidence does not relieve prosecutor of burden to prove charged offenses beyond reasonable doubt.

A modification decision.

Where peace officer employed by state agency under civil service system transferred from one agency to another but was rejected by latter agency before completing probationary period and granted mandatory reinstatement by former agency, former agency could not require that he undergo a new background check.

Where state employee claimed that he was forced to resign in retaliation for complaints of wrongdoing, filed administrative California Whistleblower Protection Act complaint, and was provided the opportunity to submit evidence, name witnesses, and argue his claim to State Personnel Board, he was provided with the type of quasijudicial hearing sufficient to satisfy Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 1094.5 even though the SPB was not required to provide an evidentiary hearing. Because Whistleblower Act did not clearly provide that a whistleblower could pursue alternative remedies and did require plaintiff to initiate administrative proceedings, he was collaterally estopped from relitigating in an action for damages findings--not challenged by mandamus petition--on issues that were litigated in the quasiadjudicatory proceedings.

Terms and conditions on which California State University provides parking to its employees--including where the employees are allowed to park--involve the employment relationship between the university and its employees, and Public Employment Relations Board determination to the contrary was clearly erroneous.

School district misclassified employee as a substitute rather than temporary or probationary teacher where she was hired to teach a newly created class and not to temporarily replace an absent teacher. Teacher was not entitled to tenure as a remedy for misclassification where she was dismissed prior to completion of following school year and thus would not have been entitled to tenure even if properly classified.

Where prisoner filed petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging his classification as a "multijurisdiction prisoner" and denial of his request to appear in person at his "lifers hearing" before Board of Parole Hearings, substantive issues raised in petition were not mooted by board's vague assurances that it would facilitate petitioner's future attendance at hearings because issues were capable of repetition yet evading review with respect to petitioner or others similarly situated. Plain language of Penal Code Secs. 3041.5 and 2911 show that petitioner has statutory right to appear in person at "lifers hearing," and California Code of Regulations, Title 15, Secs. 2367(d)(1) and (d)(2), which provide for telephonic appearance, are void to extent they bar a prisoner from appearing in person at parole hearing. CDCR violated petitioner's right to due process where it failed to honor specific agreement that petitioner's "hearings for parole consideration and determination of sentence [would] be conducted on the same basis as if [he] were in a California institution.

Condition that parolee, convicted of child molestation, waive his right to confidentiality of psychotherapist-patient communications and authorize his privately retained psychotherapist to communicate with the parole authority was unreasonable where state could not identify a nefarious reason for parolee's decision to engage in private therapy.

A modification decision.

Trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to discharge jury panel on claim that prosecution's use of peremptory challenges to dismiss African-American potential jurors, which prosecutor justified in part by reference to dismissed potential jurors' skeptical attitudes toward criminal justice system, was motivated by discrimination. Such skepticism constituted a plausible basis for challenge and, regardless of its prevalence among African-Americans, was not so exclusively associated with their race or "inherent" that it could be considered a proxy for race that suggested intentional racial discrimination.

A modification decision.

Where defendant was given a suspended sentence and placed on probation, and entered into plea agreement for subsequent probation violation that allowed him to remain on probation, trial court lacked authority to increase defendant's unexecuted sentence from four to five years pursuant to terms of plea agreement. Where defendant subsequently admitted to another probation violation, trial court's execution of modified sentence was error but was an act in excess of jurisdiction--rather than without jurisdiction--because court retained jurisdiction over defendant during probationary period. Defendant was not entitled to relief from imposition of modified sentence on grounds that trial court exceeded its jurisdiction where defendant failed to timely appeal modification order, and where defendant's consent in plea agreement estopped him from challenging modification.

Standard instruction that jurors "compare and consider all the evidence that was received throughout the entire trial" could not mislead reasonable jurors into convicting a defendant based on evidence not amounting to proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

Where field representatives for labor union breached fiduciary duties by secretly participating in campaign to decertify the union that employed them, trial court properly awarded as damages the cost of defendant's union salary and benefits during the period in which the breaches occurred. Award as damages of the campaign costs union incurred in its unsuccessful effort to prevent decertification was unsupported by substantial evidence of causation where defendants could have gathered the signatures required to force a decertification election if they had resigned their employment and relied on their own contacts and knowledge of the membership to mount the signature gathering campaign. Where punitive damages were awarded after bench trial, defendant was entitled to reversal so that, if it chose to, trial court could reconsider the amount awarded in light of appellate court's partial reversal of the compensatory damages award.