CA Pub. Decisions

Trial court's denial of class certification in an unfair competition action against a health insurer for wrongful rescission of policies on basis of misrepresentations and post claims underwriting was erroneous as a matter of law; conclusion that defenses of fraud and unclean hands raised individual issues that predominated over the common issues related to liability was flawed because unclean hands is not a defense to a UCL action based on violation of a statute, and insurer's alleged failure to attach the applications containing class members' allegedly false statements to their policies would defeat its fraud defense based on antiwaiver provision of Insurance Code.

A modification decision.

A modifiation decision.

In ruling on motion for attorney fees by plaintiff who prevailed in Fair Employment and Housing Act case, trial court erred in denying fees solely because plaintiff's recovery was below the $25,000 threshold for general civil jurisdiction.

Lawsuit brought by an attorney alleging that another attorney improperly solicited his client was subject to the anti SLAPP statute as it arose out of the second attorney's communications concerning pending litigation. A cause of action arising from a lawyer's conduct, when the conduct includes advice to a prospective client on pending litigation, does not fall within the "commercial speech" exemption to the anti SLAPP statute. Plaintiff attorney failed to establish a probability of prevailing on his claim where plaintiff offered no evidence in support of the claim, and trial court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining defendant's attorney client privilege and work product objections to discovery. Trial court erred in awarding attorney fees under the anti SLAPP statute to defendant attorney who represented himself.

California Constitution does not guarantee parents the right to home school children. Where children were "enrolled" in a private school but were in fact taught at home by parent who was not a credentialed teacher, such schooling did not comply with compulsory education law. Parents' assertion that children's home schooling was necessitated by their "sincerely held religious beliefs...based on Biblical teachings and principles" was insufficient to establish that application of California's compulsory education law to them violated their First Amendment rights. Where juvenile court found that dependent children's home schooling was of poor quality and deprived them of important social opportunities, it was an error of law for court, absent showing that an exception to compulsory education law applied, not to order that children be enrolled in a public or private school other than school that was complicit in parents' denial of a legally sufficient education and that parents see to it that children were educated in such school.

Incentive compensation plan that allows employees the option of using a portion of their annual earnings to purchase shares in employer's stock at a price below the stock's publicly traded market price, but requires employee to forfeit both the stock and the money used to purchase it if employee resigns or is terminated for cause within a two year vesting period, does not violate Labor Code Secs. 201 and 202, which require an employer to pay its employee all earned but unpaid compensation following the employee's discharge or his or her voluntary termination of employment.

Where defendant waived his right to counsel and invoked his right to self representation after trial court adequately advised him of dangers and advised him he would be afforded no special treatment, and waiver form defendant completed notified him of his rights and warned him about disadvantages of self representation with specificity, defendant's waiver was knowing and voluntary. Where defendant changed his mind during jury selection and requested appointment of counsel at that time and also at close of jury selection, trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant's request at end of first day of trial. Trial court's error was structural and required reversal without analysis of prejudicial effect because deprivation of counsel at a critical stage of a criminal trial constitutes federal constitutional error affecting framework within which trial proceeds with consequences that are necessarily unquantifiable and indeterminate.

Jury's determination to award plaintiff $13,317 in economic damages in her suit against defendant who caused vehicle collision while high on methamphetamine rather than claimed medical bills of $131,282, based on conclusion that only a small portion of medical bills were causally related to collision, was not inadequate as a matter of law and was supported by substantial evidence where medical testimony did not establish causal link with collision, and plaintiff suffered other injuries requiring treatment both prior and subsequent to collision. Plaintiffs are never entitled to punitive damages as a matter of right, even if there is abundant evidence that a defendant acted with conscious disregard for safety of others, and jury acted within its prerogative when it found defendant acted without malice.

Lease provision asserting "any statement of size" in the lease or used to calculate rent "is an approximation which the Parties agree is reasonable and any payments based thereon are not subject to revision whether or not the actual size is more or less" did not insulate defendant landlords from liability for fraud or establish that plaintiff tenant's reliance on defendants' alleged misrepresentations with regard to size of unit was unjustifiable as a matter of law. Alleged misrepresentations during negotiation of lease did not constitute a breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Defendants did not violate plaintiff's rights under Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act by obtaining plaintiff's credit report where lease identified tenant as a commercial enterprise, and defendants obtained credit report to determine whether plaintiff could meet her financial obligations under the lease.

Lease provision asserting "any statement of size" in the lease or used to calculate rent "is an approximation which the Parties agree is reasonable and any payments based thereon are not subject to revision whether or not the actual size is more or less" did not insulate defendant landlords from liability for fraud or establish that plaintiff tenant's reliance on defendants' alleged misrepresentations with regard to size of unit was unjustifiable as a matter of law. Alleged misrepresentations during negotiation of lease did not constitute a breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Defendants did not violate plaintiff's rights under Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act by obtaining plaintiff's credit report where lease identified tenant as a commercial enterprise, and defendants obtained credit report to determine whether plaintiff could meet her financial obligations under the lease.

Where county outsourced engineering work to private firms, engineers who were employed and paid by the firms, signed written acknowledgements that they were not employees of the county, and not entitled to any of the benefits available to county employees were not "common law employees" and were not entitled to civil service and retirement benefits under the county's retirement plan.

Where defendant motorist stopped at intersection and gestured to left turning motorist to proceed, and left turning motorist did so and collided with plaintiff as he was riding his motorcycle through an intersection, defendant was not liable for negligence because defendant did not owe plaintiff a duty to ensure that intersection was clear of oncoming traffic before signaling that he was yielding right of way.

On defendants' motion for summary judgment in medical malpractice action, trial court erred in excluding declaration of plaintiff's expert on ground that expert did not say he was familiar with the standard of care in Southern California; appropriate test for expert qualification in ordinary medical malpractice actions is whether the expert is familiar with circumstances similar to those of the parties. Trial court abused its discretion by excluding opinion of physician who examined plaintiff in her home country that defendants' treatment of plaintiff's fractured wrist breached relevant standard of care where witness declared he had practiced orthopedics for 27 years, had treated thousands of patients with injuries similar to plaintiff's, had numerous contacts with doctors from the United States regarding treatment of injuries similar to plaintiff's, had reviewed many publications on treatment of fractures in the United States, and that treating a fracture would be handled similarly in his country as in the United States.