CA Pub. Decisions

Where plaintiff's defamation claim against his former employer, based on alleged statements by one named and other unnamed co employees, was fully resolved on its merits, plaintiff's subsequent defamation claim against same defendant based upon statements allegedly made by other named employees during the period covered by the prior claim was barred under doctrine of claims preclusion because they were raised or could have been raised in the prior action. Issue preclusion barred claim against named employee in second action based on statements made during period covered by first action, where issue of defamatory remarks by "other unnamed employees" was tendered by the pleading in first action and resolved against plaintiff on its merits, but did not bar claim against same employee based on separate statement allegedly made after the period covered by first action. Where trial court in second action erroneously allowed jury to consider alleged statements made by defendant both during and after period covered by first action, and jury returned verdict in favor of plaintiff that did not distinguish among the statements, defendant was entitled to new trial.

Where plaintiff's defamation claim against his former employer, based on alleged statements by one named and other unnamed co employees, was fully resolved on its merits, plaintiff's subsequent defamation claim against same defendant based upon statements allegedly made by other named employees during the period covered by the prior claim was barred under doctrine of claims preclusion because they were raised or could have been raised in the prior action. Issue preclusion barred claim against named employee in second action based on statements made during period covered by first action, where issue of defamatory remarks by "other unnamed employees" was tendered by the pleading in first action and resolved against plaintiff on its merits, but did not bar claim against same employee based on separate statement allegedly made after the period covered by first action. Where trial court in second action erroneously allowed jury to consider alleged statements made by defendant both during and after period covered by first action, and jury returned verdict in favor of plaintiff that did not distinguish among the statements, defendant was entitled to new trial.

Where defendant physically assaulted, threatened, and falsely imprisoned his 60 year old mother who was partially paralyzed on one side of her body, his conviction under Penal Code Sec. 368 was supported by sufficient evidence that he had willfully injured and falsely imprisoned a "dependant adult" because statute defined term as "any person between the ages of 18 and 64, who has physical or mental limitations which restrict... ability to carry out normal activities or to protect... rights," and "restrict" is not synonymous with "preclude." Evidence of victim's limited mobility, comprehension, and memory satisfied state's 'burden to prove that victim's ability to carry out normal activities or protect rights was limited in a significant way, and state was not required to demonstrate a caretaker relationship between defendant and victim.

Defendant was properly convicted of burglarizing his own home where he returned and forcibly entered, with intent to sexually assault his wife, after wife told him to leave the residence and he did so, turning over his keys to wife.

Defendant was properly convicted of burglarizing his own home where he returned and forcibly entered, with intent to sexually assault his wife, after wife told him to leave the residence and he did so, turning over his keys to wife.

Defendant was properly convicted of burglarizing his own home where he returned and forcibly entered, with intent to sexually assault his wife, after wife told him to leave the residence and he did so, turning over his keys to wife.

Where defendant pled guilty to gross vehicular manslaughter a nonviolent felony and two felony counts of alcohol related driving with admissions as to great bodily injury violent felonies he was subject to Penal Code Sec. 2933.1(a)'s limit on the amount of worktime credits that a defendant convicted of a violent felony may apply to reduce his sentence under Sec. 2933 to 15 percent of total sentence, even though trial court had stayed sentences as to the two violent felonies pursuant to Sec. 654's prohibition on multiple punishments for same offense. Sec. 2933.1(a), which provides that it applies to "any person who is convicted of" a violent felony notwithstanding any other law, clearly and unambiguously constituted an exception to Sec. 654 and applied to defendant's vehicular manslaughter conviction.

Trial court did not err in finding defendants guilty of aggravated kidnapping since there was enough circumstantial evidence that jury could infer defendants knew of money to rob before kidnapping commenced, and jury instructions gave enough information regarding intent. Error in jury instruction regarding voluntary intoxication was harmless in light of record and verdict. Sentencing to upper term without permitting jury to decide aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt was harmless since a jury would have been able to find at least one aggravating circumstance using a beyond a reasonable doubt standard.

Trial court did not err in finding defendants guilty of aggravated kidnapping since there was enough circumstantial evidence that jury could infer defendants knew of money to rob before kidnapping commenced, and jury instructions gave enough information regarding intent. Error in jury instruction regarding voluntary intoxication was harmless in light of record and verdict. Sentencing to upper term without permitting jury to decide aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt was harmless since a jury would have been able to find at least one aggravating circumstance using a beyond a reasonable doubt standard.

Trial court did not err in finding defendants guilty of aggravated kidnapping since there was enough circumstantial evidence that jury could infer defendants knew of money to rob before kidnapping commenced, and jury instructions gave enough information regarding intent. Error in jury instruction regarding voluntary intoxication was harmless in light of record and verdict. Sentencing to upper term without permitting jury to decide aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt was harmless since a jury would have been able to find at least one aggravating circumstance using a beyond a reasonable doubt standard.

A modification decision.

In determining whether statutory assessment upon commodities producer for the purpose of stimulating sales of product through generic advertising violates state constitution's guarantee of free speech, court employs same analysis employed by U.S. Supreme Court under First Amendment when the advertising content is overseen and subject to the control of a politically accountable official, it is government speech, and the assessment is constitutional. Purported unwillingness of consumers to purchase plaintiff's product unless certified as "Real California Cheese," which requires payment of statutory assessment, does not convert assessment into unconstitutionally compelled speech.

In determining whether statutory assessment upon commodities producer for the purpose of stimulating sales of product through generic advertising violates state constitution's guarantee of free speech, court employs same analysis employed by U.S. Supreme Court under First Amendment when the advertising content is overseen and subject to the control of a politically accountable official, it is government speech, and the assessment is constitutional. Purported unwillingness of consumers to purchase plaintiff's product unless certified as "Real California Cheese," which requires payment of statutory assessment, does not convert assessment into unconstitutionally compelled speech.

Trial court did not err in granting anti SLAPP motion by Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation in suit by private prison contractor alleging defamation by department's director who published a letter to contractor terminating contract on grounds that it had misappropriated funds because communications were protected activity under Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 425.16(e)(2), which protects statements or writings "made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by [an] executive...body," and subsection (e)(3), which protects statements or writings made in a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest. Trial court did not err in ruling that plaintiffs could not prevail on defamation claims because communications, which were made by a public official exercising policy making functions in course of discharging official duties, were absolutely privileged under Civil Code Sec. 47(a). Award of attorney's fees to defendants was proper where no error existed in order striking defamation claims, and plaintiffs did not contend that amount was excessive.