CA Pub. Decisions

Plaintiff raised triable issues as to timeliness of her claims of age and race discrimination in violation of FEHA by presenting evidence supporting a reasonable inference that defendant engaged in acts some within the one year limitations period each of which was intentionally discriminatory. Where plaintiff was employed as a nursing instructor, evidence that defendant substantially reduced plaintiff's teaching assignments and that this reduction in classes was attributable to race and age was sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact concerning whether plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action. Evidence that plaintiff's supervisor made a racial comment about plaintiff, an African American, to a co worker, and also made derogatory racial comments to plaintiff concerning her African American coworkers, and that supervisor substantially reduced plaintiff's teaching assignments and excessively monitored plaintiff's classroom performance when plaintiff was allowed to teach would permit a reasonable trier of fact to infer that plaintiff's race motivated supervisor's conduct in taking away the majority of her teaching assignments and giving them to instructors who were not African American, and in monitoring plaintiff's performance while not monitoring the nursing instructors who were not African American, and thus raised a triable issue of fact as to whether supervisor's conduct was severe and pervasive enough to alter the conditions of plaintiff's employment and thereby constituted actionable racial harassment.

Plaintiff raised triable issues as to timeliness of her claims of age and race discrimination in violation of FEHA by presenting evidence supporting a reasonable inference that defendant engaged in acts some within the one year limitations period each of which was intentionally discriminatory. Where plaintiff was employed as a nursing instructor, evidence that defendant substantially reduced plaintiff's teaching assignments and that this reduction in classes was attributable to race and age was sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact concerning whether plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action. Evidence that plaintiff's supervisor made a racial comment about plaintiff, an African American, to a co worker, and also made derogatory racial comments to plaintiff concerning her African American coworkers, and that supervisor substantially reduced plaintiff's teaching assignments and excessively monitored plaintiff's classroom performance when plaintiff was allowed to teach would permit a reasonable trier of fact to infer that plaintiff's race motivated supervisor's conduct in taking away the majority of her teaching assignments and giving them to instructors who were not African American, and in monitoring plaintiff's performance while not monitoring the nursing instructors who were not African American, and thus raised a triable issue of fact as to whether supervisor's conduct was severe and pervasive enough to alter the conditions of plaintiff's employment and thereby constituted actionable racial harassment.

A modification decision.

Where attorney appearing pro hac vice for plaintiffs in a class action sent a communication to prospective class members that contained at least one misrepresentation, trial court lacked authority to impose sanctions that it could not impose on a California attorney, such as attorney's fees or a formal reprimand, but had authority to revoke pro hac vice status if it found the misconduct to be sufficiently egregious.

Where attorney appearing pro hac vice for plaintiffs in a class action sent a communication to prospective class members that contained at least one misrepresentation, trial court lacked authority to impose sanctions that it could not impose on a California attorney, such as attorney's fees or a formal reprimand, but had authority to revoke pro hac vice status if it found the misconduct to be sufficiently egregious.

Release of methylene chloride into a public sewer was environmental pollution for purposes of pollution exclusion in comprehensive general liability policy.

Where police bugged jail cell and placed defendants in cell together hoping they would talk, such action was not "interrogation"; trial court did not violate defendants' Fifth Amendment or Miranda rights when it admitted tape of conversation into evidence. Where defendants declined to testify, introduction of tape did not violate their Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses because conversation on tape, which was neither a formal statement nor one that an objective witness would reasonably have expected to be available for use in a later trial, was not "testimonial" evidence. Introduction of tape of conversation between first defendant and his aunt identifying co participant in crime as being one of three people, including second defendant, violated second defendant's Sixth Amendment confrontation right; error was harmless where tape of conversation between defendants was properly introduced and amply established second defendant's guilt.

Annuity purchased from undifferentiated and unallocated personal injury settlement is not income for purpose of calculating child support. Trial court did not violate wife's right to due process by considering husband's supplemental trial memorandum, which was filed late and failed to provide an official citation to one of the cases cited, where wife did not object to the court's consideration of the late supplemental memorandum, move for a continuance or request additional time to brief the cited case. Trial court did not abuse its discretion by significantly reducing child support based upon payor's recent period of unemployment, even if payor had significant periods of unemployment in the past but managed to later find good-paying work, where there was no competent evidence from which trial court could have imputed additional income to payor. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering uninsured parent to reimburse insured parent for portion of medical costs not reimbursed by insurance, where uninsured parent while objecting to insured parent's request as untimely presented no evidence as to when she received statement of costs; reimbursement was required under a marital settlement agreement that did not set a time limit for presentation of a bill for such expenses; applicable statute permitted trial court to order reimbursement even if request was untimely; and trial court implicitly found that insured parent did not act unreasonably under the circumstances and properly exercised its discretion in ordering uninsured parent to reimburse insured parent for one half of the minor children's uninsured healthcare expenses.

Trial court was not required to conduct a full evidentiary hearing on the question of defendant's competence where doubt as to competence was expressed by defense counsel whom defendant discharged in order to represent himself, but not by the judge, and there was no substantial evidence of incompetence, given defendant's ability to identify the charges against him in his opening statement, to argue motions with some degree of success, to understand the concept that issues must be argued in the trial court in order to be preserved for appeal, to correct the court with regard to a sentencing allegation, to request a "jury with twelve," and to cross examine witnesses; and given the opinion of court appointed expert that defendant was competent. Trial court did not violate defendant's right to due process by permitting him to represent himself where there was substantial evidence that defendant was competent to stand trial, had the ability to consult with a lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding, and had a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. Defense counsel did not render ineffective assistance by not insisting upon a full evidentiary competency hearing, by not obtaining an independent psychiatric examination, or by not subpoenaing witnesses and medical records pertaining to defendant's mental health history; counsel acted within professional norms when he accepted the opinion of the court appointed psychiatrist that defendant's behavior was not indicative of mental incompetence. Imposition of upper prison term did not violate Sixth Amendment right to jury trial where defendant's record of numerous, increasingly serious convictions and parole violations was an aggravating circumstance that warranted imposition of the upper term.

Waiver and release by which plaintiffs, participants in an aerial sightseeing tour, agreed to "voluntarily assume all risk, known and unknown, of injuries, however caused, even if caused in whole or in part by the action, inaction, or negligence of the released parties to the fullest extent allowed by law," was sufficient to release the sightseeing company, as a common carrier, from liability for simple negligence or breach of implied warranty. Recreational airplane ride is not an "essential service affecting the public interest" for purposes of statute prohibiting exculpation of negligence by written release where contrary to the public interest. Federal Aviation Act of 1958 preempts states from adopting air safety standards but not from establishing or limiting remedies for violation of federal standards.

Southern California Air Quality Management District abused its discretion in issuing a negative declaration for a diesel fuel manufacturing project where opponents offered substantial evidence supporting a fair argument that the project's nitrogen dioxide emissions may have a significant effect on the environment. In finding no significant effect, SCAQMD improperly relied on a baseline level of permitted emissions, as set forth in RECLAIM permit, which did not reflect existing physical conditions. SCAQMD properly exercised its discretion in concluding that project would not have a significant adverse environmental impact resulting from hazards associated with soil contamination and ammonia where there was undisputed evidence of the adequacy of refinery's handling of those hazards. SCAQMD also properly declined to apply local regulation to evaluate the project's permit, as the regulation was ineffective at the time the SCAQMD issued its permit as a result of EPA's withdrawal of its delegation of enforcement authority to SCAQMD.

Southern California Air Quality Management District abused its discretion in issuing a negative declaration for a diesel fuel manufacturing project where opponents offered substantial evidence supporting a fair argument that the project's nitrogen dioxide emissions may have a significant effect on the environment. In finding no significant effect, SCAQMD improperly relied on a baseline level of permitted emissions, as set forth in RECLAIM permit, which did not reflect existing physical conditions. SCAQMD properly exercised its discretion in concluding that project would not have a significant adverse environmental impact resulting from hazards associated with soil contamination and ammonia where there was undisputed evidence of the adequacy of refinery's handling of those hazards. SCAQMD also properly declined to apply local regulation to evaluate the project's permit, as the regulation was ineffective at the time the SCAQMD issued its permit as a result of EPA's withdrawal of its delegation of enforcement authority to SCAQMD.

Southern California Air Quality Management District abused its discretion in issuing a negative declaration for a diesel fuel manufacturing project where opponents offered substantial evidence supporting a fair argument that the project's nitrogen dioxide emissions may have a significant effect on the environment. In finding no significant effect, SCAQMD improperly relied on a baseline level of permitted emissions, as set forth in RECLAIM permit, which did not reflect existing physical conditions. SCAQMD properly exercised its discretion in concluding that project would not have a significant adverse environmental impact resulting from hazards associated with soil contamination and ammonia where there was undisputed evidence of the adequacy of refinery's handling of those hazards. SCAQMD also properly declined to apply local regulation to evaluate the project's permit, as the regulation was ineffective at the time the SCAQMD issued its permit as a result of EPA's withdrawal of its delegation of enforcement authority to SCAQMD.

Southern California Air Quality Management District abused its discretion in issuing a negative declaration for a diesel fuel manufacturing project where opponents offered substantial evidence supporting a fair argument that the project's nitrogen dioxide emissions may have a significant effect on the environment. In finding no significant effect, SCAQMD improperly relied on a baseline level of permitted emissions, as set forth in RECLAIM permit, which did not reflect existing physical conditions. SCAQMD properly exercised its discretion in concluding that project would not have a significant adverse environmental impact resulting from hazards associated with soil contamination and ammonia where there was undisputed evidence of the adequacy of refinery's handling of those hazards. SCAQMD also properly declined to apply local regulation to evaluate the project's permit, as the regulation was ineffective at the time the SCAQMD issued its permit as a result of EPA's withdrawal of its delegation of enforcement authority to SCAQMD.