CA Pub. Decisions

Southern California Air Quality Management District abused its discretion in issuing a negative declaration for a diesel fuel manufacturing project where opponents offered substantial evidence supporting a fair argument that the project's nitrogen dioxide emissions may have a significant effect on the environment. In finding no significant effect, SCAQMD improperly relied on a baseline level of permitted emissions, as set forth in RECLAIM permit, which did not reflect existing physical conditions. SCAQMD properly exercised its discretion in concluding that project would not have a significant adverse environmental impact resulting from hazards associated with soil contamination and ammonia where there was undisputed evidence of the adequacy of refinery's handling of those hazards. SCAQMD also properly declined to apply local regulation to evaluate the project's permit, as the regulation was ineffective at the time the SCAQMD issued its permit as a result of EPA's withdrawal of its delegation of enforcement authority to SCAQMD.

Where parties and judge in suit against defendant for breaching indenture agreement agreed to procedure whereby judge reviewed pleadings submitted by parties and issued tentative ruling, held telephonic hearing while judge was out of state, and prepared and electronically transmitted an order to superior court that was signed by another judge in original judge's absence, Code of Civil Procedure Secs. 166(b) and 661, and Government Code Sec. 69741.1, did not deprive first judge of subject matter jurisdiction to issue order granting motion for new trial. Court did not abuse its discretion in granting conditional motion for new trial unless plaintiffs consented to a reduction in damages award after finding award speculative where there was a material conflict of evidence regarding extent of damage and order had support in record; order was not equivalent to directed verdict or JNOV where it did not fully dispose of the litigation. Court properly denied plaintiff's motion for partial JNOV where it could not be coupled with remainder of unaltered verdict to become a final judgment. Where court found only that evidence did not justify the jury's verdict, and made no findings that plaintiffs must lose on theory of causation and damages, it appropriately and correctly granted defendant's motion for a new trial, and equally appropriately and correctly denied defendant's motion for JNOV. Where plaintiffs had not accepted condition in court's order that would prevent new trial, they had no monetary recovery from defendants and no right to costs.

Where parties and judge in suit against defendant for breaching indenture agreement agreed to procedure whereby judge reviewed pleadings submitted by parties and issued tentative ruling, held telephonic hearing while judge was out of state, and prepared and electronically transmitted an order to superior court that was signed by another judge in original judge's absence, Code of Civil Procedure Secs. 166(b) and 661, and Government Code Sec. 69741.1, did not deprive first judge of subject matter jurisdiction to issue order granting motion for new trial. Court did not abuse its discretion in granting conditional motion for new trial unless plaintiffs consented to a reduction in damages award after finding award speculative where there was a material conflict of evidence regarding extent of damage and order had support in record; order was not equivalent to directed verdict or JNOV where it did not fully dispose of the litigation. Court properly denied plaintiff's motion for partial JNOV where it could not be coupled with remainder of unaltered verdict to become a final judgment. Where court found only that evidence did not justify the jury's verdict, and made no findings that plaintiffs must lose on theory of causation and damages, it appropriately and correctly granted defendant's motion for a new trial, and equally appropriately and correctly denied defendant's motion for JNOV. Where plaintiffs had not accepted condition in court's order that would prevent new trial, they had no monetary recovery from defendants and no right to costs.

Absolute litigation privilege of Civil Code Sec. 47(b) applies in action brought by public entity under Unfair Competition Law. Noerr Pennington doctrine, under which "[t]hose who petition the government...are generally immune from antitrust liability," bars unfair competition action based on defendant's allegedly fraudulent conduct in communicating information to government agencies during California Environmental Quality Act administrative proceedings held in connection with agreement by which defendant sold certain lands to state in exchange for right to harvest timber on other lands, subject to environmental review; "sham exception" to the doctrine does not apply unless the conduct was "objectively baseless."

Absolute litigation privilege of Civil Code Sec. 47(b) applies in action brought by public entity under Unfair Competition Law. Noerr Pennington doctrine, under which "[t]hose who petition the government are generally immune from antitrust liability," bars unfair competition action based on defendant's allegedly fraudulent conduct in communicating information to government agencies during California Environmental Quality Act administrative proceedings held in connection with agreement by which defendant sold certain lands to state in exchange for right to harvest timber on other lands, subject to environmental review; "sham exception" to the doctrine does not apply unless the conduct was "objectively baseless."

Statutory prompt payment charges imposed under subdivision (f) of Public Contract Code Sec. 7107 cease to accrue upon entry of judgment and are not compounded on a monthly basis.

Statutory prompt payment charges imposed under subdivision (f) of Public Contract Code Sec. 7107 cease to accrue upon entry of judgment and are not compounded on a monthly basis.

Fire appraisal proceeding pursuant to Insurance Code Sec. 2071 is an arbitration, so appraiser is immune from action alleging insufficient efforts to advance the position of the party designating the defendant as appraiser. Litigation privilege is not a defense in action brought by party to an earlier proceeding against that party's own expert.

Fire appraisal proceeding pursuant to Insurance Code Sec. 2071 is an arbitration, so appraiser is immune from action alleging insufficient efforts to advance the position of the party designating the defendant as appraiser. Litigation privilege is not a defense in action brought by party to an earlier proceeding against that party's own expert.

Federal Locomotive Boiler Inspection Act preempts railroad employees' state law actions against manufacturers of locomotives containing asbestos materials, regardless of whether asbestos exposure occurring during repairs or when the trains were in use.

A modification decision.

California Coastal Act of 1976 does not empower the California Coastal Commission to declare that property is an "environmentally sensitive habitat area" during an administrative appeal from a local government's grant of a coastal development permit.

California Coastal Act of 1976 does not empower the California Coastal Commission to declare that property is an "environmentally sensitive habitat area" during an administrative appeal from a local government's grant of a coastal development permit.

Former Revenue and Taxation Code Sec. 17942, which imposed a levy on limited liability companies registered to do business in California, measured by the limited liability company's total income regardless of whether the income derived from or was attributable to business within the state, violated the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution as applied to a taxpayer that had no operations, property, inventory, employees, agents, independent contractors, or place of business in California, and did not solicit customers in California or make any deliveries to customers in California. Sec. 19717, which provides for an award of attorney fees to prevailing taxpayer in refund litigation but only if state's position was not substantially justified, is not the exclusive means by which taxpayer may recover fees. Trial court did not err in awarding fees under private attorney general statute where many taxpayers benefited as result of ruling that statute was unconstitutional, but erred in citing common fund doctrine as an alternative basis since fees would have to be paid from general state revenues. Award of fees in excess of lodestar was an abuse of discretion where lodestar calculation adequately recognized the expertise and skill of plaintiff's lawyers and nature of the work involved; trial court did not explain and record did not reveal why trial court considered the issues novel or difficult; other items cited by the trial court the importance of the constitutional rights preserved through the action, the results achieved, and the substantial benefits conferred on the public did not distinguish the action from other private attorney general cases; and burden of fee award fell on shoulders of taxpayers rather than being paid from a common fund or by a private party.