CA Pub. Decisions

Former Revenue and Taxation Code Sec. 17942, which imposed a levy on limited liability companies registered to do business in California, measured by the limited liability company's total income regardless of whether the income derived from or was attributable to business within the state, violated the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution as applied to a taxpayer that had no operations, property, inventory, employees, agents, independent contractors, or place of business in California, and did not solicit customers in California or make any deliveries to customers in California. Sec. 19717, which provides for an award of attorney fees to prevailing taxpayer in refund litigation but only if state's position was not substantially justified, is not the exclusive means by which taxpayer may recover fees. Trial court did not err in awarding fees under private attorney general statute where many taxpayers benefited as result of ruling that statute was unconstitutional, but erred in citing common fund doctrine as an alternative basis since fees would have to be paid from general state revenues. Award of fees in excess of lodestar was an abuse of discretion where lodestar calculation adequately recognized the expertise and skill of plaintiff's lawyers and nature of the work involved; trial court did not explain and record did not reveal why trial court considered the issues novel or difficult; other items cited by the trial court the importance of the constitutional rights preserved through the action, the results achieved, and the substantial benefits conferred on the public did not distinguish the action from other private attorney general cases; and burden of fee award fell on shoulders of taxpayers rather than being paid from a common fund or by a private party.

Former Revenue and Taxation Code Sec. 17942, which imposed a levy on limited liability companies registered to do business in California, measured by the limited liability company's total income regardless of whether the income derived from or was attributable to business within the state, violated the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution as applied to a taxpayer that had no operations, property, inventory, employees, agents, independent contractors, or place of business in California, and did not solicit customers in California or make any deliveries to customers in California. Sec. 19717, which provides for an award of attorney fees to prevailing taxpayer in refund litigation but only if state's position was not substantially justified, is not the exclusive means by which taxpayer may recover fees. Trial court did not err in awarding fees under private attorney general statute where many taxpayers benefited as result of ruling that statute was unconstitutional, but erred in citing common fund doctrine as an alternative basis since fees would have to be paid from general state revenues. Award of fees in excess of lodestar was an abuse of discretion where lodestar calculation adequately recognized the expertise and skill of plaintiff's lawyers and nature of the work involved; trial court did not explain and record did not reveal why trial court considered the issues novel or difficult; other items cited by the trial court the importance of the constitutional rights preserved through the action, the results achieved, and the substantial benefits conferred on the public did not distinguish the action from other private attorney general cases; and burden of fee award fell on shoulders of taxpayers rather than being paid from a common fund or by a private party.

State law including Penal Code Sec. 12026, which prohibits localities from restricting handgun possession in an individual's home, business, or private property; Government Code Sec. 53071, which indicates express intent by legislature to occupy whole field of firearms registration and licensing; and Unsafe Handgun Act, which establishes protocol for designating which handguns may be sold in state preempted municipal ordinance banning handgun possession and sale, manufacture, transfer, or distribution of all firearms or ammunition within locality. Where state law represented a comprehensive scheme of firearms possession, sale, licensing, and registration laws, complete with detailed exceptions and exemptions, issue was of "statewide" rather than merely "municipal" concern, and ordinance could not escape preemption challenge by virtue of "home rule" provision included in locality's charter.

State law including Penal Code Sec. 12026, which prohibits localities from restricting handgun possession in an individual's home, business, or private property; Government Code Sec. 53071, which indicates express intent by legislature to occupy whole field of firearms registration and licensing; and Unsafe Handgun Act, which establishes protocol for designating which handguns may be sold in state preempted municipal ordinance banning handgun possession and sale, manufacture, transfer, or distribution of all firearms or ammunition within locality. Where state law represented a comprehensive scheme of firearms possession, sale, licensing, and registration laws, complete with detailed exceptions and exemptions, issue was of "statewide" rather than merely "municipal" concern, and ordinance could not escape preemption challenge by virtue of "home rule" provision included in locality's charter.

Statutory deadline for filing petition to extend commitment of defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity is not jurisdictional, and filing of petition 16 days past deadline did not deprive defendant of due process where trial was held prior to date defendant would otherwise have been released, and defendant had adequate time to prepare for trial. Trial court erred in rejecting defendant's request for an instruction requiring prosecution to prove he had "serious difficulty controlling his dangerous behavior," but the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where there was overwhelming evidence that defendant had serious difficulty controlling his dangerous behavior, including evidence that he continued to suffer from and had a compulsion to act upon the same delusions that led him to commit the crimes for which he was committed.

Agreement between state and nonprofit private entity, by which that entity agreed to fund project that legislature authorized but failed to sufficiently fund, did not violate constitutional separation of powers where the agreement was within the scope of statutory contracting authority.

Agreement between state and nonprofit private entity, by which that entity agreed to fund project that legislature authorized but failed to sufficiently fund, did not violate constitutional separation of powers where the agreement was within the scope of statutory contracting authority.

Trial court's inherent authority to correct its own errors applies in circumstances where court was prompted to reconsider its prior ruling by a motion to reconsider that was filed in violation of Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 1008, which sets strict standards for such motions.

Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 precludes state law action by beneficiaries of trust administered by bank from suing bank for alleged misrepresentations and omission of material facts with respect to investment practices; such action was "in connection with the purchase or sale" of securities even though beneficiaries lacked investment authority. Where plaintiffs' action was precluded by SLUSA, plaintiffs were entitled to amend complaint to assert state claims for a group of fewer than 50 plaintiffs or exclude allegations that trigger SLUSA preclusion.

Evidence Code Sec. 1109(a)(2), which authorizes the admission of evidence of prior acts of abuse of an elderly or dependent adult to prove a propensity to abuse such persons, subject to the court's discretion to exclude evidence that is unduly prejudicial or time consuming, or likely to confuse or mislead the jury, does not violate constitutional guarantees of due process as applied to evidence of prior physical assaults with a sexual tone committed on elderly men, which were very similar to charged crimes and were no more inflammatory than the acts with which defendant was charged.

Juvenile court cannot consider deferred entry of judgment under Welfare and Institutions Code Sec. 791 unless juvenile admits allegations of petition and waives right to jurisdictional hearing.

Prevention of destruction of evidence was not an exigent circumstance justifying police officers' warrantless entry into residence where only crime of which police were aware possession of marijuana was a nonjailable offense.

Where liability insurer settled claims against its insured, then sued third party insurers for equitable contribution, the contribution claim did not arise from insurance contracts between insured and third party insurer so arbitration clauses of those contacts did not apply. Third party insurers, who were not parties to arbitration agreements between insured and first party insurer, were not bound by arbitration clauses in those agreements.

Where municipal district annexed property pursuant to Cortese Knox Hertzberg Act, trial court's decision that county local agency formation commission substantially complied with Government Code Sec. 57026(e) was not error even though commission failed to comply with statute's requirements that public notice of protest hearing set forth statement of reasons for annexation because record was replete with references to widespread notice of annexation proceedings and reasons for annexation, and challengers failed to show prejudice under Sec. 56107(a). Potential ambiguities in maps of annexed territory were not prejudicial where map sufficiently described exterior areas of subject area, and errors were insignificant; no evidence existed that residents of annexed area failed to receive proper notice or did not understand that area was included in proposed annexation; and challengers failed to show prejudice. Annexation was properly finalized without an election under Sec. 57075(a)(2) where less than 25 percent of registered voters in affected area protested annexation. Commission did not violate Secs. 57052 and 56707 which require that commission determine amount of written protests filed and not withdrawn, and compare them against total registered voters in affected area where it delegated task to elections department because department was government division competent to perform task. Commission did not err in counting total number of registered voters at end of protest period rather than at commencement of annexation procedures where it had a reasonable explanation for doing so, and matter was within commission's discretion. Commission properly excluded protests that did not include protesters' residence address under Sec. 57051, and trial court's determination that requirement was inconsistent with act because some residents' residential address differed from their mailing address was error.