CA Pub. Decisions

Proposition 69, the DNA Fingerprint, Unsolved Crime and Innocence Protection Act of 2004, requires misdemeanants who must register as sex offenders to provide DNA samples, regardless of whether the conviction triggering the registration requirement occurred before or after the initiative's passage.

Proposition 69, the DNA Fingerprint, Unsolved Crime and Innocence Protection Act of 2004, requires misdemeanants who must register as sex offenders to provide DNA samples, regardless of whether the conviction triggering the registration requirement occurred before or after the initiative's passage.

Defendant's conviction for failure to register as a sex offender was in excess of jurisdiction and thus must be set aside by writ of habeas corpus where defendant did not appeal, where defendant was not required to register as a sex offender under California law, and conviction was based on purported authority of juvenile court in another state to order defendant to register as a sex offender in this state based on defendant's plan to live with his mother in this state.

Optional service contracts sold by computer manufacturer to its consumers at time of computer purchase are not tangible personal property and are exempt from taxation, even if computers and service contracts are sold for a single lump sum price, without a separate statement on the invoice of the charge for the service contract.

Optional service contracts sold by computer manufacturer to its consumers at time of computer purchase are not tangible personal property and are exempt from taxation, even if computers and service contracts are sold for a single lump sum price, without a separate statement on the invoice of the charge for the service contract.

Trial court did not err in instructing jury to find that airport police had probable cause to arrest woman who sarcastically said she had a bomb in her luggage for making a false bomb "report" under Penal Code Sec. 148.1(a) merely if woman "stated" that a bomb had been placed regardless of intent of speaker or effect of words. False statements regarding bombs in airports are not protected by First Amendment. Trial court's failure to instruct jury to find whether plaintiff knew statement was false was not error where fact that plaintiff said she had a bomb was not controverted.

Trial court did not err in instructing jury to find that airport police had probable cause to arrest woman who sarcastically said she had a bomb in her luggage for making a false bomb "report" under Penal Code Sec. 148.1(a) merely if woman "stated" that a bomb had been placed regardless of intent of speaker or effect of words. False statements regarding bombs in airports are not protected by First Amendment. Trial court's failure to instruct jury to find whether plaintiff knew statement was false was not error where fact that plaintiff said she had a bomb was not controverted.

A modification decision.

Substantial evidence supported findings that cigarette manufacturer made intentional misrepresentations and false promises to consumers where witnesses testified without contradiction that defendant publicly denied all allegations that its products were harmful and contended that independent research supported its denials, while in fact defendant knew that there was no valid scientific controversy concerning the adverse health effects of smoking, carefully avoided conducting or sponsoring research that might reveal the health hazards of smoking and concealed the results of research conducted overseas on its behalf, and sought to maintain the false controversy and to make its cigarettes more addictive to increase sales. Plaintiff was not required to show must prove that she heard and actually relied on a specific representation. Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1969, while preempting claims "based on smoking and health," did not preempt plaintiff's fraud related claims and did not bar admission of evidence of defendant's post 1969 advertising that was probative on the intent to defraud and reliance elements of plaintiff's nonpreempted claims. While FCLA precludes liability for punitive damages for targeting of underage smokers subsequent to act's effective date, it does not do so with regard to prior conduct, so instruction that would have precluded liability for punitive damages based on youth targeting activities regardless of date was erroneous and was properly rejected. Defendant was entitled to new trial on punitive damages where trial court erroneously rejected proposed instruction barring jurors from imposing punitive damages on basis of harm done to persons other than plaintiff.

Substantial evidence supported findings that cigarette manufacturer made intentional misrepresentations and false promises to consumers where witnesses testified without contradiction that defendant publicly denied all allegations that its products were harmful and contended that independent research supported its denials, while in fact defendant knew that there was no valid scientific controversy concerning the adverse health effects of smoking, carefully avoided conducting or sponsoring research that might reveal the health hazards of smoking and concealed the results of research conducted overseas on its behalf, and sought to maintain the false controversy and to make its cigarettes more addictive to increase sales. Plaintiff was not required to show must prove that she heard and actually relied on a specific representation. Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1969, while preempting claims "based on smoking and health," did not preempt plaintiff's fraud related claims and did not bar admission of evidence of defendant's post 1969 advertising that was probative on the intent to defraud and reliance elements of plaintiff's nonpreempted claims. While FCLA precludes liability for punitive damages for targeting of underage smokers subsequent to act's effective date, it does not do so with regard to prior conduct, so instruction that would have precluded liability for punitive damages based on youth targeting activities regardless of date was erroneous and was properly rejected. Defendant was entitled to new trial on punitive damages where trial court erroneously rejected proposed instruction barring jurors from imposing punitive damages on basis of harm done to persons other than plaintiff.

Substantial evidence supported findings that cigarette manufacturer made intentional misrepresentations and false promises to consumers where witnesses testified without contradiction that defendant publicly denied all allegations that its products were harmful and contended that independent research supported its denials, while in fact defendant knew that there was no valid scientific controversy concerning the adverse health effects of smoking, carefully avoided conducting or sponsoring research that might reveal the health hazards of smoking and concealed the results of research conducted overseas on its behalf, and sought to maintain the false controversy and to make its cigarettes more addictive to increase sales. Plaintiff was not required to show must prove that she heard and actually relied on a specific representation. Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1969, while preempting claims "based on smoking and health," did not preempt plaintiff's fraud related claims and did not bar admission of evidence of defendant's post 1969 advertising that was probative on the intent to defraud and reliance elements of plaintiff's nonpreempted claims. While FCLA precludes liability for punitive damages for targeting of underage smokers subsequent to act's effective date, it does not do so with regard to prior conduct, so instruction that would have precluded liability for punitive damages based on youth targeting activities regardless of date was erroneous and was properly rejected. Defendant was entitled to new trial on punitive damages where trial court erroneously rejected proposed instruction barring jurors from imposing punitive damages on basis of harm done to persons other than plaintiff.

Substantial evidence supported findings that cigarette manufacturer made intentional misrepresentations and false promises to consumers where witnesses testified without contradiction that defendant publicly denied all allegations that its products were harmful and contended that independent research supported its denials, while in fact defendant knew that there was no valid scientific controversy concerning the adverse health effects of smoking, carefully avoided conducting or sponsoring research that might reveal the health hazards of smoking and concealed the results of research conducted overseas on its behalf, and sought to maintain the false controversy and to make its cigarettes more addictive to increase sales. Plaintiff was not required to show must prove that she heard and actually relied on a specific representation. Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1969, while preempting claims "based on smoking and health," did not preempt plaintiff's fraud related claims and did not bar admission of evidence of defendant's post 1969 advertising that was probative on the intent to defraud and reliance elements of plaintiff's nonpreempted claims. While FCLA precludes liability for punitive damages for targeting of underage smokers subsequent to act's effective date, it does not do so with regard to prior conduct, so instruction that would have precluded liability for punitive damages based on youth targeting activities regardless of date was erroneous and was properly rejected. Defendant was entitled to new trial on punitive damages where trial court erroneously rejected proposed instruction barring jurors from imposing punitive damages on basis of harm done to persons other than plaintiff.

County's refusal to allow lessee of county land from removing improvements at end of lease term did not amount to inverse condemnation even if such refusal was a breach of lease. County's breach of lease did not entitle plaintiff to value of in place improvements as damages where Coastal Commission regulations would have prevented removal of improvements even if county had consented.

Plaintiff was not entitled under the attorney fault provision of Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 473(b) to relief from denial of attorney's fee motion where substantial evidence supported trial court finding that plaintiff, not her attorney, was responsible for briefing delay that caused judge to deny motion. Attorney fault provision does not apply where default or dismissal is the fault of a plaintiff who is also an attorney. Denial of discretionary relief under Sec. 473(b) was not an abuse of discretion where motion was based on plaintiff's illness, and medical documentation accompanying the motion failed to establish that plaintiff suffered from that illness during the period in which she was required to prepare brief.