CA Pub. Decisions

Right of way dedication requirement applicable to properties lying along the route of a planned highway did not violate Fifth Amendment takings clause or any other provision of state or federal law.

Right of way dedication requirement applicable to properties lying along the route of a planned highway did not violate Fifth Amendment takings clause or any other provision of state or federal law.

An appeal from the order of the juvenile court that terminated parental rights. the trial court erred by failing to find appellant's difficult to place under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(3). court affirm the order.

Ordinance granting specific preferences to minority owned and women owned businesses with respect to public contracts violates Proposition 209, which amended the state constitution to bar such preferences. Proposition 209 is not preempted by the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, which expressly provides that signatories need not adopt special measures to combat discrimination, nor does the initiative violate the Equal Protection Clause by restructuring the political system to the detriment of disfavored groups. Initiative's exception allowing race and gender based preferences to extent necessary to qualify for federal funding does not apply where applicable federal regulations permit but do not require implementation of preferences to remedy pervasive discrimination in federally funded programs.

Ordinance granting specific preferences to minority owned and women owned businesses with respect to public contracts violates Proposition 209, which amended the state constitution to bar such preferences. Proposition 209 is not preempted by the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, which expressly provides that signatories need not adopt special measures to combat discrimination, nor does the initiative violate the Equal Protection Clause by restructuring the political system to the detriment of disfavored groups. Initiative's exception allowing race and gender based preferences to extent necessary to qualify for federal funding does not apply where applicable federal regulations permit but do not require implementation of preferences to remedy pervasive discrimination in federally funded programs.

Ordinance granting specific preferences to minority owned and women owned businesses with respect to public contracts violates Proposition 209, which amended the state constitution to bar such preferences. Proposition 209 is not preempted by the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, which expressly provides that signatories need not adopt special measures to combat discrimination, nor does the initiative violate the Equal Protection Clause by restructuring the political system to the detriment of disfavored groups. Initiative's exception allowing race and gender based preferences to extent necessary to qualify for federal funding does not apply where applicable federal regulations permit but do not require implementation of preferences to remedy pervasive discrimination in federally funded programs.

Ordinance granting specific preferences to minority owned and women owned businesses with respect to public contracts violates Proposition 209, which amended the state constitution to bar such preferences. Proposition 209 is not preempted by the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, which expressly provides that signatories need not adopt special measures to combat discrimination, nor does the initiative violate the Equal Protection Clause by restructuring the political system to the detriment of disfavored groups. Initiative's exception allowing race and gender based preferences to extent necessary to qualify for federal funding does not apply where applicable federal regulations permit but do not require implementation of preferences to remedy pervasive discrimination in federally funded programs.

A modification decision.

A modification decision.

Appointment of guardian ad litem for mother of dependent child was error where mother's agreement to the appointment was secured without a clear explanation to her of the consequences and where there was no convincing evidence that mother either lacked the capacity to understand the nature or consequences of the proceeding or was unable to assist counsel in preparation of the case. Erroneous appointment of guardian ad litem was not fundamental error requiring reversal per se and was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where it did not inhibit mother's ability to present her case.

A modification decision.

Appellate challenge to sentence as being based on judicial factfinding in violation of federal constitutional right to jury trial was not waived by lack of objection in trial court, where such objection would have been futile according to then-controlling California Supreme Court precedent and challenge would not have been viable but for subsequent U.S. Supreme Court ruling. Jury's implicit determination that victim was incapable of resisting defendant's sexual advances due to intoxication or influence of a controlled substance could not be used both to find the defendant guilty of specific sexual offenses having use of intoxication, anesthesia or a controlled substance as an element and to find that defendant was "particularly vulnerable" for sentencing purposes. Judicial determination that crimes involved "great violence" and involved "great danger to society" because victim was forced into sex did not support upper term because such factors were inherent in the crimes themselves. Imposition of upper term based on aggravating factors that might not have been found by reasonable jury was prejudicial. Imposition of consecutive sentences based on judge's finding that violent sex crimes were committed on separate occasions did not violate right to trial by jury where judge had discretion to impose such sentences regardless of any judicial factfinding. Where upper term sentence was reversed as violating right to trial by jury, and trial court lacked discretion to impose upper term on remand because no aggravating factors were admitted by defendant or found true by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, nor did defendant have any prior convictions, trial court was required on remand to impose middle term sentence.

Appellate challenge to sentence as being based on judicial factfinding in violation of federal constitutional right to jury trial was not waived by lack of objection in trial court, where such objection would have been futile according to then-controlling California Supreme Court precedent and challenge would not have been viable but for subsequent U.S. Supreme Court ruling. Jury's implicit determination that victim was incapable of resisting defendant's sexual advances due to intoxication or influence of a controlled substance could not be used both to find the defendant guilty of specific sexual offenses having use of intoxication, anesthesia or a controlled substance as an element and to find that defendant was "particularly vulnerable" for sentencing purposes. Judicial determination that crimes involved "great violence" and involved "great danger to society" because victim was forced into sex did not support upper term because such factors were inherent in the crimes themselves. Imposition of upper term based on aggravating factors that might not have been found by reasonable jury was prejudicial. Imposition of consecutive sentences based on judge's finding that violent sex crimes were committed on separate occasions did not violate right to trial by jury where judge had discretion to impose such sentences regardless of any judicial factfinding. Where upper term sentence was reversed as violating right to trial by jury, and trial court lacked discretion to impose upper term on remand because no aggravating factors were admitted by defendant or found true by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, nor did defendant have any prior convictions, trial court was required on remand to impose middle-term sentence.

A modification decision.