CA Pub. Decisions

A modification decision.

A modification decision.

Conviction for oral copulation was not a "strike" under Three Strikes Law where record did not negate possibility that offense was classified as a felony solely because it was committed by threatening retaliation, in which case it was not a serious felony as defined by statute at time of defendant's current conviction. Where defendant was convicted of burglary under a sister-state statute defining that crime as entering another person's residence with intent to commit an offense, and record of that conviction showed that the target offense was larceny, offense was equivalent to first degree burglary, a California serious felony. Mug shot from sister-state case, examined by court and determined to be that of defendant, although alleged by defendant to be too dark and blurry to permit valid identification, together with prison records showing that defendant and the person convicted in the sister state case had the same date of birth and the same tattoo, were sufficient to prove that defendant was the person convicted in the earlier case.

A modification decision.

Cause of action against a person arising from an act of that person in furtherance of his or her right of free exercise of religion is not subject to special motion to strike under anti SLAPP statute, which does not import First Amendment protections wholesale but specifically defines "protected activity" as "conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest."

Undisputed evidence that peace officer was transferred from one bureau to another at the same rank and rate of pay for the purpose of improving harmony and cooperation among employees who had complained about transferred officer's personality established as a matter of law that transfer was not a punitive action for purposes of the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act. Claim by which employee sought to compel employer to comply with written agreement by which employer resolved its prior dispute with employee by promising certain training was essentially a cause of action for specific performance, as to which employee had no right to jury trial. Where prior agreement did not specifically detail the training that employee was to receive, trial court did not err in considering extrinsic evidence to determine whether the agreement was breached.

Undisputed evidence that peace officer was transferred from one bureau to another at the same rank and rate of pay for the purpose of improving harmony and cooperation among employees who had complained about transferred officer's personality established as a matter of law that transfer was not a punitive action for purposes of the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act. Claim by which employee sought to compel employer to comply with written agreement by which employer resolved its prior dispute with employee by promising certain training was essentially a cause of action for specific performance, as to which employee had no right to jury trial. Where prior agreement did not specifically detail the training that employee was to receive, trial court did not err in considering extrinsic evidence to determine whether the agreement was breached.

Labor Code provisions ensuring an employee's right to payment of wages apply to salaried corporate executives.

Trial court properly imposed a deadly weapon use enhancement under Penal Code Sec. 12022(b)(1) where defendant used a knife to kill a dog and was convicted of animal cruelty. Statute does not limit enhancement's application to attacks on human beings, and use of a knife or other deadly weapon is not an element of the crime of animal cruelty.

Tax deed was void where records showing property to have been owned by a private individual were erroneous, and property was in fact owned by a public entity exempt from taxation. Failure to comply with statutory requirement that notice of acquisition of property by a tax exempt entity be sent to county assessor does not constitute a waiver of the exemption.

Where it was discovered after arbitration that the judge who granted order compelling arbitration had, prior to granting such order, engaged in discussions concerning possible employment as a dispute resolution neutral, it was proper to disqualify judge who granted the order compelling arbitration and vacate that order, but it was premature to vacate arbitration award. Where order compelling arbitration is void because judge was disqualified from granting it but is not set aside until after arbitration is concluded, award may stand if newly assigned judge makes a de novo determination that the parties were contractually bound to arbitrate, that acts of disqualified judge did not taint the arbitration, and that no other grounds exist to vacate the award.

Defendant convicted of cocaine possession is subject to mandatory financial penalties, including criminal laboratory analysis fee in the amount of $50, a drug laboratory fine under Penal Code Sec. 1464(a) in the sum of $50, a $35 assessment under Government Code Sec. 76000(a), a $10 state surcharge on the criminal laboratory analysis fee, and state court construction penalties totaling $67.50, or one half of the criminal laboratory analysis fee, the drug laboratory fine, and the Sec. 76000(a) assessment. Failure to impose any of such penalties constitutes jurisdictional error. State surcharge of 20 percent applies to criminal laboratory analysis fee but does not apply to Sec. 1464(a) and Sec. 76000(a) assessments. State court construction penalty applies to all counties regardless of whether they are participating in a local Courthouse Construction Fund or the Transitional State Court Facilities Construction Fund. Restitution fine under Penal Code Sec. 1202.4(b)(1) and parole revocation restitution fine under Penal Code Sec. 1202.45 are not enhanced by Sec. 1464(a) and Sec. 76000(a) penalty assessments or by the 20 percent state surcharge under Penal Code Sec. 1465.7. Court security fee of $20, which by statute must be imposed upon conviction of any offense other than a parking violation, is enhanced by a Sec. 1464 (a) penalty assessment of $20; a $14 Sec. 76000(a) penalty assessment; a $4 Sec. 1465.7(a) state surcharge; and a $10 state court construction penalty, plus a $10 state court construction penalty on the Sec. 1464(a) assessment and a $7 state court construction penalty on the Sec. 76000(a) penalty assessment.

Federal Arbitration Act Sec. 2, which mandates the enforcement of arbitration clauses in contracts involving interstate commerce, preempts Labor Code Sec. 229 to extent that section guarantees workers a judicial forum for unpaid wage claims. Section 2 indisputably applied where employer did business in more than one state, employee traveled outside California on business, and employee's duties included negotiating loans from out of state lenders. Employee's claim for large bonus and severance payment is not subject to special requirements dictated by fundamental public policy for arbitration of claims involving discrimination, wrongful termination, or payment of minimum wages or overtime. Requirement that employee arbitrate any dispute with "our Company" unambiguously mandated that claims be arbitrated as to all of the related entities that were sued by employee for allegedly breaching employment contract.

City may not force worker to use vacation time rather than sick leave to obtain medical care for industrial injuries if it permits employees to use sick leave to obtain treatment for nonindustrial injuries; such discrimination violates Labor Code Sec. 132a, which takes precedence over conflicting provisions of local regulation or collective bargaining agreement. Provisions of SB 899, legislation reforming the workers' compensation system, governing apportionment of industrial injuries apply to injuries suffered prior to the law's effective date of April 19, 2004, unless a final ruling was made prior to that date. Examining physician's conclusions regarding apportionment were supported by substantial evidence where physician, while admitting that assigned percentages were imprecise and based to some extent on intuition and professional judgment, stated the factual bases for his determinations based on his medical expertise as set forth in a lengthy report and deposition.