CA Pub. Decisions

In granting school superintendent's anti - SLAPP motion against high school principal's invasion of privacy and defamation claims, trial court properly held that superintendent's statements concerning principal's handling of student violence on his school's campus, his leadership abilities, and his retirement plans were constitutionally protected, where incidents of student violence on high school campus were serious and triggered involvement of city officials; statements mentioned principal's private retirement plans only to the extent they directly concerned school district's solution to student violence; and statements were not the equivalent of a personnel evaluation under collective bargaining agreement that would trigger personnel exception to Brown Act. Court properly found that principal failed to demonstrate probability of prevailing on his claims because any private facts included in superintendent's disclosures were logically relevant to the newsworthy subject of the violence at high school and district's response to it. Superintendent's statements explaining district's response to a matter of widespread concern were protected by the executive officer privilege of Civil Code Sec. 47. Court did not abuse its discretion in excluding as improper lay opinion as to legal conclusions the statements by school district employee that collective bargaining agreement barred superintendent from making statements to the press about personnel matters such as job performance and retirement plans; district officials have recognized in discussions that personnel matters may only be discussed in a closed session of the school board, subject to the provisions of Brown Act; superintendent's statements to press regarding principal were "false and unfortunate"; and superintendent knew that making those statements was proscribed by the California Constitution, Brown Act, and collective bargaining agreement.

In granting school superintendent's anti - SLAPP motion against high school principal's invasion of privacy and defamation claims, trial court properly held that superintendent's statements concerning principal's handling of student violence on his school's campus, his leadership abilities, and his retirement plans were constitutionally protected, where incidents of student violence on high school campus were serious and triggered involvement of city officials; statements mentioned principal's private retirement plans only to the extent they directly concerned school district's solution to student violence; and statements were not the equivalent of a personnel evaluation under collective bargaining agreement that would trigger personnel exception to Brown Act. Court properly found that principal failed to demonstrate probability of prevailing on his claims because any private facts included in superintendent's disclosures were logically relevant to the newsworthy subject of the violence at high school and district's response to it. Superintendent's statements explaining district's response to a matter of widespread concern were protected by the executive officer privilege of Civil Code Sec. 47. Court did not abuse its discretion in excluding as improper lay opinion as to legal conclusions the statements by school district employee that collective bargaining agreement barred superintendent from making statements to the press about personnel matters such as job performance and retirement plans; district officials have recognized in discussions that personnel matters may only be discussed in a closed session of the school board, subject to the provisions of Brown Act; superintendent's statements to press regarding principal were "false and unfortunate"; and superintendent knew that making those statements was proscribed by the California Constitution, Brown Act, and collective bargaining agreement.

Nonattorney trustee may not represent trust in trial or appellate court but may sign notice of appeal on trust's behalf. Improper filing of notice of appeal by person not authorized to represent appellant does not render notice void; defect may be cured by having an attorney appear within a reasonable time.

Where attorney had advised business owner concerning commercial lease and partnership arrangement with a potential investor whom owner ultimately replaced with new joint venture partners, attorney could not later represent new joint venture partners in dispute involving same business.

Disqualification of publicly funded, nonprofit law office from representing child in dependency court on ground that it had previously represented her mother in a separate proceeding was error where child's attorney was not personally and directly involved in representing mother and there was no divulgence of any confidential or privileged communication.

Disqualification of publicly funded, nonprofit law office from representing child in dependency court on ground that it had previously represented her mother in a separate proceeding was error where child's attorney was not personally and directly involved in representing mother and there was no divulgence of any confidential or privileged communication.

Disqualification of publicly funded, nonprofit law office from representing child in dependency court on ground that it had previously represented her mother in a separate proceeding was error where child's attorney was not personally and directly involved in representing mother and there was no divulgence of any confidential or privileged communication.

Petitioner challenges the trial courts striking of his peremptory challenge under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6 on the grounds his complaint was related to a prior action before the same trial judge and therefore the challenge was untimely. We find the second action was not a continuation of the first action and therefore that Bravos challenge, filed two days after assignment of his case to the trial judge, was timely. Court grant the petition.

Romero Act, which provides for the transfer of substantial power from the Los Angeles Unified School District Board of Education to the LAUSD superintendent, grants mayor authority to ratify appointment of superintendent, and provides for the transfer of complete control of three low performing high schools and their feeder schools from board to a partnership led by mayor, is an unconstitutional attempt by legislature to overrule LAUSD voters' determination that their board is to be elected rather than appointed, and to transfer authority over part of the school system to entities outside of the public school system.

Romero Act, which provides for the transfer of substantial power from the Los Angeles Unified School District Board of Education to the LAUSD superintendent, grants mayor authority to ratify appointment of superintendent, and provides for the transfer of complete control of three low-performing high schools and their feeder schools from board to a partnership led by mayor, is an unconstitutional attempt by legislature to overrule LAUSD voters' determination that their board is to be elected rather than appointed, and to transfer authority over part of the school system to entities outside of the public school system.

Romero Act, which provides for the transfer of substantial power from the Los Angeles Unified School District Board of Education to the LAUSD superintendent, grants mayor authority to ratify appointment of superintendent, and provides for the transfer of complete control of three low-performing high schools and their feeder schools from board to a partnership led by mayor, is an unconstitutional attempt by legislature to overrule LAUSD voters' determination that their board is to be elected rather than appointed, and to transfer authority over part of the school system to entities outside of the public school system.

A modification decision.

A modification decision.

Agreement obligating city to vacate a portion of a city road to provide access to a proposed casino hotel, to remodel an existing fire station in order to serve the hotel property, and to construct connections to the casino's sewer and water systems and to increase their capacities to meet the needs of the casino development was a "project" within the meaning of CEQA. City's approval of agreement without performing an initial study to determine whether to prepare a negative declaration or an EIR violated CEQA; where agreement was, by its terms, contingent on comprehensive mitigation of negative impacts, severance of provisions violating CEQA, permitting enforcement of remainder of the agreement, would preclude fulfillment of agreement's central objectives and was correctly denied by the court.