CA Unpub Decisions

Sengupta started BeyondCore in 2004, while he was earning his master of business administration degree from Harvard University. At all relevant times, Sengupta was BeyondCore’s majority and controlling shareholder and chief executive officer (CEO). Sengupta made no monetary investment in the company, but his wife provided a convertible loan of $30,000 in 2004. Two years later, Sengupta moved BeyondCore’s location to California.

Plaintiff Barbara McBride alleges she became the successor trustee and/or successor in interest of her family trust following the death of her parents. She sued defendants National Default Servicing Corporation, Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., and “Deutsche Bank National Trust Company” for violations of Civil Code sections 2923.7 and 2920.7 after defendants initiated a foreclosure of the trust’s real property.

In 2011, Franklin was charged with first-degree murder (Penal Code § 187), with an enhancement for personal use of a firearm (§ 12022.53, subds. (b)–(d).) Franklin was a minor at the time. A jury found him guilty of the charge and found true the firearm enhancement. The trial court sentenced him to 25 years to life for the murder and a consecutive 25-to-life term on the enhancement, for a total of 50 years to life in state prison.

“In brief, the parties invested together in a series of real estate transactions in Marin County. Through shrewd real estate dealings over the course of 30 years, Epis had amassed a fortune of some $22 million. Bradley and Jolley used her as a ‘deep pocket’ investor in properties they planned to renovate and sell at a profit. Epis provided the cash required for down payments and certain other financial needs during development; Bradley managed the renovation and development of the properties they purchased; Jolley provided credit financing and funds for debt service and remodeling. It appears Jolley and Bradley also handled accounting and legal issues that arose.” (Epis I, supra, A143387 [2018 Cal.App.Unpub.LEXIS 6469, pp. *2–*3].)

C.G. and the mother met in 2016. The two lived together in a tumultuous relationship marked by substance abuse, untreated mental health issues, and mutual verbal and physical violence. In early 2020, C.G. and the mother separated.
In February 2020, the mother began a relationship with E.S., and the two moved in together. The mother became pregnant. E.S. accompanied the mother to some of her prenatal appointments. At one such appointment at Stanford University, “the medical provider informed both [E.S.] and [the mother] that no heartbeat was found.” The mother was told she may have had a miscarriage. Believing she was no longer pregnant, the mother stopped going to prenatal appointments. E.S. also believed the mother was not pregnant. In May 2020, E.S. and the mother separated.

Lance Brown (Lance), his wife Diane Stember Richards (Richards), and their company Enterprise Plan B, Inc. (EPB), doing business as Spruce and Pine, purchase, remodel and sell single family homes. One of those homes was located at 1437 Weaver Drive in San Jose (Weaver Project). Lance signed the building permit application for the Weaver Project on behalf of himself and EPB as “Owner Builder” on May 24, 2017.
In May 2017, Lance retained VBC as a contractor for the Weaver Project. VBC is a sole proprietorship owned by Victor Bringas, a licensed contractor. VBC and Lance entered into a contract for the Weaver Project, which provided that VBC would perform specified tasks including excavation, concrete, framing, retrofit, sheetrock, siding, windows and door installation work.

In October 2019, the Santa Clara County District Attorney filed an information charging Altamiran with sexual penetration by force or fear (§ 289, subd. (a)(1)(A); count 1) and the lesser included offense of assault with the intent to commit a specified felony (§ 220, subd. (a)(1); count 2).
On December 9, 2019, a jury found Altamiran guilty of count 1, sexual penetration of Jane Doe by use of force or fear. On December 1, 2020, the trial court sentenced Altamiran to the middle term of six years. The trial court waived various fines, fees, and assessments pursuant to People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157.
Altamiran timely appealed.

In May 2015, Aguilar lived in a small one-bedroom house with his wife X.D. and three children. Aguilar was 45 years old. The two younger children were Aguilar’s biological children, but the oldest child—X.D.’s 11-year-old daughter A.D.—was not Aguilar’s biological child. A.D. slept in the living room with another child, while Aguilar and X.D. slept in the bedroom with the third child.
X.D. testified as follows: On the night of May 4, 2015, X.D. was asleep when she was awoken by noises from the pull-out sofa bed that A.D. was sleeping on in the living room. When X.D. went to the living room, she saw Aguilar crouching down next to the sofa bed. When Aguilar saw X.D., he got up right away, walked towards the window, and called out to X.D. to ask if she was okay.

On October 27, 2017, defendant pleaded guilty to possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of sale. Defendant was placed on probation. Defendant’s probation was revoked on December 6, 2017. Defendant’s probation was reinstated on August 3, 2018, revoked again August 28, 2018, and reinstated again on February 6, 2020. In October 2020, defendant was again arrested for “possession of 12-24 pounds of methamphetamine.” On October 9, 2020, the trial court summarily revoked defendant’s probation and set the matter for a formal revocation hearing.

In March 2021, then five-year-old N.P. was living with mother who had primary custody. N.P.’s father, G.P. (father), had weekend visits. On March 6, 2021, father told the police that N.P. disclosed that her seven-year-old male cousin (minor cousin) digitally penetrated her vagina while they showered at mother’s home. Father also reported that N.P. arrived at his home every week with scratches and bruises. She also had a bite mark on her upper thigh.

On January 4, 2020, Valdovinos observed a vehicle (later identified as appellant’s) struggling to maintain its lane near Coffee Road, south of Rosedale Highway in Bakersfield. Specifically, the officer observed appellant’s vehicle drift to the right and into another lane and then later veer to the left and again into another lane. Valdovinos initiated an enforcement stop because of appellant’s unsafe lane changing and straddling (§ 21658, subd. (a)).
Appellant exhibited signs of intoxication during his initial contact with Valdovinos. He was unsteady on his feet, had red, watery eyes, and he smelled like alcohol. Valdovinos asked appellant if he consumed any alcohol and appellant replied he drank a margarita. Appellant underwent a series of field sobriety tests, but he refused to complete a preliminary alcohol screening (PAS) test.

On January 22, 2019, defendant Gabriel Mark Angel Hinojos was stopped while driving a vehicle that had been reported as stolen. A jury convicted defendant of unlawful taking or driving a vehicle and the trial court sentenced him to a four-year prison term. Defendant contends on appeal that (1) the trial court failed to instruct the jury that it must find the value of the vehicle to be at least $950 to convict defendant of taking a vehicle, (2) the jury verdict is not supported by sufficient evidence that the vehicle was valued in excess of $950, (3) the trial court erred by failing to sua sponte instruct the jurors that they had to agree on the same criminal act or acts for conviction, (4) the trial court erred in excluding a redacted portion of body camera footage after permitting the prosecution to introduce a different portion of the footage

In this writ proceeding, petitioner Martell Turner seeks review of the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence. The evidence was discovered during an inventory search of Turner’s car conducted when law enforcement impounded it after arresting him on suspicion of misdemeanor reckless driving under Vehicle Code section 23103, subdivision (a) (undesignated statutory references are to this code). Section 23109.2, subdivision (a)(1) (section 23109.2(a)(1)) grants law enforcement officers discretion to “cause the removal and seizure of the motor vehicle used in that offense.” The trial court concluded that the law enforcement officer’s reasons for impounding the car were not relevant because the impound was authorized by statute. Turner argues that was error, and we agree. We grant the petition and remand for further proceedings.

Defendant John Kevin Medina appeals from his conviction of first degree premeditated attempted murder. (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 187, subdivision (a); unlabeled statutory references are to this code.) He argues that the trial court erroneously denied his motion for acquittal after the prosecution presented its case-in-chief, because the prosecution introduced insufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation. He also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting an enhancement allegation that he caused the victim to become comatose as a result of a brain injury. (§ 12022.7, subd. (b) (§ 12022.7(b)).) We reject both arguments and therefore affirm the judgment.