CA Unpub Decisions

Rafael David Escercega appeals following his guilty plea to possession of a dirk or dagger in violation of Penal Code section 21310 that carried an enhanced sentence due to his commission of a prior serious felony. His court-appointed counsel has filed a brief seeking our independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. We requested and reviewed supplemental briefing on the content and effect of Escercega’s plea as support for his sentence. We now conclude there are no issues requiring further review. We affirm with directions to the trial court to modify the abstract of judgment to reflect the basis for the four-year sentence imposed on Escercega for possession of a dirk or dagger.

Plaintiff Beverly Chinn appeals from two orders granting two separate anti-SLAPP motions, one striking all causes of action, one striking three causes of
action. We affirm.

After his fifth day of work at Bay City Chevrolet, Troy Silva quit his job as a car salesman. The Employment Development Department (EDD) determined Silva voluntarily quit his job without good cause (Unemp. Ins. Code, § 1256) and denied his application for unemployment benefits. An administrative law judge (ALJ) and the California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board (the Board) upheld the denial. Silva then petitioned for writ of administrative mandate, requesting the superior court set aside the denial of unemployment benefits (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5). The superior court denied the petition, concluding the presumption of good cause had been rebutted, and that Silva did not have good cause to terminate his employment. The court entered judgment for EDD and the Board (collectively, respondents).
Silva appeals. He contends the superior court’s ruling was “legally untenable” because the statutory presumption and the “uncontested evidence” established he had good ca

Defendant Paula Darline Galbadores pleaded no contest to two counts of using personal identifying information without authorization. (Pen. Code, § 530.5, subd. (a).) The trial court placed her on probation, ordering her to serve 60 days in county jail and imposing probation conditions that allow searches of email on her electronic devices and require her to provide email account passwords.

Defendant Ricardo Garcia pleaded no contest to several offenses, including two counts of assault with a deadly weapon upon a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (c)); active participation in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (a)); possession of a billy (§ 22210); possession of ammunition by a felon (§ 30305, subd. (a)(1)); and reckless driving while attempting to evade a peace officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a)). Defendant also admitted various allegations, including that he had a prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12) and a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)), and that he had served four prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The trial court sentenced defendant to 15 years eight months in prison, which included a concurrent 4-year term for active participation in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (a)).

In December 2006, defendant Gary Russell Elerick pleaded no contest to second degree robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c)) and admitted that he had nine prior convictions that qualified as strikes (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12) and five prior serious felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)). In March 2007, defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 28 years to life consecutive to a 25-year determinate term.
In October 2014, defendant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging that one of the prior serious felony convictions should not have been used to enhance his sentence because it had previously been found invalid. The trial court issued an order to show cause and appointed counsel for defendant. Defendant subsequently moved to replace appointed counsel and, separately, moved to represent himself. The trial court denied both of those motions, but it granted habeas relief and resentenced defendant to a term of 25 years to life consecutive to a de

Patricia Salgado appeals from a judgment after the trial court granted Santa Ana Unified School District’s (SAUSD) summary judgment motion. Salgado argues the court erred because it failed to consider equitable tolling and continuing violations. Her contentions have no merit, and we affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted Antonio Burgoa of making a criminal threat (Pen. Code, § 422; all statutory references are to this code), interfering with a police officer in the performance of his duties (§ 69), and battery (§ 242). Burgoa contends the trial court prejudicially erred by instructing the jury on flight (CALCRIM No. 372). For the reasons expressed below, we affirm.

Harold J. Brown challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s $1.225 million special verdict in favor of John and Judith Delong finding Brown breached his fiduciary duty to them in promoting an investment opportunity. Brown contends the jury could not reasonably conclude he owed the Delongs a fiduciary duty, and he argues the evidence does not show he caused the loss of their funds. As we explain, these contentions are without merit and therefore we affirm the judgment.

In this strict products liability action, plaintiff and appellant Elizabeth Ault Smietana sued for injuries she suffered in an accident involving an off-road vehicle designed by defendants and respondents Yamaha Motor Corporation, U.S.A., Yamaha Motor Manufacturing Corporation of America, and Yamaha Motor Company, Ltd. (collectively, Yamaha). Ault-Smietana broke her leg when she extended it outside of the vehicle to brace herself as it tipped over during a turn. The jury returned a verdict in Yamaha’s favor and Ault-Smietana appeals.

Appellant Patrick C. appeals from the superior court’s order freeing M.B. from his custody and control pursuant to Family Code sections 7822 and/or 7825. We affirm.

Appellant Armando Ruiz pled no contest to one count of possession of child pornography and was sentenced to formal probation. Ruiz was ordered to register pursuant to Penal Code section 290. Ruiz challenges the requirement that he register pursuant to section 290 as a violation of equal protection, contending there is no rational basis to treat misdemeanor noncontact possession offenses the same as contact offenses with minors. He also contends requiring registration under section 290 violates his First Amendment rights, as it is compelled speech. We affirm.

Petitioner J.C. is the mother (mother) and petitioner R.C. is the father (father) (collectively, parents) of two children, S.C. and A.C. (collectively, the children) who were ages three and one, respectively, on the date of the challenged orders. Each parent asks this court to direct the juvenile court to vacate its orders of June 27, 2017, denying them reunification services under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivision (b)(4) (the parent caused the death of another child through abuse or neglect) and setting a hearing under section 366.26 for October 23, 2017. We conclude the court’s true finding that the parents caused the death of another child through abuse or neglect is supported by substantial evidence. We also affirm the dispositional orders because we cannot say the juvenile court abused its discretion when it determined the parents did not make the required showing by clear and convincing evidence that providing them with reunification services would be

Defendant and appellant K.M. (MGM) is the sister of the maternal grandmother of J.M. and N.O. J.M. was removed from his mother’s care at birth after he tested positive for drugs. MGM appeals from the juvenile court’s order denying placement of J.M. in her care, arguing the juvenile court abused its discretion by ignoring the relative placement preference factors. We find no abuse of discretion, and affirm the judgment.