CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant and respondent Ricky Burton suffered two prior strike convictions, first degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 459) and first degree robbery (§ 211), as a result of offenses he committed in 1995. In 2001, he was convicted of two drug offenses by a jury, and his two strikes were found to be true. Under the Three Strikes law, the trial court sentenced him to 25 years to life. On July 10, 2015, he petitioned for resentencing in light of Vargas, in which the California Supreme Court held that two prior convictions arising out of a single act against a single victim cannot constitute two separate strikes, and the sentencing court should dismiss one of them. Defendant argued that because the two strikes used to qualify him for “three strikes” sentencing were based on the same single act, the trial court was required to dismiss one of them and resentence him. The trial court agreed and ordered defendant to be resentenced. The People appeal the resentencing court’s order, ar

In 2007, defendant and appellant Samuel Kwame Amankrah was convicted by a jury of kidnapping to commit rape, kidnapping, forcible rape, and forcible oral copulation. Eighteen special allegations, dealing with the use of a deadly weapon and/or movement of the victim so as to increase the risk of harm, were found true. Defendant was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of 90 years to life. We affirmed the judgment in an unpublished opinion. (People v. Amankrah (Dec 10, 2009, E046952) [nonpub. opn.].)

The City of San Diego (City) denied Toni Berg's application to renew her massage-therapist license. Berg then unsuccessfully challenged the denial in the superior court. Berg appeals. We affirm. Substantial evidence supports the court's findings that Berg materially misrepresented her criminal background in the renewal application and thus the City properly denied the application.

This appeal arises from a plea bargain in which the parties agreed to an unauthorized sentence. When the fact the sentence was unauthorized was brought to the court's attention by the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), the court imposed a lawful sentence. The appellant now contends he is entitled to specific performance of the bargain and is thus entitled to serve his sentence in prison rather than county jail, even though such sentence cannot be imposed by statute. As we will explain below the appellant is not entitled to specific performance because the courts have no authority to impose an illegal sentence. Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment, but remand the case to the trial court with directions to permit the appellant to withdraw his guilty plea if he wishes to do so.

Gregg Hume Erlandson appeals from an order denying his motion to withdraw his 1988 guilty plea to committing a lewd or lascivious act on a child under the age of 14. (Pen. Code, §§ 1203.4, subd. (a), 288, subd. (a).) Erlandson contends the court lacked discretion to deny him relief because he had completed all probation requirements. We affirm.

Continental Heritage Insurance Company (Continental) appeals from a summary judgment forfeiting a bail bond and from an order denying Continental's motion to vacate the summary judgment. We conclude the appeal is untimely as to the summary judgment. In addition, Continental has abandoned the appeal as to the order denying the motion to vacate the summary judgment because Continental's opening brief does not raise any specific arguments regarding the order. (County of Riverside v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 20, 27, fn. 4.) We, therefore, dismiss the appeal.

Plaintiff Neil Tran, representing himself, appeals from the judgment entered after a bench trial in favor of his former legal counsel, defendant Elliot Kanter. The court found Tran had failed to establish one or more elements of his legal malpractice claim against Kanter arising from Kanter's representation of Tran in a third-party defamation action titled Tran v. Lieu (Sup. Ct. Case No. GIC 879986 (defamation action)). As we explain, we affirm the judgment because Tran has failed to provide an adequate record to review any alleged errors he raises in connection with it.

A jury convicted Andrew Aune of grand theft. The trial court placed Aune on three years' formal probation and sentenced him to 90 days in the electronic surveillance program. Aune appealed, claiming the court improperly denied his Batson/Wheeler motion based on the prosecution's peremptory challenges to two African-Americans from the jury panel. We rejected this argument and affirmed the judgment. (People v. Aune (Sept. 1, 2016, D068770) [nonpub. opn.], review granted Dec. 14, 2016, S237808 (Aune I).) Aune filed a petition for review, which was granted and held pending the California Supreme Court's resolution of People v. Enriquez, S224724. On June 1, 2107, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in that case. (People v. Gutierrez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1150 (Gutierrez).) On August 16, 2017, the Supreme Court transferred the matter back to this court with directions to reconsider the cause in light of the decision in Gutierrez. We requested supplemental briefing addressi

Attorneys Hillel and Rafael Chodos sued former clients Roger and Brian Corman (the Corman Brothers) for unpaid attorney fees. Hillel died while the action was still pending. Although the Corman Brothers subsequently filed a cross-complaint in the case, they did not file a timely claim against Hillel’ estate in probate court, thereby failing to toll the applicable statute of limitations under Code of Civil Procedure section 366.2.

Marvin D., the biological father of Dakota G., appeals from the judgment terminating his parental rights and freeing Dakota for adoption by her maternal grandparents, respondents Susan G. and Geoffrey G. (Fam. Code, § 7822.) Appellant claims that respondents did not comply with the notice provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C.S. § 1901 et seq.). Statutory and case law require that we reverse and remand with directions to comply with ICWA. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.2, subds. (a) & (d); 25 U.S.C.S. § 1912(a); In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 5.)

Appellant S.R. punched a fellow student at school. The Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office filed a juvenile petition pursuant to former Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, subdivision (a), alleging that appellant committed a misdemeanor battery on school property in violation of Penal Code section 243.2, subdivision (a). Appellant admitted the allegation, and the juvenile court found the petition to be true. On May 2, 2016, appellant was placed home on probation without wardship (§ 725, subd. (a)) for a period of six months, subject to various terms and conditions. Condition 9 required that appellant attend school every day, be on time to class, engage in good behavior and receive satisfactory grades.

Shannen Patton appeals an August 18, 2016 order granting respondents Nanette Dean (the paternal grandmother) and Renato Dean (the paternal uncle) visitation with Shannen’s seven-year-old son, Michael. The trial court found a preexisting relationship and that it was in Michael’s best interest to have contact with respondents. (Fam. Code, § 3102, subds. (a) - (b).) We affirm.

Amy B. (mother) and Jeremy B. (father) appeal a judgment declaring their 13-year-old daughter and 12-year-old son dependents of the court, and removing them from their parents’ care. Mother and father contend that the state of Washington was the children’s home state when this case began, and the juvenile court did not properly exercise emergency or continuing jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA; Fam. Code, § 3400 et seq.). We conclude the court properly exercised emergency jurisdiction over the children under the act, but remand the matter to the juvenile court to allow it to contact and provide notice to Washington authorities. If a Washington court declines to exercise jurisdiction, the jurisdictional and dispositional orders will remain in effect. If a Washington court initiates proceedings, the juvenile court is directed to void its jurisdictional and dispositional orders, and proceed in compliance with the UCCJEA.

Mother challenges the juvenile court’s order sustaining dependency jurisdiction and removing her five-year-old daughter, A.T., from her custody. Mother was arrested for child endangerment after refusing to comply with a police officer’s repeated instructions to remove the child from her boyfriend’s vehicle during a traffic stop in which officers forcibly disarmed her boyfriend of a loaded handgun. Mother contends the court improperly assumed jurisdiction because there was no evidence that she knew her boyfriend was armed at the time. We disagree and affirm.