CA Unpub Decisions

Respondent Ronald Joseph Marazzo (Marazzo) owned a commercial property in Mountain View, California which he sought to develop into a multi-unit apartment complex with appellant Prometheus Real Estate Group, Inc. (Prometheus). To that end, the parties entered into an agreement under which Marazzo agreed to transfer the property to a jointly owned limited liability company once certain conditions were met, and Prometheus agreed to develop the property and to secure entitlements and financing for the project. As part of its due diligence on the property, Prometheus obtained a title report which revealed that the property was subject to a reciprocal parking easement in favor of an adjoining property. Prometheus negotiated an agreement extinguishing the easement with the adjoining property owner, but Marazzo refused to sign, and the due diligence period specified in the agreement expired. Prometheus brought suit for breach of contract, alleging that Marazzo had breached the implied cov

Defendant Eric Dwayne Perry pleaded no contest to the charge of felony assault with means of force likely to create great bodily injury, in violation of Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(4), and to four misdemeanor charges of spousal battery with corporal injury, in violation of section 273.5, subdivision (a); he also admitted three prior strike convictions. Other charges were dismissed pursuant to the plea agreement. Perry sought dismissal of the strike priors under People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 and moved, at several points in the proceedings, to appoint a new attorney under People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118. The trial court denied the Romero request and the Marsden motions. In accordance with the plea agreement, the court sentenced Perry to four years in state prison and awarded credit for time served. Perry requested a certificate of probable cause, based on a detailed list of complaints about the handling of his case and his plea, which the

Appellant Herbert Perry Allen appeals from the denial of his petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.18 (Proposition 47). Following independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, we affirm.

A jury convicted appellant Raul Maciel of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)/count 1), infliction of corporal injury on a spouse or cohabitant (§ 273.5, subd. (a)/count 2), and misdemeanor violation of a court protective order (§ 273.6, subd. (a)/count 3). The jury also found true a great bodily injury enhancement (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) in count 1, an enhancement in count 2 for inflicting great bodily injury under circumstances involving domestic violence (§ 12022.7, subd. (e)), and allegations that Maciel had a prior domestic violence conviction (§ 273.5, subd. (f)). In a separate proceeding, the court found true allegations that Maciel had a prior conviction within the meaning of the three strikes law (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)).

After a contested hearing, appellant Lawrence Kingsley Andrews was found to be in violation of probation. Probation was revoked and a prison sentence reinstated. Andrews filed a timely notice of appeal. Appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. We affirm.

A.M., formerly the foster mother of A.C., appeals an order of the juvenile court denying her petition under Welfare & Institutions Code section 388 to change its order removing the child from her home and placing the child in a new foster home. We dismiss the appeal because she lacks standing to challenge the order on appeal.

Defendant and appellant J.O. (minor) has a history of violating the terms and conditions of his informal and formal probation. Following minor’s repeated violations, the juvenile court ordered minor placed outside the home in a family-like setting for a period of six to nine months. Minor’s sole contention on appeal is that the juvenile court abused its discretion in ordering minor placed outside of the home. We find no abuse of discretion, and affirm the judgment.

On April 25, 2016, a jury convicted defendant and appellant Dany Rene Franco of inflicting corporal injury on a cohabitant resulting in a traumatic condition (Pen. Code, §§ 243, subd. (f)(10), 273.5, subd. (a); count 1), dissuading a witness (Pen. Code, § 136.1, subd. (b); count 2), false imprisonment (Pen. Code, § 236; count 3), and violating a protective order (Pen. Code, § 166, subd. (c)(1); counts 5 and 6). It further found true the allegations that defendant inflicted great bodily injury during the commission of count 1 (Pen. Code, §§ 12022.7, subd. (e), 1192.7, subd. (c)(8)), and that he used force as to count 2 (Pen. Code, § 136.1, subd. (c)(1)). The trial court sentenced defendant to state prison for a total term of 12 years eight months. He appeals, contending the court erred in allowing testimony of prior uncharged acts of domestic violence (Evid. Code, § 1109) and refusing to stay the sentence on count 3 pursuant to Penal Code section 654. Finding no error, we a

Defendant appeals from the trial court’s order denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.18 (Proposition 47). We find no error and so affirm.

Defendant and appellant William Christopher Scherer was found with methamphetamine in his possession for the purposes of sale and transportation. Pursuant to a plea to the court, defendant pleaded guilty to selling and transporting methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a)), possession of methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378), and misdemeanor driving with a suspended license (Veh. Code, § 14601.1, subd. (a)). In return, the trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on probation for a period of three years on various terms and conditions, including 180 days in county jail to be served on work release and payment of various fines and fees. On appeal, defendant argues five of the ordered fees were improperly imposed as conditions of probation. He further asserts the residence approval condition is unconstitutionally overbroad. For the reasons explained below, we will modify the judgment with directions.

A jury found defendant and appellant Jeffrey Allan Davis, guilty of 11 counts of committing a lewd or lascivious act upon a child under the age of 14 years. (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a).) The trial court sentenced defendant to prison for a term of 28 years. Defendant contends the trial court erred by excluding expert testimony on the topic of police interrogation techniques and false statements. We affirm the judgment.

L.W. (Father) appeals from the juvenile court's order denying his Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition to modify a previous order and place his minor daughters, P.W. and R.W. (the twins), in his care. He also appeals from the termination of his parental rights under section 366.26, contending the court erred in determining the beneficial parent-child relationship exception did not apply. The San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency) maintains the record does not show any abuse of judicial discretion or lack of sufficient evidence. We agree, and affirm the order and judgment.

Nonlawyers who represent themselves in a civil trial are usually at a considerable disadvantage, as would be anyone attempting to function in a complex task without the necessary training, education, and experience. Nevertheless, self-represented litigants are held to the same standards as lawyers because a contrary rule "would lead to a quagmire in the trial courts, and would be unfair to the other parties to litigation." (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 985 (Rappleyea).)

This appeal arises from an order entered in a complex divorce case commenced in 2009 involving Jeffrey and Jacqueline Guise (hereafter, Jeff and Jackie). In an early temporary support order, Judge Lisa Schall ordered Jeff to pay fixed monthly amounts of child and spousal support based on his fixed salary, plus additional support payments based on specified percentages of any bonus income he received. (See In re Marriage of Ostler & Smith (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 33 (Ostler-Smith).) About six months later, when a health condition interfered with Jeff's ability to work, the parties stipulated that he would pay only a reduced, fixed monthly support payment that would be unallocated as between child and spousal support. The stipulation did not expressly address Jeff's bonus income. About eight months later, a different judge (Hon. William McAdam) modified support prospectively to a higher fixed monthly amount, but did not include a bonus component because the higher fixed amount