CA Unpub Decisions

Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant Eduardo Magana pleaded no contest in 2010 to one count of second degree burglary (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460, subd. (b)) and was sentenced to two years in state prison. In 2015, while still on parole for the 2010 offense, Magana filed a waiver and stipulation for resentencing under Proposition 47 (§ 1170.18). The trial court recalled his sentence, directed that the conviction be reduced to a misdemeanor and imposed a jail term of 180 days, deemed served. The trial court also imposed one year of parole supervision.
On appeal, Magana argues the trial court erred by failing to apply his excess custody credits to outstanding penal fines. The People concede the argument in large part.

Defendant Marvin Magat pleaded no contest to two counts of committing a lewd act on a child (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)). On May 29, 2013, the court suspended defendant’s sentence and placed him on felony probation for three years under various terms and conditions, including the requirement that he pay a fine of $300 and penalty assessments of $735, pursuant to section 290.3. Thereafter, on July 19, 2013, the court imposed additional conditions.

A.C. (Father), J.V. (Mother), and Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) appeal from the juvenile court’s order pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 364, subdivision (c), continuing jurisdiction of the minor, D.C. Father, Mother, and SSA argue insufficient evidence supports the court’s order. We disagree and affirm the order.

A “sharp practice” is defined as a “dealing in which advantage is taken or sought unscrupulously.” (Webster’s 3d New Internat. Dict. (2002) p. 2088.) This is an appeal borne of sharp practices.
Defendant Professional Community Management, Inc. (PCM), unilaterally orchestrated the issuance of an appealable order by: (1) applying ex parte, a mere 11 days before trial, for an order shortening time to hear its motion to compel arbitration; (2) voluntarily submitting a proposed order to the trial court that not only reflected the court’s denial of the ex parte application — the only ruling reflected in the trial court’s own minute order — but also included a denial of the motion on the merits; and (3) promptly appealing from that order, which then stayed the scheduled trial.

The Madrona Project is a proposed development of 162 “executive” homes on the hillsides above Carbon Canyon in the City of Brea (the City). The Madrona Project was proposed by OSLIC Holdings, LLC (OSLIC), the appellant in this appeal, and opposed by, among others, Hills for Everyone, Friends of Harbors, Beaches and Parks, the California Native Plant Society, and the Sierra Club (collectively, HFE), the respondents in this appeal. In 2014, the Brea City Council approved the Madrona Project by enacting resolutions certifying a final environmental impact report prepared pursuant to the California Environmental Quality Act, Public Resources Code section 21000 et seq. (CEQA), approving a tentative tract map, making CEQA findings, and adopting a statement of overriding considerations.

Dustin James Elwood and Jimmy Ernest Hutton appeal from judgments after a jury convicted them of numerous sexual offenses. Elwood argues the trial court erred by excluding evidence the victims previously engaged in sexual activity and made false allegations of molestation, and he requests we independently review the victims’ school records. Hutton contends insufficient evidence supports one of his convictions and the court erred in instructing the jury. Elwood and Hutton join in each other’s arguments where applicable. None of their contentions have merit, and we affirm the judgments.

A.H. (mother), in propria persona, seeks extraordinary writ review of the juvenile court’s dispositional orders, denying her reunification services under Welfare and Institutions Code, section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(10) and (11) and setting a section 366.26 hearing as to her now nine-month-old daughter Ava. Mother contends she completed or was participating in services and argues the court should have increased visitation. She seeks a writ directing the juvenile court to vacate its section 366.26 hearing and return Ava to her custody. We deny the petition.

Adrianne M. (mother) received reunification services for two years four months after her children were placed in custody in September 2014 pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 because mother and father were arrested for being under the influence of methamphetamine. After a contested hearing on January 31, 2017, over whether mother’s parental rights should be terminated (§ 366.26), the juvenile court ruled the parent-child exception did not apply and it terminated mother’s parental rights to Ayden B. (then four years old) and Kobe B. (then three years old) by written order on February 9, 2017. Mother contends on appeal she had a close bond with both children and the juvenile court erred in failing to apply the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to the statutory preference for adoption. We find no error and affirm the juvenile court’s orders.

Defendant Randy Wesley Langley appeals from the judgment entered following his conviction of battery against a spouse and disobeying a prior domestic relations court order. His sole contention is that the trial court abused its discretion by declining to dismiss his prior strike conviction pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero). We affirm.

On February 27, 2015, a jury convicted appellant Charlette Corine Novak of transportation of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a)/count 1), possession for sale of methamphetamine (§ 11378/count 2) and evading a peace officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a)/count 3). In a separate proceeding, the court found true three prior conviction enhancements (§ 11370.2).
On appeal, Novak contends: (1) the penalty assessments on the lab fees the court imposed were unauthorized; (2) Novak’s abstract of judgment does not memorialize a stayed term the court imposed; (3) Novak’s abstract of judgment contains a drug program fee that was not imposed; (4) the AIDS education program fee the court imposed was unauthorized; and (5) the court abused its discretion when it refused to order the preparation of a current probation report. We find merit to contentions 1, 3, and 4 above and modify the judgment accordingly. In all other respects, we affirm.

Defendant Jose Carlos Lopez contends on appeal that the trial court erred in imposing penalty assessments attached to a criminal laboratory analysis fee (lab fee) and a drug program fee (program fee). In response to defendant’s letter, the trial court struck the lab fee penalty assessment, and defendant now asks that we, likewise, strike the program fee penalty assessment. Disagreeing with defendant’s view of the law, we reinstate the lab fee penalty assessment and affirm the judgment as so modified.

Appellant Raymond Woodward pled no contest pursuant to a negotiated plea to first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a) /count 1), second degree robbery (§ 211/count 2), and admitted a personal use of firearm enhancement (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) in count 1.

Defendant Roxanne Nicole Williams was convicted by no contest plea of assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4)) and resisting a peace officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)). On appeal, she contends the probation conditions that restrict her residence and travel are unconstitutionally overbroad. We affirm.

Defendant Harold Hendricks Fagan contends on appeal that (1) the trial court abused its discretion in finding defendant would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if resentenced under Proposition 36, the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (Proposition 36), and (2) the definition of dangerousness in Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act (Proposition 47), applies to Proposition 36 petitions. We affirm.