CA Unpub Decisions

Cecelia Kennedy appeals from an order denying her motion for relief from an adverse summary judgment on her cross-complaint against Farhad Zaghi. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b).) Summary judgment was entered after Kennedy’s attorney failed to work on the case for two months and substituted out of the case days before opposition was due, leaving Kennedy on her own to seek a continuance in vain. We conclude that Kennedy’s attorney abandoned her at a critical juncture of the litigation and shall reverse the order denying relief.

In this dependency appeal, L.H. (mother) challenges juvenile court orders which led to the removal of her three children—D.H. (born January 2006), D.H.2 (born December 2009), and D.H.3 (born July 2012)—from her custody. Specifically, mother argues that the juvenile court’s finding under section 387 of the Welfare and Institutions Code—that the previous dispositional order had not been effective to protect the minors—must be reversed because it was not supported by substantial evidence. Mother also claims that the juvenile court’s subsequent dispositional order removing her three children from her care was not sufficiently supported by evidence of risk to the minors and that reasonable means existed to keep the minors safe without removal. Having reviewed this matter in detail, we see no error requiring reversal of the juvenile court’s challenged findings and orders. We therefore affirm.

Respondent Medley Capital Corporation (MCC) was sued for fraud in a
cross-complaint filed by appellants Security National Guaranty, Inc. and Edmond Ghandour (when referred to collectively, appellants). The cross-complaint was filed against the background that appellants were advised MCC had no involvement in the transaction involved in the lawsuit, which lawsuit was thereafter maintained despite that appellants were warned that it should be dismissed. Appellants refused, and the
cross-complaint remained pending. Then, after appellants settled the main lawsuit against them, they filed a voluntary dismissal in favor of MCC.

A jury convicted Juan Joseph Ferrer of voluntary manslaughter with personal use of a knife. (Pen. Code, §§ 192, subd. (a), 12022, subd. (b)(1).) He is serving a 12-year prison sentence. Defendant contends the court abused its discretion in withdrawing its approval of a negotiated plea under which defendant would have received a four-year term for involuntary manslaughter. Defendant also contends the court erred in responding to a request for further definition of the phrase “conscious disregard for human life” in homicide instructions by directing the jury to “use the common, everyday definition of those words,” and that defense counsel was ineffective in approving the court’s response. Further, defendant contends the court abused its discretion in sentencing him to the aggravated term for voluntary manslaughter. We shall affirm the judgment and sentence.

Defendant Eryck Johnson appeals an order denying his Proposition 47 petition for resentencing. (Pen. Code, § 1170.18.) Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it found that he was ineligible for resentencing under Proposition 47 because he was serving an indeterminate life term for robbery (§§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c)) under the Three Strikes law. We agree and reverse the order.

Defendant Craig Allan Edmonds, Jr., pleaded no contest to attempted pimping of a minor (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 266h, subd. (b)(1)), and was placed on formal felony probation. Upon defendant’s timely appeal, we appointed counsel to represent him in this court. Appellate counsel filed a brief stating the case and facts but raising no arguable issues. We notified defendant of his right to submit written argument on his own behalf, and received no response.

Defendant Barton Rhett Williams appeals following his conviction by a jury of first degree murder. On appeal, he raises claims of instructional error, prosecutorial misconduct, ineffective assistance of counsel, and cumulative error. He also contends the trial court erred in determining that two out-of-state convictions were strikes for purposes of the Three Strikes Law. We shall affirm.

Sima Kazerooni Abedi (wife) and Hamid Reza Abedi (husband) each appeal from a judgment of dissolution of marriage with which neither party is satisfied. Wife contends the court erred in denying her request to continue trial, in its division of several marital assets, in valuing husband’s business as of the date of separation rather than the date of trial, and in refusing her a one-week extension to file her objections to the court’s tentative decision. Wife has not established error.

Bonnie P. (mother), in propria persona, seeks extraordinary writ review of the juvenile court’s order issued at a postpermanency review hearing (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.3) setting a section 366.26 hearing as to her now eight-year-old daughter, M.T. We deny the petition.

Appellant Alfonso Cuevas pled guilty to one felony count of unauthorized use of personal identifying information, a violation of Penal Code section 530.5, subdivision (a), and one misdemeanor count of driving with a blood-alcohol level of 0.08 percent or higher, a violation of Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision (b). In exchange for his plea, multiple other counts were dismissed and he was to receive a maximum total term of three years. Cuevas was sentenced in accordance with the plea agreement to 18 months in local custody and 18 months on mandatory supervised release. Cuevas appealed and obtained a certificate of probable cause. Appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. We affirm.

Appellant counsel for appellant Nathan Aron Pearce filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 asserting that after reviewing the record he could not find any arguable issues. We agree there are no arguable issues in the case and affirm the judgment.

Brothers Warren and Forrest Felger (the Felgers) appeal from a judgment of the Fresno County Superior Court entered on December 3, 2015, in favor of Sandstone Marketing, Inc. (Sandstone).
In an earlier lawsuit (the First Action), Sandstone prevailed on its breach-of-contract claim against Felger Farms, a general partnership, and Mt. Whitney Farms, a limited liability company. Thereafter, in the case underlying this appeal (the Second Action), the court concluded the Felgers, as general partners of Felger Farms, were jointly and severally liable for the judgment in the First Action.

By petition for writ of mandate, Nevan Forsythe challenges an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County (the family court) denying as untimely his peremptory challenge to the judge assigned for all purposes to the paternity action filed against him by his former girlfriend, Kristin Dove. We conclude that the challenge was timely filed and in proper form and should have been granted, and therefore grant the petition.

Grace Lorraine Walker appeals from a judgment of the superior court denying her petition for a writ of administrative mandamus. The petition asked the court to set aside a decision of the Physical Therapy Board of California (the "Board") that subjected Walker to discipline based on a misdemeanor hit-and-run conviction and the Board's finding she had used alcohol in a manner dangerous to herself or others. The superior court concluded the misdemeanor conviction was not an appropriate ground for discipline because it was not sufficiently related to Walker's fitness to practice physical therapy, but that discipline was appropriate pursuant to Business and Professions Code sections 2239 and 2660 based on Walker's use of alcohol in a dangerous manner. On appeal, Walker argues the court erred because the statutes do not permit discipline of a physical therapist based on a single isolated instance of alcohol use in a dangerous manner without a specific finding of a ne