CA Unpub Decisions

Fausto Jesus Urrea appeals from the judgment of the superior court that in principal part sentenced him to state prison for three years. Urrea's brief on appeal, filed by appointed appellate counsel, presents no argument for reversal, but invites this court to review the record for error in accordance with People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). Urrea did not respond to separate invitations from appellate counsel and from this court to file a supplemental brief. After independently reviewing the entire record for error as required by Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders) and Wende, we affirm.

Fausto Jesus Urrea appeals from the judgment of the superior court that in principal part sentenced him to state prison for three years. Urrea's brief on appeal, filed by appointed appellate counsel, presents no argument for reversal, but invites this court to review the record for error in accordance with People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). Urrea did not respond to separate invitations from appellate counsel and from this court to file a supplemental brief. After independently reviewing the entire record for error as required by Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders) and Wende, we affirm.

A jury convicted Emanuel Dunn, Jr. of one count of second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) as a lesser crime of a charged first degree murder. In a bifurcated trial, the court found true allegations that Dunn had suffered a prior serious felony (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)) that also constituted a strike (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i); 1170.12). It sentenced Dunn to a total prison term of 35 years to life, consisting of 30 years to life (15 years to life doubled under the "Three Strikes Law"), plus five years for the prior serious felony. Dunn contends his counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to explain to the jury the law of accessory liability and argue the evidence showed Dunn may have been, at most, an accessory after-the-fact. He further contends the trial court abused its discretion by denying his posttrial motion to replace his appointed counsel under People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden), and declining to strike his prior st

A jury found defendant Renard Galloway, Jr., guilty of misdemeanor assault (Pen. Code, § 240) and felony false imprisonment (§ 236). In a bifurcated proceeding, defendant admitted two prior convictions within the meaning of the three strikes law. (§§ 667, subd. (e)(2), 1170.12, subd. (c)(2).)

Westley Johnson appeals, in propria persona, from a court order denying his motion to set aside a prior order for spousal support. We affirm.

Appellant, R.S., a minor, was the subject of a four-count wardship petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 for taking a gold necklace and money from another minor. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602, subd. (a).) The court sustained the petition as to robbery and attempted extortion charges, but found criminal threats and misdemeanor battery charges untrue. The court adjudged the minor a ward of the court and committed him to the juvenile detention center for 90 days with 45 days suspended pending successful school review. Among other terms and conditions of probation upon his release from the juvenile detention center, the court ordered that the minor not “illegally use or possess or associate with persons known to use drugs, narcotics, marijuana, and/or alcohol,” and not “knowingly frequent places where drugs, narcotics, marijuana and/or alcohol are being used illegally.”

Appointed counsel for defendant Daniel Portugal has filed an opening brief that sets forth the facts of the case and asks this court to review the record and determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment.

Can a history of spousal abuse negate a finding of undue influence by a spouse who secured an unfair advantage in a marriage settlement agreement? Here appellant Leah Chavez and respondent Rudolfo Chavez ended their marriage and signed a series of marital settlement agreements, some subsequently amended. Leah sought to enforce one of the marital settlement agreements and amendments. The trial court found the marital settlement agreements between the parties arose out of their confidential relationship and were not made at arm’s length. Leah, with a superior knowledge of the law, gained an advantage in the agreements, including waivers of community interest in property and unconscionable provisions for spousal support. Rudolfo believed he had no choice but to acquiesce to Leah’s demands. The trial court found the agreements void.

The trial court granted summary adjudication of all 10 causes of action in plaintiff Kelly Tevis’s complaint against her former employer, Spare Time, Inc. (Spare Time), and the general manager of the company’s Natomas facility, Joe Rose (Rose). We affirm the summary adjudication of causes of action arising from Rose’s alleged sexual harassment, assault, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The claims are barred by the statute of limitations, by an admission by plaintiff, and by a failure of proof of intentional tortious conduct. We reverse, however, a single cause of action for disability discrimination, and four causes of action arising from Spare Time’s alleged failure to engage in the interactive process in good faith, failure to provide a reasonable accommodation, retaliation, and wrongful termination; triable issues of material fact remain as to those causes of action.

Defendant Richard Garcia appeals following his plea of no contest to two counts of assault with caustic chemicals or flammable substances. Defendant’s appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, stating that no arguable issue exists and requesting that this court independently review the record. Defendant, informed of his right to submit any contentions or argument he wished the court to consider, submitted a letter. We have reviewed the entire record and find no arguable issue. However, we have identified a clerical error in the abstract of judgment that must be corrected. So modified, we affirm the judgment.

“[A] knowing and intelligent jury waiver requires an appreciation of the nature of the jury trial right and the consequences of forgoing this right.” (People v. Sivongxxay (2017) 3 Cal.5th 151, 171.) There is no merit to defendant’s argument that his jury trial waiver was not knowingly and intelligently made. We affirm the judgment of conviction.

Brandon S. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders regarding his two sons, Josiah and Cesar. He challenges the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings based upon his commission of domestic violence, drug use, and failure to protect his children from their mother’s mental health issues. He argues the dispositional order removing Josiah and Cesar from his custody was not supported by substantial evidence. He also argues the juvenile court’s orders requiring him to attend parenting classes and submit to random drug testing constituted an abuse of discretion. We disagree and affirm.

In this malicious prosecution action attorney Gary Hollingworth appeals from orders granting the anti-SLAPP special motions to strike (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16) filed by respondents Jimmy Loh and Su Liu, CPAs, APC (hereafter, JLASL), an accounting firm, and its president, Su Liu; as well as by their former counsel, respondent Steven Sugars. Appellant has not made the requisite showing that a cross-complaint for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress filed against him in an earlier lawsuit was favorably terminated on the merits, or that it was brought without probable cause. We, therefore, affirm the orders.

Michael Nateras challenges the imposition of gang enhancements following his conviction by jury on one count of shooting at an occupied motor vehicle (Pen. Code, § 246) and one count of assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)). Appellant contends there is insufficient evidence of a connection between gang subsets to support the gang allegation. He also challenges the gang enhancement jury instruction, and he contends the gang expert’s testimony was inadmissible hearsay testimony and violated the confrontation clause. We affirm.