CA Unpub Decisions

Appellants Victoria Scott Yeager (Mrs. Yeager) and Charles E. Yeager (General Yeager; collectively, the Yeagers) appeal a judgment to enforce a settlement agreement with respondents Wild, Carter, & Tipton (WCT). The Yeagers claim the trial court erred in granting WCT’s motion to enforce the agreement. They specifically contend (1) the trial court violated General Yeager’s civil rights, (2) the Yeagers did not understand the material terms of the settlement agreement, (3) the trial court lacks jurisdiction to enforce the agreement, (4) a valid contract was not formed because there was no meeting of the minds, (5) the record is incomplete, (6) the agreement was based on fraud, (7) the court exceeded its jurisdiction by ordering a nonparty to comply with the settlement agreement, (8) WCT violated the confidentiality agreement, and (9) the agreement was executed under duress. The Yeagers also claim certain records ordered sealed by the trial court should not remain under seal.

Appellants Victoria Scott Yeager (Mrs. Yeager) and Charles E. Yeager (General Yeager; collectively, the Yeagers) appeal a judgment to enforce a settlement agreement with respondents Wild, Carter, & Tipton (WCT). The Yeagers claim the trial court erred in granting WCT’s motion to enforce the agreement. They specifically contend (1) the trial court violated General Yeager’s civil rights, (2) the Yeagers did not understand the material terms of the settlement agreement, (3) the trial court lacks jurisdiction to enforce the agreement, (4) a valid contract was not formed because there was no meeting of the minds, (5) the record is incomplete, (6) the agreement was based on fraud, (7) the court exceeded its jurisdiction by ordering a nonparty to comply with the settlement agreement, (8) WCT violated the confidentiality agreement, and (9) the agreement was executed under duress. The Yeagers also claim certain records ordered sealed by the trial court should not remain under seal.

Appellants Victoria Scott Yeager (Mrs. Yeager) and Charles E. Yeager (General Yeager; collectively, the Yeagers) appeal a judgment to enforce a settlement agreement with respondents Wild, Carter, & Tipton (WCT). The Yeagers claim the trial court erred in granting WCT’s motion to enforce the agreement. They specifically contend (1) the trial court violated General Yeager’s civil rights, (2) the Yeagers did not understand the material terms of the settlement agreement, (3) the trial court lacks jurisdiction to enforce the agreement, (4) a valid contract was not formed because there was no meeting of the minds, (5) the record is incomplete, (6) the agreement was based on fraud, (7) the court exceeded its jurisdiction by ordering a nonparty to comply with the settlement agreement, (8) WCT violated the confidentiality agreement, and (9) the agreement was executed under duress. The Yeagers also claim certain records ordered sealed by the trial court should not remain under seal.

Defendant Sergio Tanori, an inmate at the Kern Valley State Prison, was convicted by jury of battery upon a correctional officer. (Pen. Code, § 4501.5.) In a bifurcated proceeding, the court found true allegations alleging defendant had seven prior strike convictions (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)). Defendant was sentenced to a prison term of 25 years to life, to be served consecutive to his commitment sentence.

Defendant Armando Enrique Herrera was convicted by jury of second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); count 1), a lesser included offense of the charged offense of first degree murder, personally discharging a firearm at an occupied motor vehicle (§ 246; count 2), and carrying a loaded firearm in public while actively participating in a criminal street gang (§ 25850, subd. (c)(3); count 3). With respect to counts 1 and 2, the jury also found true enhancements alleging defendant personally discharged a firearm causing death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)), and he had committed the underlying offenses for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)).

On August 15, 2016, a felony complaint charged defendant and appellant Paullita Jeane Hanley with identity theft under Penal Code section 530.5, subdivision (a) (count 1); and grand theft under Penal Code section 487, subdivision (a) (count 2). On December 6, 2016, defendant pled guilty to count 1. On the same day, the trial court placed defendant on formal probation for three years, and ordered her to serve 180 days in county jail or the weekend work release program. On January 31, 2016, defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.

On May 25, 2005, defendant and appellant Rick Beltz pled guilty to six separate crimes, including possession of methamphetamine in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11377, subdivision (a). In exchange, defendant was initially sentenced to a total prison term of eight years six months—including the upper term of six years for the possession count—and released on his own recognizance pursuant to a Vargas waiver on various terms and conditions and a promise to appear. Defendant thereafter committed residential burglary and was charged with violating Penal Code section 459.
On September 22, 2005, the trial court found that defendant had violated the terms of his Vargas waiver. For the methamphetamine possession offense, the trial court sentenced defendant to the aggravated term of six years in prison, to be served consecutively with his sentence in another case.

After a jury trial, defendant and appellant Ricardo Anthony Perez received a two-year prison term for stealing two vehicles and evading and resisting arrest. He argues the People presented insufficient evidence that either of the vehicles was worth more than $950, and so his felony convictions for violating Vehicle Code section 10851 must be reduced to misdemeanors. We affirm.

Plaintiff and appellant Marcos Melchor appeals the dismissal of his First Amended Complaint (FAC) based on defendants and respondents U.S. Bank National Association’s sustained demurrer without leave to amend.
Melchor obtained a $650,000 loan to purchase the property located at 1560 Rancho Hills Drive in Chino Hills (Property). The loan was secured by a Deed of Trust (DOT) recorded on January 9, 2007, in favor of lender American Brokers Conduit (American). Melchor defaulted on his loan obligations and the Property was sold at a trustee’s sale on October 17, 2012, to Arch Bay who had previously been assigned the DOT by American. U.S. Bank obtained the Property from Arch Bay. U.S. Bank filed an unlawful detainer action in San Bernardino County Superior Court case No. UDFS1401624 (UD) against Melchor pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1161a. U.S. Bank was successful. Melchor then filed his FAC for the causes of action of quiet title; cancellation of instruments; sl

Plaintiff and respondent Ghasan Tabel, in his individual capacity and as Ghasan Tabel M.D., Inc., a professional corporation, sued defendants and appellants (1) Hospital Corporation of America, a corporation (HCA); (2) Riverside Community Hospital, a corporation (RCH); (3) Ben Russo (Russo); (4) Kenneth Dozier (Dozier); and (5) Russ T. Young (Young) (collectively, Hospital). Hospital moved the trial court to strike Tabel’s complaint as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (anti-SLAPP). (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16.) The trial court denied the motion. Hospital contends the trial court erred. We affirm the order.

Thomas E. Montgomery, County Counsel, John E. Philips, Chief Deputy County Counsel, and Patrice Plattner-Grainger, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
At a six-month status review hearing, the juvenile court terminated reunification services for N.R. (Mother) and O.V. (Father) and set a permanency planning hearing for their minor sons, D.V. and J.V., who had earlier been placed in foster care. Mother filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388, requesting that the court modify its order by placing the children with her or by reinstating her reunification services. The juvenile court found Mother met her burden of showing changed circumstances, but had not met her burden of showing modification was in the children's best interests. The court terminated parental rights and selected adoption as the children's permanent plan. The parents appeal only the juvenile court's denial of Mother's section 388 petition. We affirm.

Thomas E. Montgomery, County Counsel, John E. Philips, Chief Deputy County Counsel, and Daniela Davidian, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Mary S. (Mother) and Paul H. (Father) appeal from orders terminating parental rights to their daughter M.H. under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Mother contends the evidence does not support the juvenile court's finding that the beneficial relationship exception of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) did not apply. She asserts that, as a matter of law, a reasonable trier of fact could not have reached the conclusion that the beneficial relationship exception did not apply. Father joins in her arguments. We affirm the orders.

A jury found Juan Pinal Mondragon (Pinal) guilty of one count of inflicting an injury causing a traumatic condition on a person with whom he had a dating relationship (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a)), and one count of possessing narcotics paraphernalia (Health & Saf. Code, § 11364).
Pinal contends that the trial court prejudicially erred because it concluded that Evidence Code section 352 did not require the exclusion of two recordings in which a witness described seeing Pinal punch the victim in the face in an altercation that occurred on the same evening that Pinal committed the acts for which Pinal was prosecuted in this case. We conclude that Pinal's argument is without merit, and accordingly we affirm the judgment.

Erick Toledo was charged with one felony count of resisting an executive officer. (Pen. Code, § 69.) The jury found him guilty, and the trial court granted him three years' formal probation with 365 days in custody. On appeal, Toledo contends the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury sua sponte on assault and battery as lesser included offenses, and by imposing an allegedly invalid probation condition that requires him to obtain consent from his probation officer before leaving San Diego County. He also asks us to independently review the trial court's proceedings on his motion to discover law enforcement personnel records (see Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess)), and to correct a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of a probation condition regarding marijuana use and the subsequent written probation order. We find no reversible error and affirm the judgment, as modified to resolve the discrepancy on the marijuana-use probation