CA Unpub Decisions

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Collette C. Cavalier and Joy Utomi, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Susan Joy Avignone and William Alan Avignone (together the Avignones) defrauded five investors out of more than $700,000 in a real estate scheme. In exchange for dismissal of some of the charges, the Avignones pleaded guilty to three counts of fraud in connection with the offer, sale, and purchase of a security (Corp. Code, §§ 25401 & 25540, subd. (b); counts 2, 8, 10) and two counts of grand theft of personal property with a value of more than $950 (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (a); counts 3, 5).

Appointed counsel for defendant Elizabeth Ventura has asked this court to review the record to determine whether there exist any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) We find no errors that arguably would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant and therefore affirm the judgment.

Following a series of civil actions and a flurry of bankruptcy filings, plaintiffs Christian M. and Shirley C. Steele brought suit against defendant Bank of America, N.A. (Bank of America) alleging causes of action stemming from the foreclosure of their property by the lender. The trial court granted Bank of America’s motion for judgment on the pleadings without leave to amend. The Steeles appeal, arguing they sufficiently pled their first three causes of action. We shall affirm the judgment.

Defendant Roger Earl Bonner, Jr., contends he had a right to be personally present at a hearing on his petition for resentencing brought pursuant to Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d)(2), and his absence from the hearing was prejudicial. Finding no prejudice, we will affirm the trial court’s order denying defendant’s petition for resentencing. Because we address defendant’s contentions on the merits, we do not address his alternative forfeiture contention regarding ineffective assistance.

Appellant Martha R. (Mother), the mother of C.R., Jr. (C.) and Marilyn R., appeals the juvenile court’s jurisdic-tional order, contending substantial evidence does not support the court’s finding that her abuse of marijuana and alcohol posed a substantial risk of serious harm to the children. She also challenges the dispositional order requiring her to drug test and to enroll in a substance abuse program if she tests dirty or misses a test. Mother does not contest the court’s other jurisdictional findings -- that substance abuse on the part of the children’s presumed father, C.R., Sr. (Father), and the domestic violence between Mother and Father posed a substantial risk of serious harm to the children -- nor dispute that the children will be subject to dependency jurisdiction whatever the outcome of this appeal. However, she contends her reunification plan should not require her to drug test or to potentially participate in a substance abuse program. Finding no error, we af

Appellant Thomas Richard Silas shot his wife, Alana Silas (Alana), three times in the stomach on Christmas Day 2014 after a domestic quarrel, blowing off one of her fingers. The jury found him guilty of one count of attempted voluntary manslaughter and one count of mayhem. The court imposed and stayed an 18-year sentence for attempted manslaughter, and sentenced appellant to 29 years to life for mayhem. The original information charged appellant with attempted premeditated murder, and the sole contested issue on appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion in permitting the prosecution to amend the information in the middle of trial to add the mayhem count.

Appellants mother (A.F.) and father (R.M.) and respondent Mendocino County Health and Human Service Agency (the agency) have stipulated to the entry of an order reversing the juvenile court’s finding and order terminating appellants’ parental rights to their five-year-old son (A.M.). We shall enter the stipulated order.

Johnson Kelley Gibbs fatally shot his brother, Allison. A jury convicted Gibbs of involuntary manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (b)) and found true an allegation he personally used a firearm in the commission of the crime (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced Gibbs to five years in state prison.
Gibbs appeals. He contends the court coerced the deadlocked jury into continuing to deliberate, which denied him the right to due process. We disagree and affirm.

Plaintiff William Y. Moores, a physician licensed to practice in California, appeals from an order granting summary judgment to defendants the Medical Board of California, Division of Medical Quality (Board), Sharon Levine, as president of the Board, and Linda K. Whitney, as executive director of the Board, on his third amended complaint (TAC). Moores is the subject of a probation order that was imposed by the Board in 2001. The TAC alleges causes of action against defendants for violation of his due process rights, and for failure to comply with an alleged mandatory duty to disclose certain details of his probation status to a prospective employer. We affirm.

Plaintiff Shamil Alukay defaulted on his mortgage. Foreclosure proceedings were instituted and his property was sold. He commenced this lawsuit by alleging the foreclosure was initiated on behalf of an entity to which the deed of trust was never validly assigned. Defendants Deutsche Bank National Trust Company (Deutsche Bank), Central Mortgage Company (CMC), PLM Loan Management Services, Inc. (PLM), and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) demurred to his amended complaint, and the trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. We affirm.

Defendant Florencio Adan Anselmo was convicted by a jury of first degree murder by lying in wait, with the special circumstance of lying in wait and an additional finding that he personally used a deadly weapon, a knife. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a); 190.2, subd. (a)(15); 12022, subd. (b)(1).) On appeal, he contends that (1) insufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding of premeditation and deliberation; (2) insufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding of lying in wait, both as to the theory of first degree murder and as a special circumstance; (3) he received insufficient advisement of his Miranda rights before he confessed to killing the victim; (4) the trial court erred in giving CALCRIM No. 3428, which limited the jury’s use of evidence that defendant was mentally impaired; and (5) the court erred in instructing the jury on lying in wait with CALCRIM Nos. 521 and 728. He further asserts that the cumulative effect of these errors produced an unreliable verdi

Defendant Maria Martinez appeals from a trial court order denying her motion to withdraw her plea of no contest to violating Penal Code section 186.22, subdivision (a) (active participation in a criminal street gang). Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion because she entered the plea under duress and is “arguably factually innocent.”

A jury convicted Angel De Jesus Maldonado of one count of receiving a stolen vehicle (Pen. Code, § 496d, subd. (a)) and he admitted a prior theft conviction (§ 666.5, subd. (a)). Maldonado argues his conviction for receiving a stolen vehicle should be reversed for instructional error and insufficiency of the evidence. Neither argument has merit. We affirm.

A jury convicted Aquiles Sanchez of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); count 1) with the special circumstances of murder committed during the commission of robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A)) and murder committed to further the activities of a criminal street gang (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(22)), two counts of second degree robbery (§§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c); counts 2, 3), and active participation in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (a); count 4).
The court found defendant committed counts 1, 2, and 3 for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)), a principal in the crimes discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53, subds. (d), (e)(1)), and defendant had a prior juvenile adjudication of a felony within the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law (§ 667, subd. (d), (e)(1)).