CA Unpub Decisions

Donna Jones appeals from a judgment in favor of the law firm of Feldsott & Lee (Feldsott) and Stanley Feldsott. Feldsott represented Jones and another owner in an arbitration against the homeowners’ association (HOA) of their condominium complex, after the HOA levied an emergency special assessment against their units. Feldsott persuaded the arbitrator the assessments were improper. After the arbitrator made an interim decision in the homeowners’ favor, but before he ruled on their entitlement to attorney fees and costs, the parties agreed to a universal settlement of $50,000.

A jury convicted petitioner Luis Loza of the first degree murder of Edward Mauricio Rendon. (Pen. Code, §187.) The jury found him not guilty of the attempted murder of a second victim (§§664/187, subd. (a)), and not guilty of street terrorism (§186.22, subd.(a).) The jury returned not true findings on allegations he committed the murder at the direction of, for the benefit of, or in association with, a criminal street gang (§186.22, subd. (b)(1)) and that he was vicariously armed with a firearm. (§12022.53, subds. (d), (e)(1)). He was sentenced to prison for 25 years to life. We affirmed the judgment on appeal and the Supreme Court subsequently denied review. (People v. Andrade et al. (April 9, 2007, G035759) [nonpub. opn.].)

Joseph Hebert pleaded no contest to one count of assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4)), and admitted to a prior strike. The trial court sentenced him to six years in state prison. On appeal, Hebert’s appointed counsel has filed an opening brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). We affirm the judgment.

Although Jaroslaw Waszczuk, a self-represented plaintiff, purports to appeal the trial court’s order granting five individual employees of the University of California’s special motion to strike (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16) four causes of action arising from their involvement in his termination, he does not argue the merits of the motion but insists the judgment must be reversed because of systemic corruption including collusion between his then lawyer, defense counsel, and the trial judge. He misunderstands his burden on appeal, ignores the dispositive issues, provides no evidence of corruption or untoward collusion, and fails to demonstrate either relevance or prejudice from the shortcomings he cites. We need go no further than to answer the contentions he raises, and in finding no merit in those claims, we affirm.

Tammy Fernandes successfully sued vexatious litigant Raj Singh and his wife Kiran Rawat individually and as trustees of the Sita Ram--or “Sitaram”--Trust (Trust), for wrongful eviction and related claims. She obtained an award of compensatory and punitive damages, as well as costs and attorney fees. All defendants filed a joint notice of appeal through counsel. While Rawat and the Trust remain represented by counsel on appeal, Singh now represents himself.
On appeal, Rawat claims error in the trial court’s denial of her motion to vacate the judgment based on lack of service, and attacks the punitive damage award. Singh also challenges the punitive damage award, disputes service on Rawat, and contends the attorney fee award was excessive. Finding no merit in defendants’ claims, we shall affirm.

The dispositive issue on appeal is whether there is substantial evidence to support the trial court’s factual finding that plaintiff Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo) did not receive a letter revoking defendants Mark and Nancy Weiner’s personal guaranty of their business line of credit prepared and mailed by their assistant. The record contains sufficient and credible evidence to support the trial court’s finding that Wells Fargo rebutted the presumption of receipt of the letter created by Evidence Code section 641. Defendants’ motion to vacate the judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 663, based on the same grounds they lost on at trial, is not appealable and, since we affirm the judgment, the attorney fee award will remain intact.

Dyna, LLC (Dyna) and GreatCall, Inc. (GreatCall) separately appeal from a judgment confirming an arbitration award in GreatCall's favor, as corrected to reduce the amount of costs recoverable by GreatCall. Dyna contends we must reverse the judgment and direct the superior court to vacate the award on the ground the arbitrator exceeded his power by ignoring the res judicata effect of a prior arbitration award. GreatCall contends we must reverse the judgment and direct the court to confirm the award as made without any reduction in the amount of recoverable costs.

On January 11, 2016, defendant Gerald Pete Penner was charged with six offenses: two counts of unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a); counts 1, 3); three counts of receiving a stolen motor vehicle (Pen. Code, § 496d, subd. (a); counts 2, 4, 6); and one count of operation of a chop shop (Veh. Code, § 10801; count 5).
On March 22, 2016, defendant was found guilty of counts 1, 3, and 5. Counts 2 and 4 were discharged after trial and a mistrial was declared on count 6. Defendant was sentenced to three years for count 5, two years for count 1, and two years for count 3. The sentences for counts 1 and 3 were to run concurrent to count 5. Defendant filed a timely appeal, arguing the conviction for operation of a chop shop was not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm the judgment.

Defendant Jacob Edward Sotelo appeals following his no contest plea to sexual battery upon an unconscious person. (Pen. Code, § 243.4, subd. (c).)
Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it imposed probation conditions requiring him to participate in polygraph testing, to waive his psychotherapist-patient privilege and to submit to chemical testing. We find that the conditions were properly imposed and affirm the judgment.

Charlie Zhao (husband) appeals from a judgment of dissolution of marriage, challenging the trial court’s division of the marital estate and the reimbursement it ordered him to pay respondent Suzie Young (wife). Husband largely takes issue with the court’s finding that husband diverted $247,999 away from the community without wife’s written authorization and in violation of his fiduciary duties described in Family Code section 1101. We reverse the court’s finding that husband diverted $43,200 to his sister Cindy between 2005 and 2009, and remand for the trial court to reassess this amount in light of other findings the court made. We affirm on all other grounds because the court’s other findings were supported by substantial evidence.

This appeal is another in a series of appeals arising from a long-running dispute between plaintiffs and appellants Joseph L. Shalant and Wendy Kronick (plaintiffs), and defendant and respondent Robert Mackston (defendant). In one of our prior opinions (Shalant v. Mackston (Dec. 8, 2014, B250208) [nonpub. opn.]), we affirmed the trial court’s award of statutory attorney fees to defendant pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (c). We also awarded defendant costs of appeal. Following issuance of the remittitur, defendant filed, in the trial court, a cost bill and a motion for appellate fees. The trial court granted defendant’s motion and awarded appellate fees and costs in the aggregate amount of $98,186.97.

Defendants appeal from a declaratory relief judgment in favor of plaintiffs, declaring void certain amendments to the bylaws of two nonprofit public benefit corporations. The two defendant nonprofit corporations, FAME Assistance Corporation and FAME Housing Corporation, were established in the 1980’s by the First African Methodist Episcopal Church (the Church) to provide housing and other services for needy and low income residents in Los Angeles. The trial court found that the procedures used in 2012 to amend the bylaws of the two nonprofit corporations “were unfair, unreasonable, and not performed in good faith.” Therefore, the court declared the 2012 amendments to be void and of no effect and ordered “[n]ew officers and directors . . . shall be selected in a manner consistent with the original bylaws of the [c]orporation[s].”

Plaintiff Barry N. Lipsitz appeals from a May 31, 2016 judgment entered after the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants Walt Disney Pictures, The Walt Disney Company, Disney Worldwide Services, Inc. (Disney Worldwide) and Matthew Deuel. Plaintiff contends it was error to grant summary judgment on his claims for age discrimination, medical condition and age discrimination, defamation, and punitive damages. In addition, plaintiff challenges the trial court’s evidentiary rulings. He asserts the trial court’s rejection of his excessive publication evidence on hearsay grounds is erroneous. Further, plaintiff challenges a December 1, 2015 order quashing his subpoenas, which sought deposition testimony and documents in an unrelated case to impeach Deuel. We affirm the judgment and orders.

Plaintiff James W. Menefield, III, appeals the trial court’s judgment sustaining defendant MTC Financial, Inc.’s (MTC) demurrer without leave to amend. Plaintiff does not challenge the order sustaining the demurrer itself. Rather, he asserts the trial court erred in denying him leave to amend the complaint to state a cause of action for wrongful foreclosure. We reverse. Although the trial court concluded that plaintiff did not have standing, plaintiff may be able to amend his complaint to establish that status. We also conclude that on the record before us the complaint would not be barred by tender requirements or privilege.