CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant and appellant Rosalio Ordorica pleaded no contest to possession of a firearm by a felon. (Pen. Code § 29800, subd. (a)(1).) He admitted suffering two prior strikes within the meaning of the three strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)), and five prior felony convictions. Defendant was sentenced to 32 months in prison. He appeals from the denial of his motion to suppress evidence under section 1538.5, arguing the trial court erred in concluding defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his makeshift dwelling located on property owned by the Department of Water and Power (DWP) and marked with “no trespassing” signs. We affirm.

The main asset of the O’Reilly Family Trust is the family home. The trust permitted the trustor’s widow to remain in the home as long as she wished; thereafter, the home and the rest of the assets were to be “distributed” to the trustor’s three adult children. Due to a dispute among the children, one of them, who was the successor trustee, filed a petition to determine whether the trust granted him permission to sell the house. The trial court granted the trustee the relief sought, and his brother, the objecting beneficiary, appeals. We conclude, as did the probate court, that the trust unambiguously grants the trustee the right to sell the house. We therefore affirm.

Defendant was found guilty by a jury of 18 crimes: kidnapping for the purpose of robbery (Pen. Code, § 209, subd. (b)(1)); felony false imprisonment (Pen. Code, §§ 236, 237, subd.(a)); first degree robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 212.5, subd. (a)); (Pen. Code, § 209, subd. (b)(1)); dissuading a victim or witness from testifying by force or threat (Pen. Code, § 136.1 subd. (c)(1)); making a criminal threat (Pen. Code, § 422); committing an assault with “a stun gun or less lethal weapon” (Pen. Code, § 244.5); extortion (Pen. Code, § 518); theft from an elder (Pen. Code, § 368, subd. (d)); four counts of the unlawful use of personal identifying information (Pen. Code, § 530.5, subd. (a)); and six counts of first degree burglary (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460, subd. (a)). The jury found true enhancement allegations that the false imprisonment, kidnapping, robbery, and four of the burglaries were committed against a person older than 65. (Pen. Code, § 667.9, subd. (a).)

The Malibu Township Council, Inc., plaintiff, appeals from orders and a judgment. In 2013 it filed a petition and complaint for three causes of action under the Ralph M. Brown Act (the Brown Act) (Gov. Code , § 54950 et seq.) against defendant City Council of the City of Malibu. The trial court granted defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as to causes of action for declaratory and injunctive relief under sections 54960 and 54960.1. The trial court permitted the action to proceed as to the writ of mandate cause of action under section 54960.1. Following discovery and a writ of mandate hearing, the trial court denied the writ of mandate.

This appeal pertains to a recoupment action under Government Code section 996.4 (Section 996.4 action) in which the judgment awarded: (1) attorney fees and costs incurred by two public employees in an underlying action (Cashline action); and (b) attorney fees and costs incurred by those same two public employees in pursuing the Section 996.4 action.
In the Cashline action, Cashline ATM, Inc. (Cashline) alleged that George L. Hosac (Hosac) and Reginald M. Franklin (Franklin)—two deputies of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (LASD)—breached a contract they signed to provide the Los Angeles County Men’s Central Jail (MCJ) with an automated teller machine (ATM), and to service that ATM. Their legal fees were $323,662.75. When Hosac and Franklin demanded that County of Los Angeles (County) pay their defense costs pursuant to section 996.4, County declined. Ultimately, the trial court dismissed Hosac and Franklin from the Cashline action.

A jury convicted David Daniel Hernandez (appellant) of attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664/187, subd. (a)). It found true the allegations that the offense was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)), and that appellant personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). In a separate proceeding, the trial court found true the allegation that appellant suffered two prior serious convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)). Appellant was sentenced to a state prison term of 45 years to life as follows: 25 years to life, plus 10 years for violation of section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1) in the commission of a violent felony (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)), and 10 years for the serious felony convictions. The trial court stayed the deadly weapon enhancement.

Plaintiff and appellant Brian Joseph Barry appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion for attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. The trial court denied the attorney fees request on the basis that Barry’s suit did not enforce an important right protecting the public interest, or confer a significant benefit to the public or to a large class of persons. We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion and affirm.

Appellant Stacy E. Simone (Stacy) appeals from a move-away order made after a judgment dissolving marriage. Specifically, Stacy challenges that part of the order allowing respondent Eric M. Kerensky (Eric) to divert $1,000 of his monthly support arrearages into a travel trust. We agree with Stacy that this portion of the move-away order must be reversed because accrued support cannot be modified and because the trial court did not make an analysis of each parent’s ability to pay travel expenses related to Eric’s visitation with the couple’s children. Accordingly, the matter is remanded for such an analysis.

In an eight-count information filed by the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office, defendant and appellant Thomas Adams Driscoll was charged with arson of an inhabited structure or property (Pen. Code, § 451, subd. (b); count 1), disobeying a domestic relations court order (§ 273.6, subd. (a); count 2), vandalism causing damage over $400 (§ 594, subd. (a); count 3); criminal threats (§ 422, subd. (a); counts 4, 7 & 8), and stalking (§ 646.9, subd. (b); counts 5 & 6).
Defendant pleaded guilty to the eight charged crimes pursuant to a negotiated open plea. As part of the negotiated open plea, defendant agreed to pay restitution ordered by the trial court.

David Wayne Hoyle appeals from a judgment which sentences him to 115 years to life in state prison for the sexual and physical abuse of three children. We find the trial court erroneously believed it lacked discretion to impose concurrent sentences on counts 1-5 and 8. In addition, the trial court erred in that it failed to impose a mandated sentence of 25 years to life on counts 5 and 8 under Penal Code section 667.61, subdivision (j)(2). We therefore remand for resentencing.

Dr. Hoomad Melamed (Melamed), a physician at Cedars-Sinai Medical Center (Cedars), operated on a 12-year-old patient, causing complications requiring corrective surgery. The hospital suspended Melamed, who requested a peer review hearing challenging the suspension. Every level of administrative review upheld the suspension. Melamed did not seek mandamus review of these decisions. Melamed then filed suit against Cedars, William Brien, M.D., Rick Delamarter, M.D., Michael Langberg, M.D., Neil Romanoff, M.D., and medical staff (collectively the hospital) involved in the summary suspension decision. The hospital filed an anti-SLAPP motion, contending that Melamed’s claims arose out of a protected activity—the medical staff’s peer review process—and that Melamed could not show a probability of success on the merits. The trial court granted the motion. Melamed appeals the order granting the motion. We agree and therefore reverse the order.

A jury convicted defendant Oscar Pearson of second degree vehicle burglary (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460, subd. (b)) and resisting a peace officer (§ 148). Defendant raises a single issue on appeal—that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of a prior vehicle burglary conviction. We affirm.

Defendant Dominique Xavier Spears appeals from a restitution order entered pursuant to a plea of no contest to one count of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c)), one count of second degree commercial burglary (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460, subd. (b)) and admission of an enhancement that the commission of second degree commercial burglary occurred while released from custody (Pen. Code, § 12022.1). All other charges were dismissed. In accordance with the negotiated disposition, the trial court sentenced defendant to a total term of three years in state prison (with 297 days of presentence credit) and imposed various fines and fees. Defendant entered a Harvey waiver regarding the restitution to victims of the dismissed counts and the amount owed was put over for further proceedings.

Following defendant’s plea of guilty to voluntary manslaughter and admission of an enhancement and three prior prison convictions, defendant was sentenced to 10 years in state prison. Court affirm.