CA Unpub Decisions

E.S. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating his parental rights (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26 [section 366.26 hearing], all further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institution Code unless otherwise noted) to his son A.S. (born in November 2015). He argues the court erred in denying a request to continue the section 366.26 hearing until this court decided a prior appeal by father and a maternal relative from the juvenile court’s order declining to move A.S. from his foster home to the maternal relative’s home in Colorado. We affirmed that order in a now final opinion filed June 26, 2017. (In re A.S. (June 26, 2017, G054288) [nonpub. opn.].) Our review of this appeal discloses no basis to reverse the court’s order terminating parental rights.

Defendant Robert Earl Willis, Jr., appeals from an order denying a petition for resentencing of his conviction for violating Penal Code section 484e, subdivision (b) (acquiring access cards) as a misdemeanor.
This is our second opinion in this case. In our first opinion we held that the trial court correctly denied the petition and we affirmed because (1) section 484e was not listed in the relevant statute as one of the felonies for which resignation and resentencing could be sought, and (2) defendant had not proved the value of the access cards he obtained was less than $950. (People v. Willis (Nov. 29, 2016, G051940) [nonpub. opn.], review granted Feb. 15, 2017, S239452.) The California Supreme Court granted defendant’s petition for review, and later transferred the case back to this court for reconsideration in light of People v. Romanowski (2017) 2 Cal.5th 903 (Romanowski). We now reverse and remand for further proceedings.

In an information filed November 24, 2015, defendant was charged with assault by a prisoner with force likely to produce great bodily injury. (Pen. Code, § 4501, subd. (b).) The information also alleged that defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury (GBI) on the victim (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) , has three prior strike convictions (§ 667, subd. (e)), one prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)), and had served two prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).
A jury convicted defendant of the assault as charged. The court found true the allegations that defendant had suffered two prior strikes and one prior prison term.
The court sentenced defendant to 25 years to life, plus one year for the prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).

In 2011, appellant Tracy McMillan was convicted of, inter alia, second degree commercial burglary in violation of Penal Code sections 459/460, subdivision (b) and sentenced to an aggregate term of six years in state prison. After Proposition 47 passed, McMillan filed a petition requesting her conviction be reduced to a misdemeanor and that she be resentenced. (See § 1170.18.) The trial court granted the petition, reduced the conviction to a misdemeanor, and imposed a one-year period of parole. The trial court also awarded McMillan 1,700 days custody credits. McMillan contends the trial court erred when it imposed a one-year parole term under section 1170.18, subdivisions (a) and (d). She argues in the alternative that the trial court should have applied her excess custody credits towards her one-year parole period. We disagree and affirm.

On June 26, 2015, a jury found defendant Pascual Sanchez guilty of inflicting injury to a former cohabitant or child’s parent under Penal Code section 273.5, subdivision (a), count 1. On the same day, defendant admitted an allegation of a prior strike conviction, for which he served prison time.
On August 10, 2015, the trial court sentenced defendant to a middle term of three years, which was doubled to six years for a prior serious or violent strike conviction. A consecutive year was added for his previous prison term pursuant to Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b), for a total prison term of seven years. He received custody credits of 283 days.

Appellant Alexander Ramon Arreola appeals his 2015 sentence, arguing it improperly includes a one-year enhancement for a prior prison term under Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b) (section 667.5(b)) , because the underlying prior conviction had previously been reduced to a misdemeanor pursuant to the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act (hereafter Proposition 47 or the Act.) We agree and modify the judgment as to him.
Appellant Mabel Medina Espinoza’s case comes to us pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). Having reviewed the record as required by Wende, we affirm the judgment as to her.

Defendant Micah Andrew McKinney was charged with unlawful possession of a firearm (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 1) and ammunition (§ 30305, subd. (a)(1); count 2), possession of marijuana for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11359; count 3) and simple possession of marijuana (Health & Saf. Code, § 11357, subd. (c); count 4). A jury convicted defendant of counts 3 and 4. The trial court sentenced defendant to three years of formal probation for count 3 upon the condition he serve one year in county jail, and the court dismissed count 4 in the interests of justice.
On appeal, defendant challenges the trial court’s ruling denying his motion to suppress. Defendant contends (1) there was not probable cause to support a search of his home and cellular phone for evidence of firearm and ammunition possession, (2) there was not probable cause to support a search of his home and cellular phone for evidence of drug trafficking, (3) the good faith exception to the warrant require

Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Carlos A. Martinez and Stephen G. Herndon, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Defendant and appellant, J.L. (father), challenges the juvenile court’s order terminating his visitation with his children, B.L., L.L., and J.L., Jr. At the time the court made this order, this case was well beyond the reunification stage, and the children were in a planned permanent living arrangement (PPLA) with their foster mother. Father contends the court erred because it based its order solely on the children’s wishes, and substantial evidence did not otherwise support the court’s order. We do not agree with father’s assertion that the court based its decision solely on the children’s wishes and did not exercise its own judgment. The record contains ample evidence that continued visitation with father would have been detrimental to the children’s physical or emotional well-being. We therefore affirm.

A jury convicted defendant and appellant, Timothy Joseph Tatro, of assaulting his neighbor, G.S., with a deadly weapon, namely, a pipe (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1); count 1), but acquitted defendant of making a criminal threat against G.S. (§ 422, subd. (a); count 2). The court placed defendant on three years’ probation, subject to terms and conditions, including that he serve 270 days in jail.
Defendant appeals, claiming insufficient evidence supports his assault with a deadly weapon conviction. He argues the record contains insufficient evidence that the “pipe,” or similar object he used during the assault, was a deadly weapon “‘capable of producing and likely to produce, death or great bodily injury.’” (People v. Aguilar (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1023, 1029.) He claims the conviction must be reduced to simple assault. (§ 240.) We disagree. Substantial evidence shows the three-foot long, one-inch diameter pipe or similar object was capable of producing, and lik

A jury convicted defendant and appellant, Eric Haro, of attempted second degree robbery after hearing evidence that he demanded money from Arturo Rojas Mier (Rojas), threatened to kill Rojas, and physically attacked Rojas. (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c), 664.) The trial court sentenced defendant to a two-year prison term. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court prejudicially erred when it failed to instruct sua sponte on theft and simple assault, which he contends are lesser included offenses. He also contends the court should have sentenced him to 18 months’ imprisonment rather than two years. We affirm.

Defendant Anthony John Jurado repeatedly punched and kicked a female friend in the face. At Jurado’s direction, defendant Christy Annette Garduno also repeatedly punched the victim in the face. The victim was left with a “shattered” cheekbone and a broken nose, both requiring surgery. Meanwhile, Jurado also threatened to kill the victim and her adult daughter. The motive for the attack was not at all clear. However, Jurado later told the victim’s daughter, “Your mom fucked up,” “I had to beat her ass.” Jurado denied all of this; he testified that the victim went out to buy drugs, and by the time she came back, she had been beaten up.

In this action over a disputed real estate transaction, plaintiff and respondent, VM Residential, LLC (VM Residential), obtained a default judgment against defendant and appellant, “Equity Trust Company Custodian FBO Scott McKhann Traditional IRA” (Equity). As the name might imply, Equity “serves as a passive, self-directed custodian” for an individual retirement account (IRA) owned by Scott McKhann. McKhann, as the owner of the IRA, is responsible for defending this lawsuit, even though Equity is the named defendant. Upon receiving the summons and operative complaint here, Equity mailed the documents to the address it had on file for McKhann. This was an outdated address, however, and McKhann did not receive notice of the operative complaint until too late. He did not have a chance to mount a defense before VM Residential sought entry of Equity’s default and the default judgment. McKhann first learned of the operative complaint when he received notice of the default ju

Victim Lawrence Dion Ables pulled a gun on defendant Charles Ray Robinson and robbed him of cocaine. A day or two later, Ables pulled a gun on defendant again and threatened to kill him. But then, as defendant later put it, “he made a mistake by letting me go.” Defendant got a gun, loaded it, went back to where Ables was, shot him, and killed him. Two of defendant’s shots hit and wounded a bystander.
As a result, defendant was convicted of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a), 189), with two enhancements for personally and intentionally discharging a firearm, causing great bodily injury or death (Pen. Code, § 12022.53, subd. (d)), and sentenced to 105 years to life in prison.