CA Unpub Decisions

Marvin Gaines (appellant) appeals from a suspended sentence and the grant of a three-year term of formal probation following his guilty plea to a single count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of Penal Code section 29800, subdivision (a)(1).
Appellant’s counsel has filed an opening brief in which no issues are raised, and asks this court for an independent review of the record as required by People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Counsel has declared that appellant has been notified that no issues were being raised by counsel on appeal, and that an independent review under Wende instead was being requested. Appellant was also advised of his right personally to file a supplemental brief raising any issues he chooses to bring to this court’s attention. No supplemental brief has been received from appellant.

Marvin Gaines (appellant) appeals from a suspended sentence and the grant of a three-year term of formal probation following his guilty plea to a single count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of Penal Code section 29800, subdivision (a)(1).
Appellant’s counsel has filed an opening brief in which no issues are raised, and asks this court for an independent review of the record as required by People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Counsel has declared that appellant has been notified that no issues were being raised by counsel on appeal, and that an independent review under Wende instead was being requested. Appellant was also advised of his right personally to file a supplemental brief raising any issues he chooses to bring to this court’s attention. No supplemental brief has been received from appellant.

In this dispute over the leadership of a church, plaintiffs Alice Smith and Ellissteen Owens appeal from the trial court’s judgment following an order granting a motion for summary judgment filed by defendants Jonathan L. Green, June Jackson, Pamela Wright, Dorothy Lark, Lori Green, and Larry Robinson. They also appeal from orders vacating discovery sanctions against defendants and releasing interpleaded funds to the church. We affirm.

Defendant Nohely Stephany Roldan was granted probation after she pleaded no contest to second degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 459). She contends that three probation conditions relating to her use of electronic devices are invalid under People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 (Lent), unconstitutionally overbroad, and unconstitutionally vague. We conclude that the probation conditions are unconstitutionally vague and reverse the order for further proceedings.

Defendant William Robert Morris pleaded no contest to unlawful possession of a firearm and several other offenses arising from a search and seizure of him and his car. The trial court imposed an aggregate term of 32 months in state prison.
Prior to the preliminary hearing, Morris moved to suppress the fruits of the search under Penal Code section 1538.5. Based on the testimony of the police at the preliminary hearing, the magistrate denied the motion to suppress and held Morris to answer. Counsel for Morris did not renew the motion to suppress.
Morris now contends his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to renew the motion to suppress. Alternatively, he contends we should review the magistrate’s order denying the motion.

Defendant Julio Cesar Vasquez was convicted of attempted murder for the benefit of a criminal street gang (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 664, 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). On appeal, defendant asserts that the gang enhancement must be stricken because there was not substantial evidence to support it. In addition, he asks that the matter be remanded to the trial court for a hearing pursuant to People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin), because the crime was committed just after his 18th birthday.

Defendant Armando Canchola pleaded no contest to two counts of voluntary manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (a)) pursuant to a negotiated plea that he would receive a maximum of 35 years in prison. The plea agreement also provided that if defendant committed another crime between the time of his plea and the time of sentencing, his maximum sentence would increase to 42 years.

Defendant James Ray Taylor was charged by information with one count of attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664, subd. (a) & 187, subd. (a); count 1) and one count of assault with a deadly weapon, a knife (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count 2). As to both counts, enhancements were alleged for personally inflicting great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) and personal use of a deadly weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). Defendant’s 2003 conviction of section 422 was alleged as a strike (§ 667, subds. (d) & (e)(1)), a prior serious felony (§ 667, subd. (a)(1), and a prison prior (§ 667.5, subd. (a)).

Appellant Felipe Uriostegui Pedroza was convicted by a jury of second degree auto burglary and attempted second degree robbery growing out of two crimes committed during a 15-minute low intensity “crime spree.” The trial judge reduced the

auto burglary to a misdemeanor and Pedroza was placed on formal probation for three years. He was not incarcerated, but was ordered to pay fines, fees, and restitution. He was also ordered to attend 180 Spanish-language self-help meetings and keep a daily journal of his life, to be submitted to the court.
This lenient sentence seems appropriate based upon the circumstances of the crime. Parath Chadha heard his car alarm go off and went outside to investigate. He saw Pedroza stagger down the street and converse with the owner of a nearby white van for about ten seconds. When the van left, Pedroza checked his car and found his phone accessories and cables were missing.

The trial court appointed Mark S. Adams as the receiver of an illegal business alleged to be a public nuisance. John C. Heinl and Kathy A. Heinl, the owners of the property in which the illegal business had been located (the Heinls), sued Adams individually and in his official capacity, and the receivership business he owns, for abusing the receivership process and slandering the title to their property. The court found in favor of the Heinls, but the judgment did not specify that it was rendered against Adams both as an individual and in his official capacity.

Defendant and appellant Citibank, N.A. (Citibank) appealed from the trial court’s order on its petition to compel plaintiff and respondent Sharon McGill to arbitrate her class action claims on an individual basis. The trial court granted the petition as to McGill’s monetary damages and restitution claims, but denied it as to her injunctive relief claims. In an earlier opinion, we reversed the order on the injunctive relief claims and remanded for the court to order all claims to arbitration.
The Supreme Court, however, granted McGill’s petition for review and reversed our judgment because the Court concluded the arbitration provision was unenforceable to the extent it waived McGill’s right to seek public injunctive relief in any forum. In doing so, the Supreme Court identified a potential issue regarding the severability of the waiver provision, and remanded the matter to this court for further proceedings.

Megan O. seeks extraordinary writ review (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (l)(1); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452) of the juvenile court’s order that a section 366.26 hearing be held October 10, 2017. She challenges the court’s refusal to grant her an additional six months of reunification services after it sustained a supplemental petition (§ 387) to remove her then 10-year-old son, Jayden, from her custody for a second time. Megan contends the court erred because she was entitled to further services as a matter of law. Alternatively, she argues the court erred in not exercising its discretion to continue reunification efforts. We deny the petition.

Defendant Ronald Dean Smith appeals his sentence following his entry of a guilty plea to first degree burglary. Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion at sentencing by denying his motion to strike two of his three prior strike convictions pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero). We disagree and affirm the judgment.

Joshua Moses Alvarez appeals from a postjudgment order denying his Penal Code section 851.8, subdivision (c) motion to seal and destroy arrest records related to his plea. We appointed counsel, who subsequently filed a brief requesting we independently review the record for error. (See People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441-442 (Wende).) Alvarez filed his own supplemental letter brief asserting trial court error. After reviewing the record and considering both appellate counsel’s brief and Alvarez’s letter, we affirm the order.