CA Unpub Decisions

Jennifer Lynn Bettencourt (defendant) seeks to appeal from a purported order of the superior court that was entered following a resentencing hearing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.18. We conclude that court made no order or ruling; hence, the appeal must be dismissed.

Defendant and cross-complainant, Sequoia Lake Conference of Young Men’s Christian Associations (SLC), appeals from the postjudgment order awarding plaintiff, Central Valley Young Men’s Christian Camping Association (Central Valley; formerly Central Valley Young Men’s Christian Association, Inc.), attorney fees and costs as the prevailing party. We conclude the trial court abused its discretion in making its award, in that some of the findings on which the award was based are not supported by substantial evidence and the trial court misinterpreted and misapplied case law in ruling on the matter. Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the trial court for a redetermination of the parties’ competing motions for attorney fees.

Plaintiff, Central Valley Young Men’s Christian Association, Inc. (now known as Central Valley Christian Camping, Incorporated; herein Central Valley) was a member of defendant, Sequoia Lake Conference of Young Men’s Christian Associations (now known as Sequoia Lake Conference, a California nonprofit corporation; herein SLC). Central Valley operated camps on real property owned by SLC. SLC removed Central Valley as a member after Central Valley failed to pay its annual conference fees for two years and lost its charter with the national Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA) organization. Central Valley sued SLC to establish that it held an equitable interest in the real property, for reinstatement of its membership in SLC, for an injunction preventing SLC from interfering with its use of the camps it traditionally operated on SLC’s property, and for damages for unjust enrichment. SLC cross-complained for payment of the unpaid conference fees and three other debts.

Appellants Cristobal Rubio and Oscar De Tista appeal, following a bench trial, from their convictions on one count each of participating in a street gang (Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (a)), and the true findings regarding gang enhancements (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)) related to charges to which appellants had previously pled guilty. Appellants contend there was insufficient evidence of their association with the Sureño street gang to support their convictions and enhancements. They also argue the trial court erred when it appointed conflict counsel to investigate whether there were grounds to withdraw their guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Based on evidence that defendant Edward Lemarr Jewell Williams drove from Arizona to California with less than an ounce of marijuana, a jury found him guilty of (among other things) “import[ing]” marijuana, in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11360, subdivision (a) (section 11360(a)).
Defendant contends that “import,” as used in section 11360(a), means to bring in across a national border, not merely a state border. As a fallback argument, he contends that it means that the marijuana must have originated outside California — i.e., that taking marijuana from California into Arizona and then back into California again would not constitute “import[ing]” marijuana.
We disagree. Applying standard principles of statutory construction, we conclude that, if you bring marijuana into California, you are “import[ing]” marijuana, no matter where you may be coming from and no matter where the marijuana ultimately may have come from. Accordingly, we will affirm.

After hours of drinking alcohol together, defendant Anthony Albert Garcia beat to death the victim, Steven Markley, using his fists and a baseball bat. Defendant admitted his conduct during a series of police interviews conducted while he was hospitalized, while still intoxicated and being treated with morphine and other drugs. All of defendant’s arguments on appeal involve the evidence about defendant being affected by alcohol and drugs when he was interviewed.

Defendant and appellant Aaron Alexander Hernandez pled guilty to one felony count of receiving stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a); count 1), specifically cash and identification cards. The trial court imposed a low term sentence of 16 months in state prison, doubled to 32 months for an admitted strike prior offense. (§§ 667, subds. (c) & (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1).)
After California voters later passed Proposition 47, which converted receipt of stolen property into a misdemeanor where the value of the stolen property does not exceed $950 (§ 496, subd. (a)), Hernandez petitioned for resentencing (§ 1170.18, subd. (a)). The trial court denied his petition because Hernandez failed to show the value of the stolen property did not exceed $950, and we affirmed on the same basis.

Appellant Miguel Rosales was convicted of possession of a controlled substance in 2000 and was sentenced to prison. In 2004, Rosales was convicted of kidnapping, carjacking, and vehicle theft with a prior. The prison term that Rosales served in connection with his 2000 conviction formed the basis of a prior prison term enhancement (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)) imposed on Rosales in connection with his 2004 conviction and sentence.

A jury found defendant Jerry D. Turner guilty of first degree burglary with a person present. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in refusing to find that the prosecutor failed to timely disclose an original sketch of defendant (rather than a copy) and by refusing to instruct the jury on late discovery. We affirm.

Plaintiff and appellant Tony R. Low, an incarcerated person representing himself in propia persona, appeals from a judgment dismissing his claims against various employees of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (Corrections) without leave to amend on the grounds that he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The dismissed complaint raised allegations that Low was improperly denied outdoor exercise and subjected to an unnecessarily long period in mechanical restraints. While Low raises various claims on appeal, we reverse on the basis that his administrative remedies were sufficiently exhausted to allow these core allegations to proceed.

Following a bench trial, the juvenile court found the minor, E.S., had committed two acts of misdemeanor battery. The juvenile court placed the minor on informal probation and ordered her to serve 40 hours of community service.
On appeal, the minor contends the evidence was insufficient to support the court’s finding that she committed two acts of misdemeanor battery because there was insufficient evidence that she did not act in self-defense. We conclude the finding is supported by substantial evidence in the record. Accordingly, we affirm.

Defendant Sidney Eugene Davis appeals from the trial court’s denial of his Penal Code section 1170.18 application to redesignate his conviction for grand theft from a person (§ 487, subd. (c)) from a felony to a misdemeanor. He contends the trial court erred in finding his crime ineligible for resentencing. We agree and shall reverse and remand for additional proceedings on the application.

In this consolidated appeal, we consider defendant’s appeal from the trial court’s denial of various petitions related to the resentencing provisions of Propositions 36 and 47 filed by defendant Roberto Chaidez. Finding defendant’s claims already rejected by this court in a prior appeal of defendant or raising matters not cognizable on appeal, we shall affirm.

Plaintiff David A. Ochsner appeals from the trial court’s entry of judgment after it granted defendant Deutsche Bank National Trust Company’s (Deutsche Bank) motion for summary judgment on Ochsner’s complaint challenging the nonjudicial foreclosure sale of his residence. Ochsner argues a declaration submitted in support of Deutsche Bank’s motion did not lay a proper foundation to show that documents establishing the chain of title qualified for the business records exception to the hearsay rule. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Ochsner’s evidentiary objections because the relevant documents were subject to judicial notice and not hearsay as to their operative facts. Ochsner also raises various arguments to support his wrongful foreclosure claim that have been rejected by courts of appeal, including our own, but he fails to acknowledge the authorities adverse to his position. We affirm.