CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Bryan White appeals his conviction for felony indecent exposure. He contends there is not substantial evidence to support his conviction and the trial court prejudicially erred in failing to sua sponte instruct on the lesser included offense of misdemeanor indecent exposure. We affirm the judgment.

Petitioner-respondent (wife) and respondent-appellant (husband) were in the process of marriage dissolution when wife filed a petition in the trial court for a restraining order under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA) (Fam. Code, § 6200 et seq.). The trial court denied an initial temporary restraining order pending a hearing on the matter. After a hearing, the trial court issued a two-year domestic violence restraining order and awarded $3,000 in attorney fees to wife’s attorney. Husband, an attorney, appeals in propria persona.

Following a jury trial, defendant James Coker was convicted of various felonies and related enhancements arising out of five separate incidents of domestic abuse involving his spouse, Heather, and a girlfriend, Crystal. The trial court sentenced defendant to 25 years in prison. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court prejudicially erred by (1) admitting two audio recordings of 911 calls made by Heather, (2) admitting evidence that he had committed a prior uncharged assault against another woman, Kelly, (3) admitting evidence that he had been convicted of prior acts of domestic violence against two other women, Kristie and Erin, and (4) denying his request for a mistrial. Finding no error, we affirm.

Defendant Jason Lee Rush appeals following conviction on three counts of child molestation against a 12-year-old victim for whom he was a grandfather figure, including: two counts of lewd or lascivious act with a child under 14 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a); counts one & two) and one count of lewd or lascivious act with a child under 14 by use of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of bodily injury (§ 288, subd. (b)(1); count three). He was sentenced to eight years in prison.

In a prior writ proceeding, petitioner Mark M. (petitioner), who was then designated as a prospective adoptive parent for dependent children V.S. and I.S., challenged a juvenile court order removing the children from petitioner’s home. The juvenile court determined removal was in the children’s best interest, and we upheld the court’s ruling. (Mark M. v. Superior Court (Apr. 13, 2017, B278474) [nonpub. opn.] (Mark M. I).) Before our remittitur issued—and without notice to petitioner—the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) asked the juvenile court to modify the findings it made when ordering removal so as to make an express finding it had not made: that petitioner sexually molested M.M., another minor who previously had been in his care. The juvenile court obliged without hearing from petitioner, who was unaware of the Department’s request. Having now discovered what occurred, petitioner prays for a peremptory writ directing t

The juvenile court sustained a Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1) petition as to then 16-year-old A.C., finding his parents placed him at substantial risk for serious physical harm based on the child’s uncontrolled diabetes. A.C. remained with his parents under the supervision of the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS.) Only father appealed.
Dependency jurisdiction was terminated at the six-month review hearing. (§ 364.) We invited the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing whether the appeal was moot and to address the Supreme Court’s recent decision, In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622 (R.T.). DCFS asserts the appeal is moot; father disagrees. As a resolution on the merits would have no practical effect and would not afford father any effective relief, we dismiss the appeal. (People v. Gregerson (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 306, 321.)

A jury convicted defendant Jay Jay Lee of attempted murder. (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 187, subd. (a).) The jury found defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury and personally used a deadly weapon. (§§ 12022.7, subd. (a); 12022, subd. (b)(1).) The trial court found true but then struck a prior separate prison term allegation. (§ 667.5, subd. (b).) The trial court sentenced defendant to 13 years in state prison.
Defendant’s appointed counsel filed an opening brief in accordance with People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 requesting this court to independently review the record to determine if there are any arguable issues. On August 22, 2017, we gave notice to defendant that appointed appellate counsel had failed to find any arguable issues and defendant had 30 days within which to submit by brief or letter any grounds of appeal, contentions, or arguments he wished this court to consider. Defendant did not file a brief or letter. We affirm.

The juvenile court in this case assumed jurisdiction over a baby boy (C.C.) and his older brother (S.C.) based on evidence S.O. (Mother) shook C.C. and caused him to suffer a subdural hematoma (i.e., bleeding between the brain and skull). The court later terminated jurisdiction over both children with a final custody order giving the boys’ father, G.C. (Father), sole legal and physical custody of the children. We consider whether Mother can now challenge the final custody order despite acquiescing to its terms during the juvenile court proceedings.

In 2015, Lydia G. (mother) was involuntarily hospitalized for a week in a mental health institution, where she experienced hallucinations and was diagnosed as suffering from depression. A year later she threw a hairbrush at her daughter, A.G., age six, who had failed to get ready for school, striking her on the nose and causing a bruise. Six months later, the juvenile court determined, on no other evidence—e.g., no prior or subsequent lapse, psychological evaluation, home study, or positive drug test—that mother’s mental illness led to A.G.’s injury and presented an ongoing danger to both A.G. and her younger sister. The court declared the children to be wards of the court, removed them from mother’s custody, and ordered reunification services.
We conclude no evidence suggests the hairbrush incident resulted from mother’s mental illness or indicates she poses a risk of serious physical harm to her children. Accordingly, we reverse.

The trial court ordered Nadia Dickinson to pay former spouse Gino Aquino $15,000 in attorney fees pursuant to Family Code sections 2030 and 2032. The award was not based on Dickinson’s income or assets, but on the trial court’s assumption she had the ability to borrow the money to make the payment. We reverse.

Defendant Anthony Tarkington appeals from an order entered following the denial of his petition to seal his arrest records under Penal Code section 851.8. Following our independent examination of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), we conclude no arguable issues exist. Accordingly, we affirm.

A jury convicted defendant and appellant Edwin R. Ruano of one count of first degree murder, in violation of Penal Code, section 187. The jury also found true a special circumstance, pursuant to section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17), that Ruano committed the murder while he was engaged in the commission of an attempted robbery. The trial court sentenced Ruano to life in prison without the possibility of parole.
Ruano contends: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the finding of a special circumstance; (2) the trial court erred by allowing the prosecution to introduce evidence of Ruano’s prior thefts in order to establish that he intended to rob the victim; (3) his trial attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to request a jury instruction on voluntary intoxication; (4) the trial court erred by allowing witnesses to testify improperly regarding their opinions and conclusions; (5) the trial court erred by advising the jury that the case did not invol

A jury found defendant and appellant Joshua Kane Smith guilty of multiple serious felonies, including torture, assault, and causing injury to a spouse. The jury also found true special allegations that defendant personally used a firearm and inflicted great bodily injury. Defendant was sentenced to a state prison term of 100 years to life, plus 44 years.
Defendant contends the trial court committed prejudicial error in the admission of prior acts of domestic violence against a former girlfriend, and abused its discretion in denying his motion for a mistrial due to prosecutorial misconduct. We reject both contentions. Defendant also raises three sentencing errors. We conclude one has merit and strike one 5-year enhancement imposed pursuant to Penal Code section 667, subdivision (a). We otherwise affirm the judgment of conviction in its entirety.

A jury convicted Cory Hugo Osbourne (Osbourne) of attempted second degree robbery against one victim (Pen. Code, § 213, subd. (b) ) and assault with a deadly weapon (a knife) against a second victim (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)). The trial court sentenced Osbourne to two years in prison on each count, the terms to run concurrently.
On appeal, Osbourne contends principally that the sentence for his assault conviction should have been stayed by the trial court pursuant to section 654 because that offense was committed as part of the same course of conduct as his attempted robbery conviction. We disagree. Section 654 does not apply where, as here, there are multiple victims of a continuing course of conduct.