CA Unpub Decisions

A jury convicted defendant and appellant John Jaramillo of one count each of assault with a firearm, possession of ammunition, and possession of a firearm by a felon. Defendant contends the trial court committed evidentiary errors and abused its discretion in denying his motion brought pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero).

Defendants and appellants Robert G. Bernhoft and The Bernhoft Law Firm, S.C., challenge the trial court’s denial of Bernhoft’s petition to vacate an arbitration award in favor of plaintiff and respondent Albert Bront, as well as the trial court’s order confirming the arbitration award. While the arbitration was pending, Bront filed a bankruptcy petition in which he claimed not to have any valuable unliquidated claims. Bernhoft contends that Bront, by taking inconsistent positions in bankruptcy court and in his arbitration proceedings, attempted to fraudulently claim funds to which he was not entitled. Bernhoft argues that the trial court erred when it found that it lacked the authority to exercise equitable power to vacate the arbitration award under a theory of judicial estoppel. We disagree with Bernhoft’s position. Nevertheless, we reverse the judgment of the trial court on the ground that the claim against Bernhoft belonged to the bankruptcy estate, and that Bront lac

Plaintiffs and appellants Cindy Park and Richard Weatherman (Appellants) appeal from a judgment against them following a successful demurrer and a motion for judgment on the pleadings that the trial court granted without leave to amend. Appellants borrowed $252,000 in 2005. The loan was secured by a trust deed on their home. Defendant and respondent Bank of America, N.A. (B of A) was the servicer for the loan. Defendant and respondent Bank of New York Mellon (Mellon), as the trustee of a loan trust, was the successor in interest to the original lender, America’s Wholesale Lender (AWL). The trust deed identified Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS) as AWL’s nominee and the beneficiary of the trust deed.

After plaintiff and respondent Sabine Kaneko (plaintiff) renewed a nearly 20-year-old judgment obtained by her deceased mother against defendant and appellant Toshio Masui (defendant), defendant moved to vacate the renewal on the ground that the judgment had expired and plaintiff lacked standing to renew it. The trial court denied defendant’s motion, concluding plaintiff’s renewal did not run afoul of applicable provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure. We consider whether the trial court’s ruling was correct.

Anne Kihagi, 1263 North Crescent, LLC, and Aquat 009, LLC (collectively Kihagi) appeals the trial court judgment in favor of City of West Hollywood (City) finding that Kihagi violated her settlement agreement with the City and permanently enjoining her from terminating tenancies at 1263–1267-1/2 North Crescent Heights Boulevard in West Hollywood. The trial court also awarded attorney fees to the City. We affirm the trial court’s determination that Kihagi violated the settlement agreement. However, because the permanent injunction in its current state is unenforceable, we reverse the trial court’s imposition of the injunction. Given this holding, we also reverse the trial court’s attorney fee award.

A family court adjudicating a marital dissolution found that a husband’s business no longer held an interest in its sole venture, and on that basis declined to award the wife any compensation for that business. After the dissolution became final in 2007, the husband sued his business partner for not splitting the venture’s profits with him. Once wife learned that husband had not been truthful during the dissolution case regarding his continuing interest in the venture, wife (1) moved to reopen the dissolution case, and (2) filed a civil lawsuit against husband, his partner, and his partner’s spouse. The civil suit eventually went to trial in 2015, and was dismissed. Wife appeals. We conclude that the civil suit was properly dismissed, but that wife’s motion to reopen the dissolution case was properly filed and remains to be litigated. We remand the dissolution case to the family court for further proceedings.

B.M. (Mother), mother of four-year-old C.H., appeals from the juvenile court’s orders denying her supplemental petition under Welfare and Institutions Code, section 388 (388 petition) and terminating her and C.H.’s father D.H.’s (Father) parental rights to C.H. She contends: (1) the court abused its discretion in denying her 388 petition; and (2) the “beneficial parental relationship” exception to termination of parental rights applied. We reject the contentions and affirm the orders.

This appeal presents a sad tale of parents who, through no fault of their own, had a child born with several serious congenital heart defects. Nicole M. was removed from the custody of Ronald M. (Father) and Evelyn M. (Mother) when they proved unable to meet her complex medical needs after surgery. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300, subd. (b).) By the six-month review hearing, Father and Mother had failed to make progress with their case plans and the juvenile court terminated reunification services and scheduled a section 366.26 hearing. Father filed a section 388 petition, seeking reunification or renewed services based on Nicole’s stabilized medical condition and his recent case plan progress. At a combined hearing, the juvenile court denied Father’s section 388 petition and terminated the parental rights of both parents. Father appeals, arguing the court abused its discretion in denying his section 388 petition because he demonstrated a change in circumstances and that re

A jury convicted Treshawn Rogers of first degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211 (Count 1)), and first degree burglary (§ 459 (Count 2)). The trial court sentenced Rogers to six years for the robbery conviction, and stayed a six-year sentence for the burglary conviction (§ 654). The court ordered Rogers to pay a restitution fine of $3,600 (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)).
Rogers appeals. First, he contends the prosecution relied on “a legally inadequate theory” of burglary. Second, Rogers argues there was insufficient evidence of his intent to steal. Third, Rogers contends the court improperly calculated the amount of the restitution fine.

Defendant Richard Thomas Stobaugh appeals from his commitment to the State Department of State Hospitals (DSH) after a jury found he was a sexually violent predator. Defendant contends the trial court’s commitment order violated his due process rights because no substantial evidence supported a finding of current dangerousness due to a mental disorder or serious difficulty controlling his behavior. He also contends the commitment order is not supported by sufficient evidence because the experts relied on hearsay statements not independently proven in formulating their opinions. We affirm.

Matthew Graney appeals from an order denying his petition for a writ of mandate, which Graney had filed with respect to a decision terminating his employment with the University of California San Francisco Police Department. He contends (1) the administrative findings and decision to uphold the termination of his employment were based exclusively on hearsay evidence and unauthenticated documents; (2) the trial court employed an incorrect legal standard in reviewing the evidence; and (3) there was insufficient evidence to uphold the administrative decision. We will affirm the order.

Proposition 47, passed by the voters in November 2014, reclassified certain nonserious, nonviolent offenses from felonies to misdemeanors. The measure also enacted Penal Code section 1170.18, which permits offenders to petition the superior court to redesignate their felony convictions and reduce their sentences based on the new misdemeanor classification.
Appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of his petition to strike a one-year enhancement for a prior prison term based on a felony conviction that had subsequently been reduced to a misdemeanor pursuant to Proposition 47.
Concluding that the trial court erred, we shall reverse the judgment and remand the matter with directions to grant appellant’s petition to strike the enhancement.

The issue in this appeal is whether the trial court properly performed its gatekeeper duty in the default process by ensuring that plaintiff Rosemary Court Properties, LLC (Rosemary Court) alleged a proper cause of action. Rosemary Court filed an unlawful detainer action against defendants Houri Parsi and Wade Trevor Walker and later obtained entry of default and a clerk’s judgment when defendants failed to pay the court filing fee and, as a result, had their answer stricken. Within days of entry of this default judgment, Houri Parsi moved for the trial court to vacate it. She based her motion in part on the contention that Rosemary Court failed to state an unlawful detainer cause of action because its allegations turned on the unsupported legal conclusion that Parsi had previously terminated her tenancy. The trial court and the appellate division of the superior court rejected Parsi’s contention. We granted Parsi’s petition to transfer this case to this court. We agree wit

Defendant Robert Chavez was convicted of two counts of petty theft under Penal Code section 490.2 for taking merchandise from a Fry’s Electronics store on May 23, 2015, and May 25, 2015. On appeal, he seeks reversal of the conviction based on the May 23 theft. His sole contention is that the court erred in denying his motion under California v. Trombetta (1984) 467 U.S. 479 (Trombetta) because the police failed to preserve an allegedly exculpatory surveillance video of the May 23 incident. We affirm.