CA Unpub Decisions

In this appeal, George Holland, Jr., plaintiff below, seeks to challenge two trial court rulings: an order granting defendants’ motion to vacate the entry of defaults and a default judgment against them, and an order dismissing Holland’s complaint under statutes mandating dismissal of a complaint not served within three years of its filing. Holland’s first challenge is beyond our jurisdiction to consider because he failed to appeal from the court’s ruling. Holland’s second challenge is wholly without merit. We therefore affirm.

Following a jury trial, defendant Jaime Marcelo was found guilty of the forcible rape, statutory rape, pimping, and pandering of L.O. and not guilty of human trafficking and false imprisonment of the same victim. He was sentenced to eight years eight months in state prison and timely appeals. We modify the judgment to correct the amount of the penalty assessments imposed on each of the three sex offender fines and, as so modified, affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted defendant Johnathan Walker of first-degree murder of Michael Ross (Pen. Code, § 187 ). The jury also found true an allegation that defendant personally used a firearm during the commission of the murder (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). At a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true an allegation that defendant suffered one prior serious and strike conviction within the meaning of the Three Strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (a)(1), (b)-(i); 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)). The court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 80 years to life in state prison, consisting of 25 years to life for first-degree murder (doubled to 50 years to life under the Three Strikes law), plus consecutive sentences of 25 years to life for the firearm-use sentence enhancement and five years for the prior serious conviction. On appeal defendant asserts as errors the denial of his motion pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 and People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 (Wheeler) (Bats

Pro se appellant Craig Gold appeals after the trial court sustained a demurrer and dismissed his claims against the City and County of San Francisco (“the City”), which were based on his allegation that the City erroneously refused to refund his permit fees after revoking his license to operate a food truck. Because the City enjoys immunity to suit for claims arising from discretionary licensing and permitting decisions, and because Gold failed to overcome that immunity by identifying a mandatory duty owed to him by the City, we conclude the trial court properly sustained the City’s demurrer and did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend.

This appeal concerns the scope of the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act (Cal. Const., art. II, § 10, subd. (a)) (Proposition 47). At issue is whether Proposition 47 applies to the offenses of unlawfully driving or taking a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)) and buying or receiving a stolen motor vehicle (Pen. Code, § 496d, subd. (a)) . We conclude that it does not apply to either. We also reject defendant Brent Orman’s contention that the trial court was required to grant him leave to amend his Proposition 47 petitions despite his admitted failure to carry his burden to demonstrate entitlement to relief. We shall affirm the orders disposing of defendant’s Proposition 47 petitions without prejudice to defendant filing subsequent petitions supported by evidence entitling him to relief.

Appellant E.V. seeks review of an order requiring her to pay child support for her daughter S.E.G. to the Monterey County Department of Child Support Services (DCSS) on behalf of S.E.G.’s father, C.G. Appellant contends that she was improperly denied an evidentiary hearing by the commissioner whose recommendations the court adopted in its order, and who thus deprived her of due process and the opportunity to attend mediation on issues pertaining to custody of S.E.G. We find no error and must therefore affirm the order.

Following a bifurcated jury trial, defendant Glen Ray Maxwell was found guilty of violating Health and Safety Code section 11351.5 (possession for sale of cocaine base) and Penal Code section 4573 (bringing a controlled substance, cocaine base, into a jail) Subsequently, the jury found an alleged prior robbery conviction to be true, and it also found true that defendant had prior convictions of drug offenses (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11350, 11351.5, 11352). The trial court sentenced defendant to a total term of eight years under the Three Strikes law (§§ 667, subd. (b)- (i); 1170.12).

A jury convicted defendant Jerome G. Collins of possession of child pornography. The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on three years’ probation. Defendant appealed, challenging two evidentiary rulings, five probation conditions, and an order requiring him to pay attorney fees. In People v. Collins (Oct. 6, 2015, H040380) [nonpub. opn.], a divided panel of this court rejected defendant’s challenges to the evidentiary rulings, ordered the modification of four of defendant’s probation conditions, and ordered the vacation of an attorney fee order for insufficient evidence of defendant’s present ability to pay. Among the probation conditions this court ordered modified were sex offender probation conditions imposed pursuant to Penal Code section 1203.067, subdivisions (b)(3) and (b)(4) , which required defendant to participate in polygraph examinations and to waive the psychotherapist-patient privilege.

Plaintiff and respondent Bryan Blain sued defendant and appellant PresbiBio, LLC for wrongful termination. Defendant made a motion to compel plaintiff to arbitrate the case based on an arbitration agreement plaintiff signed as a condition of his employment. The court denied the motion, finding defendant had not provided sufficient evidence to show the existence of an employment or an arbitration agreement between plaintiff and defendant.

Arbitech appeals from an order denying its second motion to compel arbitration of a former employee’s wage dispute. The court denied Arbitech’s first motion after it determined the parties’ arbitration agreement, executed in 2013, was unenforceable because it contained substantive and procedurally unconscionable provisions. Arbitech did not appeal that ruling. After waiting several months, Arbitech again sought to compel arbitration based on what it believed was a valid back-up arbitration agreement executed in 2008. The court denied the motion on the grounds of waiver. Finding no error, we affirm the order.

A jury convicted Arnold Eduardo Martinez of attempted kidnapping to commit rape (Pen. Code, §§ 209, subd. (b)(1), 664 [count 1; victim C.G.], all statutory citations are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated), assault with intent to commit rape (§ 220, subd. (a) [count 2; victim C.G.]), kidnapping to commit rape (§ 209, subd. (b)(1) [count 3; victim S.T.]), assault with intent to commit rape (§ 220, subd. (a) [count 4; victim S.T.]), kidnapping to commit rape while personally inflicting great bodily injury (§§ 209, subd. (b)(1), 12022.7, subd. (a)) [count 5; victim L.N.]), assault with intent to commit rape while personally inflicting great bodily injury (§§ 220, subd. (a), 12022.8 [count 6; victim L.N.]), battery with serious bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d) [count 7; victim L.N.], and false personation (§ 529, subd. (a)(3)). Martinez challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions involving S.T. (counts 3 & 4). We conclude substantial evidence

Plaintiff Peggy Rosen (Rosen) claimed life insurance proceeds after her husband passed away. Defendant Pacific Life Insurance Company (Pacific Life) denied the claim on the ground the policy had lapsed for lack of payment. Rosen sued, arguing she, as the beneficiary, should have been given notice before the policy was terminated. The court entered summary judgment in favor of Pacific Life, finding Rosen was not entitled to notice. Rosen appealed.
The sole issue on appeal is whether Rosen was entitled to notice of the pending lapse as an “other person having an interest in the individual life insurance policy” under Insurance Code section 10113.71, subdivision (b)(1). We conclude she was not and affirm the judgment.

Excess insurer General Security Indemnity Company of Arizona (General Security) filed a motion to compel arbitration of claims brought against it by its insureds Lennar Corporation, Lennar Homes of California, and Lennar Sales Corporation (collectively, Lennar). The trial court denied the motion on the grounds that, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2, subdivision (c) (section 1281.2(c)), the existence of other litigation between Lennar and excess insurer Interstate Fire and Casualty Company (Interstate) relating to the same claims created a possibility of inconsistent results. We affirm for the following reasons.
First, General Security failed to prove the existence of a valid arbitration agreement between it and Lennar. Second, section 1281.2(c) was not preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act, and was applicable in this case. Finally, the trial court did not err in finding that under section 1281.2(c), the motion to compel arbitration should be denied.

This case turns on the distinction between a consensual encounter and a detention for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. It arose out of a contact that occurred between appellant and the police early one morning in the City of Stanton. There is no dispute the statements appellant made during the contact provided reasonable suspicion to believe he was involved in criminal activity. The only question is whether the police had already detained appellant by the time he made those statements. We think not. Because the police did not detain appellant until after they had reasonable suspicion to do so, the trial court properly denied appellant’s motion to suppress, and we affirm the judgment against him.