CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Jonna Lynn Johnson was placed on probation after a jury convicted her of robbery. On appeal, her primary contention is that the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct in closing argument by disparaging the defense. Although we reject that claim, we agree with Johnson the judgment must be modified to correct two sentencing errors. In all other respects, we affirm.

The facts underlying this appeal are relatively straightforward. Universal Molding Company (Universal), through its principal, Dominick Baione, hired The Reynolds Group (Reynolds), an environmental consulting firm, to help it with contamination issues on a piece of Fullerton real estate purchased by Universal. Reynolds performed some testing and remediation services on the property. Universal paid for some of the services, but not all of them. Reynolds sued Universal for the unpaid fees. After a court trial, Universal was adjudged to still owe Reynolds $156,209. Universal has appealed.

Defendant Lap Phuong Nguyen appeals from an order denying a petition for resentencing of his conviction for violating Penal Code section 484e, subdivision (d) (unlawful acquisition of access card information) as a misdemeanor.
This is our second opinion in this case. In our first opinion we held that the trial court correctly denied the petition and we affirmed because section 484e was not listed in the relevant statute as one of the felonies for which resentencing could be sought. (People v. Nguyen (Oct. 14, 2016, G051524) [nonpub. opn.], review granted Dec. 21, 2016, S238410.) The California Supreme Court granted defendant’s petition for review, and later transferred the case back to this court for reconsideration in light of People v. Romanowski (2017) 2 Cal.5th 903 (Romanowski). We now reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Andrew B. (father) seeks an extraordinary writ from the juvenile court’s orders issued at a contested six-month review hearing (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.21, subd. (e)(1)) terminating reunification services and setting a section 366.26 hearing as to his now one-year-old son, S.B. Father contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by setting the section 366.26 hearing without ensuring he was provided visitation and in approving S.B.’s out-of-state placement. We deny the petition.

This is appellant Harvinder Singh Gill’s second appeal from the judgment. Appellant pleaded nolo contendere to sexual battery (Pen. Code, § 243.4, subd. (a)). At sentencing, the trial court treated appellant’s objections to the requirement that he register as a sex offender (§ 290) as an oral motion to withdraw his plea. After reviewing the plea colloquy with appellant, the court concluded appellant had voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently entered into his plea and denied the motion. The court then sentenced appellant according to the plea bargain and appellant received a suspended sentence with 180 days of custody split between county jail and a work program.

Defendant Danny Wade Crain appeals from the October 3, 2016, order terminating his probation and imposing a previously suspended six-year prison term in case No. 6559, and imposing a concurrent four-year term in case No. 32665. Defendant contends statements made by the trial court presiding over the probation revocation hearing indicate it prejudged the case, thus abusing its discretion and denying him due process. We affirm.

Counsel for defendant and appellant, Tammy Sue Holloway, filed a petition for reclassification of her conviction from a felony to a misdemeanor pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.18, which the court denied. On appeal, defendant contends the court erred in denying her petition. We affirm.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant Gary Richard Pomares pled guilty in 2007 to receiving a stolen vehicle (Pen. Code, § 496d, subd. (a) ; count 1). The court sentenced defendant to two years in state prison. After enactment of Proposition 47 (§ 1170.18), defendant filed a Proposition 47 application for reduction of his felony conviction to misdemeanor theft (§ 490.2). The trial court found him ineligible for relief and denied the application. Defendant appeals, arguing that the court erred in not reducing his felony conviction to misdemeanor theft. We affirm on the ground a section 496d, subdivision (a) conviction is not eligible for Proposition 47 relief.

As to the second contention, the record is sufficient to meet Steven’s burden of demonstrating prejudice. Prejudice is shown if there is a reasonable chance that the outcome would have been more favorable to the appellant in the absence of the error. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) A “reasonable chance” means merely “more than an abstract possibility.” (College Hospital, Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 715.) The record on appeal includes a forensic accounting, filed with the trial court on February 2, 2015, by the interim successor trustee appointed by the court, which appears to state that the trust estate was then valued at approximately $1.5 million. This is sufficient to show a reasonable chance that Steven’s one-third share of the trust estate and of any other assets Lois may have possessed outside of the trust would exceed the amount of the surcharge. As William states in his answer to the second petition for rehearing, the actual va

Defendant was convicted of numerous financial and theft-related crimes and sentenced to prison in 2011. He appealed, raising various issues, including challenges to the sentence imposed. In a published opinion (People v. DeVaughn (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1092), we affirmed his convictions and agreed with some of the sentencing challenges, remanding the matter to the trial court with directions to strike the terms imposed on counts 18, 19, 20, 21, and 33, along with the enhancement pursuant to Penal Code section 12022.6, subdivision (a)(2), as to count 10. We also directed the court to stay the sentences for counts 12, 29, 38 and 46 pursuant to Penal Code section 654, impose a consecutive term of eight months (one-third the middle term) for count 2, and to run a concurrent two-year term for count 23. Finally, we directed the court to amend the abstract of judgment to reflect those changes, and to recalculate the total sentence.

One day, defendant Kenoth Raymond Bishop started acting aggressively toward people at his apartment complex; he tried to punch a neighbor, and he shoved the apartment manager. The police were called. One officer spotted defendant and ordered him to stop. He replied, “Come and get me. I will bash your fucking head in.” Then he walked into his apartment.
As a result, a jury found defendant guilty of:
Count 1: Resisting an executive officer by means of threat or violence. (Pen. Code, § 69.)
Counts 2 and 3: Battery. (Pen. Code, § 242.)
Count 4: Resisting a peace officer. (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1).)
The trial court sentenced defendant to three years in jail on count 1; it also sentenced him to 180 days on counts 2 and 3 and one year on count 4, all to be served concurrently. It then suspended this sentence and placed defendant on formal probation for three years.

Defendant Marquise Jamaal McCook appeals from his convictions for robbery, conspiracy to commit robbery, and possession of a firearm by a felon, contending: (1) his convictions were based on uncorroborated accomplice testimony; (2) the trial court prejudicially erred by permitting the prosecution to admit belatedly disclosed evidence; and (3) his trial attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to independently discover the undisclosed evidence earlier. We find no reversible error and, therefore, we affirm.

Todd L. and Candice C. appeal orders terminating their parental rights in the juvenile dependency case of their minor daughters Taylor C., T.L., and Tatum L. They contend the juvenile court erred by determining that the beneficial parent-child relationship and sibling relationship exceptions to adoption did not apply to T.L. and Tatum. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i) & (v).) We disagree and affirm.

This appeal arises out of a dispute between insurers over the effect of their respective other insurance or excess insurance policy clauses. Plaintiff and appellant Sequoia Insurance Company (Sequoia) provided a defense to Full Spectrum Management, Inc. (Spectrum), which was named as a defendant in an underlying personal injury lawsuit seeking damages against Spectrum for its allegedly negligent acts or omissions during its property management of an apartment building. Sequoia undertook Spectrum's defense in that action under its commercial general liability (CGL) policy issued to the owners of the apartment building. The Sequoia policy also named as insureds the owners' retained property managers, such as Spectrum.