CA Unpub Decisions

A jury convicted Michael Crook of first degree murder and found true firearm and gang enhancements. In a previous appeal, we vacated the sentence and remanded for a retrial of prior conviction allegations because the record did not establish there was a voluntary and intelligent admission of the prior conviction. On remand, Crook admitted the prior conviction allegations and the trial court again imposed a sentence. In the instant appeal, Crook argues the trial court erred in imposing a consecutive determinate term pursuant to Penal Code section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(C), since Crook was also sentenced to a 25-years-to-life term for first degree murder. The People concede this was error. We agree and modify the sentence.

Plaintiffs and appellants Califco, LLC, and Elshir Enterprises, LP (Elshir), challenge the trial court’s order awarding contractual attorney fees in favor of defendants and respondents Josh Kientz and Christopher Rosas. Kientz and Rosas formed a company called The Office Partners, LLC (TOP) to operate a restaurant in West Hollywood. TOP leased space in a building that plaintiffs owned and managed. When the restaurant failed, plaintiffs sued Kientz, Rosas, and TOP for unpaid rent and other damages. After a bench trial, the trial court awarded damages to plaintiffs as against TOP, but found that Kientz and Rosas were not personally liable. Plaintiffs contend that the trial court awarded excessive attorney fees to Kientz and Rosas because most of defense counsel’s resources were expended on the unsuccessful defense of TOP, rather than the successful defense of Kientz and Rosas. We affirm.

A.C. (Mother) appeals from an order terminating her parental rights and setting adoption as the permanent plan for her daughter, C.C. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.) Mother contends adoption is not the appropriate plan because the beneficial parental relationship exception applies. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) We affirm.

Father, I.E., appeals from an order sustaining dependency jurisdiction over his infant daughter, E.E., pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a), (b) and (j), and a disposition order removing her from his physical custody. The court found Father’s physical abuse of E.E.’s half-siblings put the infant at substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm. Father contends there was no substantial evidence to support jurisdiction or the disposition order, because, at the time the court made the orders, he had completed a parenting class and was engaged in individual counseling to address anger management issues. We disagree and affirm.

Father, Miguel A., challenges the juvenile court’s order sustaining dependency jurisdiction over his infant son, Michael A., based on Father’s domestic violence against Mother, Maria R. Father contends there is no substantial evidence that Michael was at risk of suffering serious physical harm, because the one documented incident of domestic violence between him and Mother took place over a year before the jurisdictional hearing. We disagree and affirm.

On May 16, 2016, defendant and appellant Roberto Escobar Chavez was charged by information with two counts of continuous sexual abuse on a child under 14 years of age. (Pen. Code, § 288.5, subd. (a).) It was also specially alleged defendant’s offenses were committed against more than one victim. (§ 667.61, subds. (b), (c)(9), (e)(4).)
The charges arose from multiple lewd acts by defendant against his stepdaughter (K.G.) when she was between approximately 9 and 15 years of age, and multiple lewd acts with his daughter (M.C.) when she was between 9 and 15 years of age. Defendant lived with both girls, as well as K.G.’s mother and brother. The wrongful conduct against both minor girls included sexual intercourse.

Defendant Jimmy James Jackson (defendant) admits he intended to steal from a department store when he rolled a shopping cart full of merchandise out its front door. After a store employee stopped him just outside the door, defendant slapped away the employee’s hand and pushed past the employee with his shoulder so he could continue on with the shopping cart and merchandise unimpeded. We are asked to decide whether there was substantial evidence that defendant used force or fear to steal the merchandise—such evidence is required for the taking to constitute robbery—and whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant’s Romero motion at sentencing.

Defendant John Robert Castillo appeals from an order denying his petition to reclassify his felony conviction for receiving stolen property as a misdemeanor, as allowed in Penal Code section 1170.18, subdivision (f), which was enacted as part of Proposition 47. As relevant here, Proposition 47 allows a defendant who has completed his or her sentence for a felony violation of section 496, subdivision (a) (receiving stolen property), and has not suffered a separate disqualifying conviction, to petition the sentencing court for an order reclassifying the prior conviction as a misdemeanor upon a showing that the value of the stolen property did not exceed $950. (§ 1170.18, subd. (f).)

A jury convicted Kuriyan Dickinson of assault of Steven Leoni with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1) ; count 1) and assault of Osama Miro by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4); count 3). The jury found true the allegation that he inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) on both counts. The trial court sentenced him to eight years in state prison, suspended execution of that sentence, and placed him on probation for five years.

Appellant Batsheva Cohen contends that the mutual restraining order that the trial court issued should not have been mutual but should have issued only against her neighbor Constance Sullivan. We disagree.
Substantial evidence supports the factual findings necessary to support the order, and Cohen has not demonstrated that the trial court abused its discretion in issuing a restraining order against her. We affirm.

Appellant Kendrick D. Chester challenges his convictions for robbery and possession of a firearm by a felon. He contends that the trial court violated his constitutional rights by denying his requests to substitute his retained counsel and to represent himself, by admitting a tainted in-court identification of him, and by refusing to sever the charges into separate trials. We affirm.

Following revocation of probation imposed by a negotiated plea agreement, Jonathan Lamar Askew (defendant) was sentenced to eight months in state prison to run consecutively with the agreed upon term of 21 years from the prior case. Defendant then filed an appeal challenging the trial court’s calculation of his presentence custody credits for both of his cases. Given gaps in the record, we remanded the matter to the trial court with directions. While on remand, defendant claimed his 21-year sentence from the prior case was unauthorized and filed a motion for modification of his sentence and requested that he be allowed to withdraw his plea based on that illegality. The trial court granted defendant’s request to modify his sentence, but denied his request to withdraw his plea. Defendant now appeals the modified judgment contending the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by altering the plea agreement without his consent, and violated his right to withdraw from the unlawful pl

Attorney Richard J. Sullivan appeals the trial court’s October 15, 2015 order denying his motion to vacate an October 18, 2012 sanctions order requiring him to pay $2,500 pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7. He contends that because the underlying lawsuit had been ordered to arbitration at the time the trial court issued the sanctions order, it lacked jurisdiction over the matter and the sanctions award was void. We disagree, and therefore affirm.

Plaintiff Fermin Villa was injured when a car in which he was traveling struck a decorative boulder in the median of a public road located in Long Beach, California. Villa sued the defendant City of Long Beach for dangerous condition of public property, and the case was tried to a jury. On the second day of jury deliberations, an alternate juror submitted a note to the trial court in which she reported that the jurors were discussing their life experiences, such as their professional experience as an engineer, and asked that the jurors be redirected to focus on the evidence. While the court was considering the note, the jury reached a verdict, finding by a vote of nine to three that the property was not in a dangerous condition. The court took the verdict and discharged the jury without investigating the note or disclosing its existence to counsel. After Villa’s counsel learned of the note, he filed a motion for a new trial pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 657. The