CA Unpub Decisions

During an audiotaped police interview, defendant and appellant Jose Venegas (defendant) confessed to shooting 19-year-old victim Kenneth Deras (Deras). Defendant, a member of the Metro 13 criminal street gang, told the police he shot Deras, a member of rival gang South Side Montebello, in self-defense. The claim of self-defense was not the defense at trial, however; instead, defendant argued he was not the shooter and falsely confessed to the contrary only under pressure. The jury rejected that defense and found defendant guilty of first degree murder. In this appeal from his conviction, we consider defendant’s challenge to the admission at trial of certain cell-phone-related evidence, as well as defendant’s contentions that the prosecution committed prejudicial Griffin error (i.e., commenting on defendant’s decision not to testify) and improperly displayed a slide not in evidence during closing argument.

Due process protects a defendant from vindictive prosecution, that is, an increase in sentence or charges after his or her exercise of a constitutional or statutory right under circumstances that are deemed to present a reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness. After petitioner Cleamon Demone Johnson’s two first degree murder convictions were overturned by the California Supreme Court in 2011, on remand the People charged him, in addition to the two original murders, with four additional crimes: three murders and an attempted murder committed in the early and mid-1990s, as well as gang enhancements on the original and new charges. In this writ proceeding, we consider and reject Johnson’s contention that the new charges and enhancement allegations must be dismissed as vindictive. We hold that, assuming a presumption of vindictiveness arose, the People successfully rebutted it. The fact Johnson no longer stands convicted of any crime is an objective change in circumstances that l

A jury convicted Robert Antonio Ramirez of two counts of attempted murder, two counts of assault with a firearm and one count of shooting at an inhabited dwelling and found true special criminal street gang and firearm-use enhancement allegations. On appeal Ramirez, who was found guilty on an aiding and abetting theory, contends his convictions should be reversed because the natural and probable consequences doctrine relied on by the People was inapplicable to the facts of the case. Ramirez also contends the gang expert’s opinion was based on inadmissible testimonial hearsay and there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding the charged offenses were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang. We affirm.

Plaintiff 1500 Viewsite Terrace LLC appeals from the judgment dismissing its lawsuit entered after the trial court granted three separate summary judgment motions brought by defendants First American Title Insurance Company (First American), California Title Company (CTC), and Pickford Escrow, Inc. (Pickford). Plaintiff also separately appeals from the order awarding attorney’s fees and costs to Pickford (Civ. Code, § 1717). We consolidated the appeals. We hold that defendants’ motions demonstrated their entitlement to summary judgment as a matter of law and in opposition, plaintiff failed to dispute a material fact. We also hold that the attorney’s fee provision in the escrow instructions was not adhesive. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment and the attorney’s fee order.

A jury convicted Javier Banuelos (Banuelos) of conspiracy to murder one victim, the attempted premeditated murder of another victim, and four other counts, with firearm and gang enhancements. The trial court sentenced Banuelos to an aggregate term of 51 years to life. Banuelos filed a direct appeal. He also filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus. We ordered that the petition be considered with the appeal, and we resolve the appeal and the petition in this opinion.
We reverse in part the judgment on appeal and we deny the petition for habeas corpus.

Petitioner X.F., mother of two-year old U.M., challenges the Contra Costa County Juvenile Court’s June 21, 2017 order setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing and denying her reunification services. Specifically, mother argues that the juvenile court erred when it concluded that mother failed to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that it was in U.M.’s best interest that she receive reunification services. In addition, mother contends that the juvenile court erred when it reduced her visitation with minor at the time it set the section 366.26 hearing. Having reviewed each of mother’s contentions, we conclude they lack merit. Accordingly, and for the reasons given below, we deny the petition.

Derrick Childs appeals in propria persona (pro. per.) from a domestic violence restraining order. He argues there was insufficient evidence to support the issuance of the order. Because we lack a sufficient record to evaluate his claims, we shall affirm the order.

Appellant Peter Quiambao was discharged from his position as a transit operator and challenged his dismissal pursuant to the grievance procedures authorized by his employer, the San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency (Muni), and his union. The union ultimately sought binding private arbitration, which affirmed appellant’s dismissal. Appellant filed both a writ of mandamus and a motion to vacate the arbitration award before the trial court. On appeal, appellant claims he lacked standing to appeal the arbitration award and it was improperly denied on the merits. He further claims the trial court erred in sustaining Muni’s demurrer to the writ of mandamus.

Defendant James Ray Washington appeals from the trial court’s denial of his application to redesignate his 2002 felony conviction for possession of cocaine as a misdemeanor pursuant to Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act of 2014 (Proposition 47). The trial court concluded that defendant’s 2004 conviction for second degree robbery, for which he is serving an indeterminate term of 25 years to life under the Three Strikes law, disqualified him from relief under Proposition 47. For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that the 2004 second degree robbery conviction did not disqualify defendant from relief and, accordingly, reverse and remand to the trial court with directions to redesignate his 2002 felony conviction for possession of cocaine as a misdemeanor.

This is an appeal from the trial court’s denial of Christopher R. Helm’s (appellant) petition under Proposition 47 to have one of his prior felony convictions reclassified as a misdemeanor conviction. In his original appeal, we affirmed the denial of his petition on the ground that appellant had failed to present any evidence that the value of the stolen items was less than $950, the threshold for resentencing under Proposition 47. (People v. Helm (March 30, 2016, A144595) [nonpub. opn.], review granted June 8, 2016 (Helm I).)
Appellant filed a petition for review, and the California Supreme Court granted review and held the case along with numerous other similar cases. On August 16, 2017, the Supreme Court transferred the case back to this court for reconsideration in light of People v. Romanowski (2017) 2 Cal.5th 903 (Romanowski).

Plaintiff Donald Ray Hopkins (Hopkins) appeals from judgments in favor of defendants Homeward Residential, Inc. (Homeward) and Citibank, N.A. (Citi) following the trial court’s orders sustaining defendants’ demurrers to Hopkins’s fifth amended complaint without leave to amend.
Hopkins took out a loan secured by a deed of trust on his home. Homeward serviced the loan for the lender, and Hopkins made loan payments to Homeward through a checking account he had with Citi. Hopkins sued Homeward, Citi, and the lender, alleging they conspired “to engage [in] an illegal hard money lending and foreclosure scheme.” Essentially, he claimed that he always made or tried to make timely loan payments, but starting in July 2010, defendants conspired to misplace or misallocate his loan payments. This allegedly resulted in Homeward wrongly charging Hopkins late fees, which eventually caused him to stop making loan payments.

This is one of several related appeals in a representative action brought by plaintiffs Amy Lynn Baillie and Kathrine Rosas against various individuals and corporate entities allegedly involved in illegal internet payday loan practices. Plaintiff Baillie initially filed this lawsuit in May 2007 on behalf of “[a]ll persons . . . who . . . entered into Instant Cash Agreements with Defendant Lenders” by means of the “same standard form agreement.” Plaintiff asserts causes of action for usury and/or unconscionable lending and violation of the Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq. Several named defendants have been dismissed from or otherwise resolved this litigation. Respondents Processing Solutions, LLC (PSL), First East, Inc. (First East), and InstantCashUSA, Inc. (ICU), remain, as do several other defendants not involved in this particular appeal, which involves a court order denying plaintiffs’ motions for class certification and for further discovery on cla

This appeal arises from a lawsuit brought by plaintiff/appellant Kathrine Rosas, as private attorney general and on behalf of herself and all other similarly situated persons, against numerous defendants based upon their purported involvement in illegal internet payday loan practices. The particular rulings challenged herein are the trial court’s denial of plaintiff’s motion for further discovery and grant of the motion to quash service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction and to dismiss filed by specially appearing defendants/respondents Blaine Tucker and Scott Tucker (hereinafter, the Tuckers). The Tuckers argued, and the trial court agreed, that there was no evidence in this record of their involvement in usurious lending activity intentionally directed at California and that plaintiff’s efforts to obtain relevant evidence that might be in the possession of a group of named defendants not involved in this appeal, referred to herein as the “Tribal Entities,” are

This is an appeal from an order by the trial court granting a motion to quash service of summons for lack of jurisdiction and to dismiss by specially appearing defendant and respondent AMG Services, Inc. (hereinafter, AMG). Plaintiff Kathrine Rosas brought this lawsuit, as both private attorney general and on behalf of herself and all other similarly situated persons, against numerous defendants, including individuals Scott Tucker and Blaine Tucker and several corporate and tribal entities associated with them, based upon their purported involvement in an illegal internet payday loan operation. Relevant to this appeal, the trial court found AMG, a wholly-owned subsidiary of former defendant Miami Tribe of Oklahoma, a federally recognized Indian tribe, immune from suit pursuant to the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity. On this basis, the trial court then granted AMG’s motion to quash and dismissed the action as to it.